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INTRODUCTION
In our straightforward, everyday attitude, it is common to acknowledge that social groups
exist, that we live our lives amidst other community members, and that we have experiences
related to being within or opposed to certain groups (friends, family, co-workers, fellow citizens,
strangers, etc.). From a philosophical standpoint, however, these are far from uncontroversial
matters. The topic of this dissertation is the concept of community (Gemeinschaft) in the
philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1939). My primary argument is that Husserl has a
sophisticated conception of personal community which is firmly rooted in his theory of parts and
wholes, that is, in his formal mereology. The full extent to which Husserl’s concept of
community draws on his mereology has not been addressed in the secondary literature. There are
two broad questions to which this dissertation serves as an answer. First: What exactly does
Husserl mean when he writes about community? The second question: What relevance can
Husserl’s concept of community have to problems in social and political philosophy? Chapters I,
II, and III provide answers to the first question while Chapters IV and V serve as answers to the
second question. Each chapter has its own argument which together act as support for my
primary argument.
In what follows in this introduction, I first clarify the main technical terms used in the
dissertation (§1). I contextualize the concept of community within Husserl’s larger philosophical
project (§2). My project is further motivated by looking at some of the conflicting interpretations
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of Husserl that have arisen in the secondary literature (§3). Finally, I provide short chapter
summaries (§4).
§1. Clarifying Terms
It is first important to clarify the sense in which I am using “community,” since it’s a
loaded term in both philosophical and non-philosophical parlance. The sense of community as I
am using it is how I claim Husserl uses it, as I argue in the following chapters. For now, let
“community” designate any non-arbitrary personal association, that is, any non-arbitrary
grouping of two or more persons.1 By non-arbitrary, I mean that the members of the group in
question will have something in common (such as a shared interest, world, activity, value, or
goal) that is of relevance within a socio-cultural context. On such an account, a chess club will
count as a community in virtue of the shared interests and activities of its members regarding the
game of chess; the citizens of the United States will count as a community in virtue of a shared
citizenship status, including the rights and obligations belonging to members. The set of all
brunette males in Chicago, however, will not count as a distinct personal community. The latter
is not a community in the technical sense appealed to here insofar as these bodily characteristics
are not relevant on their own to speak to groupings based on socio-cultural traits such as
common interests or activities; this grouping is arbitrary.2 Husserl uses “community” as a broad

The descriptor “personal” means that I’m focusing on Husserl’s conception of relationships of persons and not
“lower level” communities such as the intersubjective community (the “transcendental We”) constituting the
objective world. Cf. CM, pp. 120-121.
1

Cf. McIntyre (2013). This is not to suggest that the latter group could not become a community in the sense I’m
using the term through the arising of community-forming circumstances. Carr (1986) also makes this claim. Cf.
Steinbock (1995), p. 193: “Steering us away from biologically rooted conceptions of generation, home, and by
implication race, Husserl will maintain that generative connections arise by participating in a community as in a
tradition; it concerns various styles of a homelife, taking up or rejecting the values of a homeworld, repeating or
criticizing life and culture through past and future generations.”
2
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term that encapsulates groupings such as a family, a friendship, civil society, or a political state.
This usage will of course need to be explained and defended. I present the criteria Husserl uses to
distinguish between a community (Gemeinschaft) and a mere collection (blosse Kollectiv).
Furthermore, I argue that Husserl provides criteria for distinguishing between different kinds of
communities ranging from loosely-bound to tightly-knit groupings.
This terminological clarification is important insofar as “community” has historically
been contrasted with terms like “society” or with concepts such as mere collections or heaps.
Ferdinand Tönnies, one of Husserl’s contemporaries, famously distinguishes between
communities (Gemeinschaften) and societies (Gesellschaften).3 Communities are, according to
Tönnies, tightly knit personal associations that are explicitly and inwardly bound together by
mutual feelings of concord.4 Societies, on the other hand, are put forth by Tönnies as mechanical
aggregations of persons, each driven by self-interest and bound at best by an alignment with
moral and legal conventions.5
The prominence of Tönnies distinction in the philosophical and social scientific literature
discourages the use of a single term for such a wide array of social formations, but my reason for
remaining with this term is grounded in Husserl’s writing, insofar as he uses “community” more
liberally than Tönnies. Husserl’s use of the term “Gemeinschaft” and its cognates is broader than
we would expect it to be if he were simply deploying it in the manner of Tönnies. Husserl speaks

3

Cf. Tönnies (2000), pp. 18-19.

4

Cf. Tönnies (2000), pp 27-28.

5

Cf. Tönnies (2000), pp. 61-62.
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of communal forms such as family communities6, linguistic communities7, the supranational
European community8, the philosophical community9, practical communities of will10, the
community of love11, scientific communities12, and communities founded on law13. In this way,
societies in Tönnies’s sense will have the same ontological structure as communities in Husserl’s
sense. One might therefore wonder how all of these groupings hang together for Husserl, or
whether this is only an accidental, nominal identity. As I show, this is not an accidental use of
terminology. Despite this breadth of usage, Husserl distinguishes between different types of nonarbitrary personal associations, and these distinctions are drawn on the basis of different kinds of
relations between parts and wholes.14
When reading Husserl’s writings, one encounters a diction that is to be expected in
informal discussions of community, including terms like “unity” (Einheit), “reciprocal”
(wechselseitige), “inwardness” (Innerlichkeit), and in some cases “intimacy” (Innigkeit).
Colloquially, we can consider communities as unities such that members have harmonious
relationships with each other. We often speak of unity in the rallying together of a community or

6

Hua XIV, pp. 175-179, Crisis, p. 259.

7

Hua XIV, pp. 182-183; Crisis, p 209; OG, pp. 358-360; Ideas II, p. 329.

8

VL, pp. 269-299, Crisis, p. 209.

9

VL, pp. 276-280, 287.

10

Hua XIV, pp. 169-175.

11

Hua XIV, pp. 172-175.

12

Hua XIV, 183, 193; Crisis, p. 130, VL, p. 288; Crisis, p. 319; OG, p. 362; Ideas II, p. 392.

13

Ideas II, p. 200.

14

For Husserl, this is not yet phenomenology (or at least not transcendental phenomenology) insofar as we have not
performed the epoché. There has been no change of attitude here, so we’re not yet engaged in an examination of the
correlations between consciousness and world. Cf. Epilogue, pp. 411-412; APS, pp. 273-274
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of members feeling a sense of togetherness. An intimate community could informally be one
with shared history with members reciprocally knowing detailed information about each other
that is kept secret from outsiders. On such interpretations of Husserl’s diction, which I refer to as
“colloquial interpretations,” he provides only non-philosophical reflections on contingent
features or tendencies of communities and community life. Such features speak to what it is like
to experience harmonious interpersonal interactions. This interpretation is not so much wrong as
it is imprecise in relation to Husserl’s writings as the chapters below show. What is perhaps
unexpected is that these terms found in Husserl’s writings on community are not colloquial
expressions that he uses lightly; he is not simply “shooting from the hip.” These terms are
precisely delimited concepts from early on in Husserl’s career, from his 1900/1901 Logical
Investigations. These terms, more specifically, are used in his discussion of formal relations
between parts (Teile) and wholes (Ganzen), that is, in his mereology. Considering Husserl’s
concept of community from the perspective of how it is framed within his mereology is what I
refer to as the “technical interpretation.” It is this interpretation of his stance regarding the
concept of community I argue is correct.
§2. Contextualizing Husserl’s Project
Why does Husserl bother to talk about communities? Do these discussions fit into his
wider philosophical project or are they non-philosophical reflections on the social and political
events of Husserl’s surroundings? I suggest that the former is the case, even when motivated by
his milieu. Part of Husserl’s philosophical project is his interest in delimiting the foundations of
the sciences, and he’s committed to a pluralistic, non-reductive approach to that task. This
approach is pluralistic insofar as different sciences study objects belonging to distinct ontological

6
regions; it is non-reductive insofar as the meanings of these regions cannot simply be accounted
for by returning to a single ontological bedrock.15 One example of a reductive approach to the
founding of the sciences can be seen in eliminative materialisms that attempt to explain all
reality by appeal exclusively to physical reality.16 Husserl’s discussions of personal communities
arise, more specifically, insofar as he is attempting to demonstrate the types of objects that are of
fundamental interest to the humanities and social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Unlike
approaches to causal interactions in the physical sciences of material nature, Husserl thought that
the humanities were sciences that studied objects and relations of a unique type. This means that
the objectivity of the humanities should not be explained by appeal to spatio-temporal objects
interacting according to laws of physical causality.17 If that is true, then the humanities require
ontological clarification so that it can be made apparent what objects and states of affairs are to
be investigated and possibly known.
Husserl puts persons, cultural artifacts, historical events, and communities forth as
objects of a unique type that operate on the basis of causal laws of motivation (Motivation).
Motivational causality according to Husserl means that a subject is stimulated by an object to act
or react in a certain way, though this is not causally determined. Motivational causality refers to
reason-based stimulations and tendencies, but does not mechanically determine subjects as

15

Ideas I, p. 20.

We see this, for instance, in eliminative materialisms, or, in in Husserl’s own time, in versions of positivism and
psychologism.
16

Husserl provides a definition of naturalism in PRS, p. 169: “Naturalism is a phenomenon consequent upon the
discovery of nature, which is to say, nature considered as a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact laws of
nature.”
17
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physical causality determines material objects.18 Even though motivational causality lacks the
rigid determinacy of physical causality, Husserl still thinks there is a lawfulness to the way it is
operative in the lives of persons. For Husserl, socio-cultural objectivities belong to the region of
Geist, not nature.19
Another reason Husserl discusses communities is anecdotal, but can be elucidated by
appeal back to his philosophical endeavors. Having lived through WWI and its aftermath,
Husserl believed he was witnessing the diminution and potential dissolution of communities. In
his “Vienna Lecture” (1935), Husserl reflects on what he sees as a crisis in the status of
European culture:

Now clearly there exists the distinction between energetic thriving and atrophy, that is,
one can say, between health and sickness, even in communities, peoples, states.
Accordingly the question is not far removed: How does it happen that no scientific
medicine has ever developed in this sphere, a medicine for nations and supranational
communities?20

In the culmination of the same lecture, Husserl claims that a purely naturalistic approach to all of
the sciences threatens us with hostility and barbarity, dissolving communities (such as Europe) in
its wake.21 As early as his essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1910), Husserl wrote on
what he perceived as the dangerous implications arising from naturalism in the context of

18

Ideas II, pp. 147-148.

An account of Husserl’s conception of the spiritual world (geistigen Welt) will be given in the following sections,
but I mention it here to demonstrate the reasons Husserl gives for writing about communities.
19

20

VL, p. 270.

21

VL, p. 299.
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cultural practices.22 For Husserl, questions of methodology matter for philosophy, for scientific
determinations of subject-matter, and for our ordinary considerations of our communities and
ourselves. Approaching all science from a naturalistic perspective meant leaving a gap in our
ability to investigate the objects and states of affairs belonging to the socio-cultural world.23
Husserl interpreted some of his contemporary events as representing the dangers of a mindless
nationalism in place of individual responsibility and as the breakdown of the bonds holding
communities together.24 In place of communal bonds, Husserl thought that naturalistic
approaches to communities reduced societies to unrelated heaps of persons based entirely on
individual self-interest. In language that is explained in the following chapters, this amounts to
considerations of community understood as composed of independent pieces in the form of an
aggregation instead of dependent moments of a reciprocally founding community whole. There
are legitimate instances where one considers a community in regard exclusively to its headcount
(think, for instance, of population and demographic polling where aggregation is key), but
focusing on this alone is to do an ontological injustice to the community as a particular type of
object. This kind of injustice is ontological since we would be committing a category mistake.
As Husserl suggests, questions regarding physiology can legitimately disregard socio-cultural
contexts, but it would not be exhaustive or even accurate to consider human beings solely in
terms of their physiology.25 Husserl’s thematization of communities arises in this context of
PRS, p. 168: “But all this takes place, when we look at it from the standpoint of principle, in a form that form the
ground up is replete with erroneous theory; and from a practical point of view this means a growing danger for our
culture. It is important today to engage in a radical criticism of naturalistic philosophy.”
22

23

This methodological lacuna is also recognized in his “Kaizo articles.” Hua XXVII, p. 7.

24

Kaizo 1, p. 327.

25

Ideas II, p. 176.
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seeking foundations for the humanities and, relatedly, seeking to prevent the dissolution of
communities on the basis of an improper understanding of their structure.26 As such, these
discussions reside within the scope of his philosophical project.
Husserl considers some communities to be akin to large-scale persons, capable of being
healthy or sick like individual human bodies. Husserl is not alone in history or amidst his
contemporaries in evoking a person-like entity for the community. The image of the community
as a large-scale person or organism runs from Plato27 through modern28 and late-modern
conceptions of the body politic.29 In closer temporal and conceptual proximity, we find these
notions being used in the projects of other phenomenological philosophers such as Max
Scheler30, Edith Stein31, and Gerda Walther32. This dissertation focuses primarily on what is
collected in Husserl’s writings on community, even though other phenomenologists close to him

Buckley has a similar reading, especially on the relation between Husserl’s project of seeking scientific
foundations and practical-cultural implications. Cf. Buckley (1992), pp. 66-75.
26

27

Cf. Plato, Republic, 368c-369b.

Cf. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994: p. 3ff: “Art goes yet further,
imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a
COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and
strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended”; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, On the Social
Contract. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987: pp. 24-25: “At once, in place of the individual person of
each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members
as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will”.
28

29

Cf. Hegel, G. W. F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Wood trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1991), pp. 290-291.
30

Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Evanston: Northwestern University Press
(1973). See especially, ‘Formalism and Person,’ ‘ad. 4: Individual Person and Collective Person’ pp. 519-561.
31

Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities. Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000. See epsecially,
‘Second Treatise: Individual and Community,’ pp. 129-314.
Walther, Gerda, „Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften,“ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung (1923), pp. 1-158.
32
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were also working on this topic. The topics of community and of community understood as
analogous to large-scale persons was definitely “in the air” as he was writing, but I leave it for
another project to investigate the extent to which the claims in Husserl’s writings are entirely his
own or whether they are borrowed from his colleagues.33
§3. Conflicting Interpretations
Some of the difficulties discussed in the secondary literature regarding Husserl’s concept
of community are put forth as problems existing within Husserl’s writings. Other difficulties
arise when we compare different interpretations within the secondary literature itself. Many of
the ambivalences, tensions, and difficulties attributed to or related to interpretations of Husserl’s
concept of community are eliminated, I claim, if we appeal to his precise mereological terms. I
believe, in other words, that a neglect of the technical usage of terms has led to inconsistent
receptions of his concept of community.34 Many commentators recognize the presence of
Husserl’s concept of “founding” in his account of community. However, this requires further
supplementation by direct appeal to the entirety of his mereology, namely, to his notions of
pieces, moments, wholes, and mereological proximity. I here present the reception of Husserl’s

Sawicki (2003), for example, claims that much of the content of the “Kaizo articles” represent not Husserl’s own
work but that of his student, Edith Stein. This is a claim that is also often associated with his Ideas II.
33

Bernhard Waldenfels is a rare example of an interpreter of Husserl’s concept of community incorporating many of
the latter’s mereological concepts. Waldenfels heads in what I take to be the correct direction by focusing on
Husserl’s distinction between pieces, moments, and founded wholes to show why Husserl is precluded from
endorsing individualism or “organicism” regarding community ontological structure. More specifically, Waldenfels
focuses on Husserl’s concept of a social whole as incorporating the mereological structures of both
“interpenetration” and “association.” There is, nevertheless, much more explanatory work to be done in regard to
how components of Husserl’s mereology such as mereological proximity and intimacy are at work in this concept of
community. I take it that Waldenfels uses “organicism” in the same way I use “holism” in Chapter 1. Cf. Waldenfels
(1971), pp. 160-164.
34
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concept of community in broad brush-strokes. A much fuller consideration of these positions in
the secondary literature in relation to my own is provided in Chapter II.
In relation to some communities being understood as “personalities of a higher order,”
Philip Buckley claims there is an inherent tension in Husserl’s work. This tension arises insofar
as such communities seem to be simultaneously understood by Husserl as authentic collectives
while also emphasizing the necessity of authentic individuals thinking and acting on their own.35
John Drummond suggests that Husserl uses the concept of community in both a wide and narrow
sense. The wide sense refers to any associations of persons whatsoever, and is, according to
Drummond, better captured by the term “society” (Gesellschaft) rather than “community.” For
Drummond, the narrow sense is the technical sense of community for Husserl, referring to
intimate communities of explicitly cooperative and joint actions.36 Buckley and Drummond set
the bar high for what is to count as a community in Husserl’s work insofar as they highlight
instances such as authentic communities and groups of companions. Timo Miettinen, on the
other hand, provides considerably lower criteria for the achievement of communities in Husserl’s
sense, even when they are understood as “personalities of a higher order.” Miettinen claims that
“the idea of personality of a higher order does not say anything substantial about the different
modes of social or political co-existence but it merely points towards the formation of a sense of

35

Buckley (2000), p. 106. See also through p. 111.

Cf. Drummond (1996), p. 245: “Persons achieve a common understanding through communicative acts, and a
personal association, i.e., an association of persons or a society is thereby formed. But such associations are
communities only in a weak, imprecise sense. While Husserl often uses the term “community” and its cognates
when discussing such experiences and such associations, at other times he reserves the word “community” and its
cognates for a more intimately united intersubjectivity.”
36
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commonness.”37 David Carr is similar to Miettinen in where he sets the bar for what Husserl
counts as a community, suggesting that it is through a shared narrative or set of stories that a
community maintains its unity over time.38 Janet Donohoe points out that the concept of
community is a difficult one in Husserl’s works, since he at time suggests that the community is
a loose association of members while at other times suggesting that the community is a tightly
knit entity analogous to an individual subject.39 While Donohoe (like Buckley, Drummond,
Miettinen, and Carr) recognizes that Husserl’s concept of community is of a higher order whole
founded on its members as individual parts, neither she nor the others explicate the notion of
founding in relation to Husserl’s more complex theory of parts and wholes.40
A clarification of the structure of communities from the standpoint of Husserl’s own
theory of parts and wholes can referee these discussions and guard against mischaracterizations
that arise when we operate only with colloquially-influenced understandings of terms that belong
within a mereological context. Pitting colloquial interpretations against the technical
interpretation is itself a move made in Husserlian spirit. In his “Philosophy as a Rigorous
Science,” Husserl rhetorically asks: “Is it sufficient to use these words in the popular sense, in
the vague, completely chaotic sense they have taken on, we know not how, in the ‘history’ of
consciousness?”41 Indeed, Husserl coins the terms “sedimentation” (Sedimentierung) and
traditionalization (Traditionalisierung) for our tendency to take concepts as ready-made without

37

Miettinen (2013), pp. 216-217.

38

David Carr (1983).

39

Donohoe (2004), p. 136. This is also reflected in the above passage from the “Kaizo articles.”

40

Donohoe (2004), p. 138.

41

PRS, p. 177.
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inquiring back into their origins.42 In the face of this sedimentation, Husserl recommends a
method of questioning-back (Rückfrage) and explication (Verdeutlichung) to the original
meanings of our concepts.43 Understanding Husserl according to colloquial interpretations
prevents us from reaching essential features of personal communities as specific types of objects,
and instead only appeals to contingent experiences and tendencies of community formations. For
Husserl, though, there are essential features of communities and the experiences of members
therein that can be reached through phenomenological analyses.
§4. Chapter Summary
The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on Husserl’s concept of community in
general. The final two chapters turn to issues pertaining to political communities from a
Husserlian standpoint. In the first chapter, I investigate how Husserl’s account of the ontological
structure of community is tied to his formal theory of parts and wholes. I position his concept of
community in relation to two traditional theories found in the philosophy of the social sciences,
namely, individualism and holism. On that basis, I argue that Husserl’s concept of community is
an attractive alternative to both traditional theories.
My second chapter explicates the criteria Husserl uses in his taxonomy of community
types. Husserl makes distinctions between community types based on how loosely or tightly
members are bound together. By appealing to Husserl’s notion of “mereological proximity,” I
argue that anonymous and intimate forms of community organization are two poles that provide
a spectrum of community organization. This allows me to demonstrate how conflicting accounts

42

Crisis, p. 52. Cf. pp. 27, 72; OG, pp. 361-371; Ideas II, pp. 231-233.

43

Crisis, p. 71.
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of Husserl’s concept of some communities understood as “personalities of a higher order” can be
disambiguated in the secondary literature.
In chapter three, I provide a phenomenological analysis of the experience of community
from the first-person perspective of membership. For Husserl, consciousness includes a blend of
presence and absence for objects and their surrounding horizons, with this process occurring in a
unique way in the context of the experience of community membership. Interactions are
experienced differently for persons we know personally as opposed to unknown others, and
Husserl’s sophisticated account of the intentionality of consciousness provides the resources for
understanding these experiences.
On the heels of the ontological and phenomenological account of community as
explicated in the first three chapters, I turn in the final two chapters to the political sphere. Both
Chapters IV and V take their starting point with the account of political obligations given by
Margaret Gilbert. The fourth chapter provides an interpretation of political obligations from a
Husserlian perspective. I argue that Husserl has an advantage over Gilbert in accounting for
political obligations amidst unknown others in large communities having the features of
impersonality and anonymity. I proceed by way of a comparative analysis with Gilbert’s social
ontology, and specifically her affirmative answer to the political “membership problem.” Put
briefly, this problem asks whether membership within a political community obligates members
to uphold that community’s institutions. Husserl and Gilbert provide similar conceptions of
communities as being akin to individual subjects, which Gilbert refers to as “plural subject
theory.” Given a difficulty with Gilbert’s account of membership in groups having the features
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of impersonality and anonymity, I supplement her argument in the form of a Husserlian-inspired
answer to the “membership problem.”
In the fifth and final chapter, I put forth an interpretation of trust and betrayal within
political communities from the perspective of Husserl’s concept of community. This task is
accomplished by way of comparing Husserl’s notion of “crisis” with experiences of trust and
betrayal in political life. Problematic implications of Gilbert’s treatments of trust and betrayal are
identified, and I argue that at least one philosophical conception of trust fills the gap left in her
theory. More specifically, I argue for the complementary fit that Karen Jones’s conception of
trust understood as “basal security” provides for Gilbert. This conception of trust and betrayal is
tied back to Husserl’s notions of “original belief” and socio-cultural crisis. In that way, a
Husserlian approach to experiences of trust and crisis is put forth in the context of political
communities. By returning to Husserl, it becomes possible to thematize trust not just as a
positive notion that can then be betrayed, but promotes philosophical reflections that elucidate
prejudicial features of the world that have been taken for granted acting as the conditions of
possibility of such crises occurring in the first place.
With these five chapters, Husserl’s concept of community is elucidated. The main
argument that unifies these chapters is that Husserl’s concept of community is based on his
theory of parts and wholes. There are advantages to this approach in comparison with other
approaches to the concept of community, in comparison with other interpretations of Husserl on
this matter, and in relation to the applied topics of political obligations and trust.

CHAPTER I
HUSSERL’S ONTOLOGY OF COMMUNITIES AS
INTERTWINED PERSONAL SUBJECTIVITIES
§1. Introduction
In this chapter, I explicate and defend an interpretation of Husserl’s theory of personal
communities in the form of an ontology of community.1 My question focuses not on Husserl’s
conception of a “good” or “right” community, but of what he takes any community to be in
general.2 I begin by focusing on what for Husserl holds communities together by putting forth an
ontology of personal communities guided by his theory of parts and wholes (§2). Understanding
the context and terminology used in Husserl’s concept of community protects against
mischaracterizations of Husserl’s position as either individualistic or holistic (§3). This ontology
of personal communities, I argue, belongs to all forms of personal associations, even though
Husserl makes a distinction between, on the one hand, loosely organized or unorganized
communities, and on the other hand, highly organized communities understood as personalities
(a topic I explore in further detail in the next chapter). In the end of the present chapter, I argue
that Husserl provides a unique ontological account of the structure of communities that differs in
important ways from traditional ontological accounts. Moreover, it is not only that there are

Cf. Epilogue, p. 412. Husserl here mentions the possibility of a science of essence that investigates “the invariant,
properly essential structures of a soul or a community of psychic life.” He also makes this claim in Hua XXVII, p. 7.
1

2

Cf. Searle (2003).
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differences, but these differences matter since Husserl’s theory can circumvent difficulties facing
other theories.3
1.1 Ontological Problems in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
For Husserl, ontology is a science of objects and their essential, invariant (“eidetic”)
properties. His “formal ontology” is an account of what it means to be any type of object
whatsoever. “Material” or regional ontologies (plural) provide accounts of what it means to be an
object of a certain type.4 For instance, Husserl claims that material things, animal psyches, and
socio-cultural entities have different types of being. Personal communities, for Husserl, belong to
the socio-cultural domain of objects.
The main philosophical backdrop upon which I frame this chapter can be seen from the
kinds of answers given to the following question: When, if ever, is a plurality of persons a
community and when is it just a collection or a heap?5 Debate on this topic has unfolded in the
philosophy of the social sciences, social and political philosophy, and more recently in social
ontology. This question refers to an ontological distinction (what kind of thing is a community?),
and not in the first instance to an epistemological or methodological distinction (how do we
know or how should we scientifically investigate a community?). To illuminate Husserl’s theory
and to contextualize his writings amidst other philosophical approaches, I here introduce the

To accomplish these tasks, I draw primarily from the third of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the ‘Second Book’
of his Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, the Crisis and related “lifeworld” texts (Hua XXXIX), the intersubjectivity
volumes (Hua XIII, XIV, and XV), and the “Kaizo articles” (Hua XXVII).
3

4

Ideas I, pp. 20-32. Cf. Null (1997), pp. 237-241.

In broader philosophical discussions of ontology and mereology, this goes by the name of the “special composition
question.” Cf. Effingham (2013), p. 154.
5
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debate between ontological individualists and ontological holists regarding the structure of social
groups.6
Some philosophers have considered communities to be nothing more than the
aggregation of a specific group of individual persons and the activities of those individuals.7 I
refer to this position as individualism in the context of the ontology of social relationships.8
Some individualists deny that a community exists as a distinct entity beyond the aggregation of
its individuals. While we may ordinarily talk as though communities exist as distinct entities
such as when we say that a community is thriving or that a family went on a vacation, the
individualist position considers these references to be conventional tools at best, but conceptually
misleading category mistakes at worst.9 Individualists claim that a community exists only insofar
as it is the name we use for a collection of individual persons and each individual’s singular
agency, denying that there is something like a community as a distinct object apart from the
collection of individuals and their actions. The notion of corporate or collective agency as
actually existing, therefore, is seen by individualists to be false. Rather, these notions are taken
as being fictitious or illusory. From the perspective of methodology, social scientists influenced
by the individualist approach to community direct their attention exclusively to individuals and

6

Cf., Gilbert (1989), pp. 427-431.

7

Cf. Rosenberg (2016), chapter 9.

This has also gone by the name of “singularism” in the secondary literature. While I am here focusing on a
distinction between individualists and holists, Pettit (2014) and Koo (2016) point out that the questions of social
philosophy regarding the relationship between individuals and the community at large can be considered from at
least three perspectives. The distinction I am focusing on in their specific terminology, therefore, is between
singularism and corporatism.
8

9

Cf. Weber (1994), pp. 238-241.
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their interactions, but do not scientifically consider communities as entities themselves apart
from their headcount. One philosophical representative of this position is Jeremy Bentham:

The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are
considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is,
what is it?—the sum of the interest of the several members who compose it.10

Max Weber is one of the major representatives of this position in the field of sociology:

Action in the sense of a subjectively understandable orientation of behavior exists only as
the behavior of one or more individual human beings. […] For still other cognitive
purposes as, for instance, juristic, or for practical ends, it may on the other hand be
convenient or even indispensable to treat social collectivities, such as states, associations,
business corporations, foundations, as if they were individual persons. […] But for the
subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated
as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual
persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively
understandable action. […] When reference is made in a sociological context to a ‘state,’
a ‘nation,’ a ‘corporation,’ a ‘family,’ or an ‘army,’ only a certain kind of development of
actual or possible social actions of individual persons.11

For the ontological individualist, a community is equal to the sum of its members and their
actions. The individualist position suggests that investigating communities as separate entities
beyond their summation is a mistake akin to missing relevant trees (individual persons) for an
illusory forest (the community).
Other philosophers have considered communities as objects in their own right that cannot
be reduced to the aggregate of the existence and activities of individuals. I refer to this position
as holism in the context of the ontology of social relationships. Holists claim there is a

10

Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 1.IV.

11

Weber (1994), pp. 238-239.
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communal whole that exists as a distinct entity and deny that the community exists only as the
summation of individuals and their interactions. In other words, holists consider community to
be irreducible to its individual members. In addition to the individual members, holists claim that
there is something new that exists in the case of a community. On the basis of a holist account,
what is of primary methodological importance for social scientists is to understand a community
in its wholeness, arriving at an understanding of individuals only insofar as they are embedded
within the community. In the philosophical literature, many contemporary analytic social
ontologists, especially those like Gilbert, Pettit, and Schmid who belong to the “non-summative”
camp of social ontology, hold this position.12 According to such non-summative positions,
communities are objects that exist beyond their headcount, that is, they cannot be understood by
way of summation alone. Emile Durkheim is one of the major representatives of this position
from a sociological standpoint. For Durkheim, there are “social facts,” “social currents,” and
even “group minds” that exist in addition to individual persons.13 A community, therefore, is a
social fact that exists as a distinct object. Durkheim writes:

A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual
an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given
society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual
manifestations. […] Social phenomena are things and ought to be treated as things. […]
We must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves as distinct from the
consciously formed representations of them in the mind; we must study them objectively
as external things, for it is this character that they present to us. […] By their very nature,

12

Cf. Gilbert (1989); Szanto (2016), p.154. These are also social ontologists that belong to the camp of those
thematizing the sharedness of collective intentionality as arising from a shared “subject.” More is said on this topic
in Chapter IV.
13

Durkheim (1994), pp. 434-436.

21
they tend toward an independent existence outside the individual consciousnesses, which
they dominate.14

For the holist, the community is more than the sum of its parts, though different holists have
different conceptions of the nature of this surplus. Focusing exclusively on individuals according
to holists is a mistake akin to missing the relevant forest (the community) for fictive trees (nonsocial, individual persons).
The term “methodological” is occasionally prefixed to the camps of both individualism
and holism when discussed in the context of philosophy of the social sciences, and this indicates
that the discussion is of how to investigate groups.15 Many of the strongest formulations of the
individualist position arise regarding the question of social scientific methodology.16 These
formulations, however, do not explicitly address the ontological question regarding communities.
The methodological question asks how we should study communities and what we can know
about them. Nevertheless, one could in principle be a methodological individualist while at the
same time espousing ontological holism. In such a case, the community would be taken as a
distinct entity that is more than the sum of its parts, but it would be these parts (individual
persons) that would be studied by the social scientist. Inversely, one could in principle take
holism as a methodological starting point while advocating for ontological individualism
regarding the structure of communities. In such a case, the community would be taken simply as

14

Durkheim (1994), pp. 438-440.

15

Cf. Rosenberg (2016), p. 175.

Cf. Watkins, “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences”; Miller “Methodological Individualism
Reconsidered”; Kincaid “Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism” in Martin and McIntyre (eds.), Readings in the
Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994.
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the sum of individuals and their actions, yet would be scientifically approached by way of an
analysis of the functions the group as a whole embodies.17 Arguments given in favor of
methodological commitments in the philosophy of the social sciences are not here addressed, and
I focus exclusively on the ontological question. This decision does not amount to an
inconsistency with the claim made in my introductory chapter that Husserl’s philosophical
interest in the concept of community arises in his seeking appropriate methods for investigating
different ontological regions. For Husserl, ontological questions should precede and thereafter
guide methodological questions.18 I here do the same.
The philosophical problem I am setting the stage with regarding essential features of
communities arises as we entertain these two options: either communities are taken as mere
collections of individuals that add up to a community in summation, or there is a communal
whole existing over and beyond its individuals. Both of these traditional positions require their
proponents to face certain difficulties. Individualist conceptions of community focus on
individuals and individual agency which is pooled at most into the form of an aggregation. It is
then doubtful whether any of our ordinary group concepts (families, friendships, states, etc.)
refer to anything that actually exists besides its parts. This presents a difficulty for the ways we
tend to understand the worlds in which we live and the language we use in expressing that
understanding. Most if not all of us have some occasion to use group concepts in thought and in
practice, and it is not immediately clear that we would mean the same thing if we replaced our

17
18

Cf. Rosenberg (2016), Chapter 10.

In this way, the present and following chapter act as a guide for the discussion I will put forth in Chapter III
regarding the ways we experience belonging to a community from the inside. “The true method follows the nature of
the things to be investigated and not our prejudices and preconceptions.” PRS, p. 178.
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group concepts with individual concepts. The individualist position faces the more serious
philosophical difficulty of providing an account of the identity of a social group over time
through the addition and subtraction of members. The belief that a community is equivalent to
the summation of members means that each and every net addition or subtraction constitutes a
new community.19
Holists thematize the community as a distinct entity that can even be the bearer of group
agency. However, if this kind of agency is attributed to the group as a whole, then it is possible
that individual persons as parts are dissolved into the whole, such that the community
overpowers the agency of its individual members. On such an account, it is possible that there is
no such thing as individual agency, or that the effectiveness of individual agency in acting
contrary to the agency of the community is significantly undercut. Holism also faces the difficult
task of providing a philosophical account of what counts as existing in addition to the summation
of members. The numerical distinctness of individual persons and their individual actions lend
themselves to counts, but it is not immediately clear what kind of objectivity philosophers and
social scientists should seek as the “more” if we say a community is more than the sum of its
parts.
1.2 An Initial Characterization of Husserl’s Position
This debate forms a space within which I place my argument regarding Husserl’s concept
of community. An adequate theory of the structure of communities should be prepared to
By “net addition” and “net subtraction,” I mean to highlight changes in overall totals. In the case of one birth
simultaneous with one death in a community, the staunch individualist could account for identity over time by virtue
of the identity of the sum. In cases of non-equivalent counts of births and deaths, however, it becomes unclear
whether the individualist can account for the identity of the community. One potential solution open to the
individualist against this charge could be to account for unity through ranges. Then we might have a rough group
identity when there is, for instance, a group of 30-50 people, etc.
19
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withstand or at least face up to the objections that arise through this debate. Where does Husserl
stand in the context of this philosophical debate? To be sure, Husserl did not directly work
through this debate. I maintain, though, that he provides a consistent account of community, and
does so for the purpose of providing philosophical foundations for the humanities.20 This
conception, furthermore, is of direct interest to philosophers who thematize the ontological
problematic of communities, as I show. Husserl’s concept of community represents a middle
position for understanding community that differs from both ontological individualism and
holism. He is able to do this, I claim, by building his concept of communities on the basis of his
theory of parts, wholes, and founding.
In his conception of communities, Husserl evokes the image “humanity writ large”
(Menschen im Großen), describing at least some communities as “personalities of a higher
order.”21 These higher-order entities are put forth as person-like beings akin to individual
persons. For Husserl, the status of being of a higher order does not amount to communities being
entirely separable from the individuals making them up as advocated by the holist position.
Instead, the community is said to be necessarily founded upon its individuals and their actions.
As such, the community has no existence in the absence of its members and their actions.22

20

Cf. Staiti (2014).

Hua XXVII, p. 4 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “Ebendasselbe werden wir, ohne uns durch einen schwächlichen Pessimismus
und ideallosen „Realismus“ beirren zu lassen, auch für den „Menschen im Großen“, für die weiteren und weitesten
Gemeinschaften nicht unbesehen für unmöglich erachten dürfen, und die gleiche Kampfesgesinnung in Richtung auf
eine bessere Menschheit und eine echt humane Kultur werden wir als eine absolute ethische Forderung anerkennen
müssen.”
21

22

Husserl draws an explicit analogy between the ontological structure of human persons and that of communities:
“The human spirit, after all, is grounded on the human physis; each individual human psychic life is founded upon
corporeity, and thus each community upon the bodies of the individual human beings who are members of it” VL, p.
271. Cf. Buckley (1992), pp. 113-114.. Husserl’s notion of “founding” is a crucial topic from his theory of parts and
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In a frequently quoted passage from his “Kaizo articles” condensing his concept of
community, Husserl states that:

The community is a personal and, as it were, many-headed yet interconnected
subjectivity. Individuals are its members, functionally intertwined through multifaceted,
interpersonal, spiritually unifying ‘social acts’ (I-Thou-acts; instructions, appointments,
activities of love, etc.). At times, a community functions as many-headed, yet is in a
higher sense ‘headless’: namely, without having the unity of a focused, willing
subjectivity that acts analogous to an individual subject. But it can also take on a higher
form of life and become a ‘personality of a higher order,’ not as the carrying out of
community performances that are the mere combined formations of individual personal
achievements, but in the true sense of communal personal achievements as such, realized
in their striving and willing.23

There is one general claim regarding community at the beginning of this passage followed by
two specific examples of community forms. The main component of this passage is its
designation of communities as higher order, intertwined personal subjectivities. Communities are
subjectivities of a higher order insofar as they are founded on individual members, and the unity
of the community is sustained on the basis of “social acts.” The interconnected (verbunden),
intertwined (verflochten) properties of a community in Husserl’s account means that it is a
whole, and individual persons are its parts in the form of being community members.

wholes that I unpack in what follows, but this passage serves to initially highlight the founded component of his
position regarding communities.
Hua XXVII, p. 22: “Die Gemeinschaft ist eine personale, sozusagen vielköpfige und doch verbundene
Subjektivität. Ihre Einzelpersonen sind ihre “Glieder”, funktionell miteinander verflochten durch vielgestalitige,
Person mit Person geistig einigende “soziale Akte” (Ich-Du-Akte; Befehle, Verabredungen, Liebestätigkeiten usw.).
Zeitweise fungiert eine Gemeinschaft vielkopfig und doch in einem höheren Sinne “kopflos”; nämlich ohne dass sie
sich zur Einheit einer Willenssubjektivität konzentrierte und analog wie ein Einzelsubjekt handelte. Sie kann aber
auch diese höherer Lebensform annehmen und zu einer “Personalität höherer Ordnung” werden und als solche
Gemeinschaftsleistungen vollziehen, die nicht blosse Zusammenbildungen von einzelpersonalen Leistungen sind,
sondern im wahren Sinne persönliche Leistungen der Gemeinschaft als solcher, in ihrem Streben und Wollen
realisierte.”
23
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Husserl’s conception of community resists being neatly grouped under the headings of
ontological individualism or holism as presented above. The plurality of members and their
interactions are invaluable for the life of the community, and for that reason we find partial
resonances with individualism. Indeed, there cannot be a “many-headed” community without a
plurality of persons. At the same time, though, the community is said to possess its own unified
existence as an intertwined, unified entity, and so has partial resonances with holism. In addition
to the collection of individual community members, there is for Husserl a bond holding them
together. My argument in what follows is that Husserl is able to hold his unique concept of
community not simply by combining some of what is found in individualism with some of what
is found in holism. Rather, Husserl’s position is built on a sophisticated ontology that neither
individualists nor holists entirely endorse.24 I argue that Husserl’s position on community is
clarified when read in conjunction with his theory of parts and wholes. More specifically,
understanding Husserl’s conception of mereological founding illuminates his formulation of the
concept of community.25 Husserl’s unique account of community is not an example of either
ontological individualism or ontological holism. Both accounts of the existence of community
are problematic from Husserl’s perspective for different reasons. Individualism is problematic
from Husserl’s perspective insofar as he believes communities exist as more than mere
aggregations. To focus exclusively on communities as aggregations of individuals is, for Husserl,

Husserl’s position here, relative to ontological individualists and holists, is similar to the position advanced by
Margaret Gilbert. This is a topic I return to in Chapter IV. Cf. Gilbert (1989), pp. 427-431.
24

25

The remainder of the above passage presents two types of community. The first type of community understood as
a loosely organized or relatively unorganized entity that still functions as a unified whole, and the second is of a
tightly-knit community that is explicitly unified in its cooperative valuing and willing. This distinction of
community types deserves further attention and is the sole focus of Chapter II.

27
to be led by naturalism into thinking that physical and psychophysical reality is all that exists.
Holism is problematic from Husserl’s perspective insofar as communities inextricably depend on
the actions of individual members for their existence. Understanding this dependence means
understanding his notion of founding, which precludes the possibility of a community as an
overarching or dominating entity with a mind of its own.
In the direction of carving out his own position in the context of the philosophy of the
social sciences, Husserl says:

Only an originary social science can arrive at an explicit understanding and a real
clarification of [regularities in social statistics]; that is, a social science that brings social
phenomena to direct givenness and investigates them according to their essence.26
The originality of Husserl’s position can be seen through the way he incorporates his mereology.
For Husserl, communities exist and have a distinct ontological structure which does not dissolve
(auflösen) its constituent members into the whole to which they belong.27 Communities are,
nevertheless, said by Husserl to exist and be founded on the lives of individual members. Given
the options presented above regarding traditional philosophical conceptions of communities and
their difficulties, Husserl’s position, if it is to be coherent, should at least be able to address these
difficulties.
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PRS, p. 174.

Hua XXVII, p. 48. Husserl’s point here is more specifically related to values. He writes that the community itself
has its own values, which are founded on the values of its members in the form of a higher value, without dissolving
the individual values.
27
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§2. Husserl’s Ontology of Communities as Subjectivities
2.1 The Socio-Cultural World
Contextualizing the scope of Husserl’s writings on community means looking first to his
account of the region of the socio-cultural, spiritual world. Husserl defines the spiritual world as
the “sum total of social subjects of lower or higher levels […] in communication with each other,
actually or in part actually in part potentially, together with the sum total of the social
Objectivities pertaining to it.”28 I here provide an analysis of both of these elements (social
subjects and social objectivities), and show how they are essentially correlated. This provides an
account of the different parts of communities, setting the stage for the next section regarding how
these parts and wholes belong together in the form of a unity.
Social subjects are associations (Verbindungen) of persons. To be an association, they
must consist of two or more persons. These intersubjective unities possess what Husserl refers to
as their own “inwardness” (Innerlichkeit).29 On this account, a social subject’s inwardness means
that two or more persons have a shared socio-cultural surrounding world, and their being
together is more than being externally grouped together according to an arbitrary principle. The
inwardness of a personal association designates that members of a group are capable of
experiencing bonds of commonness through their thinking, valuing, or acting.30 This inwardness
28

Ideas II, pp. 206-207.

Hua XXVII, p. 8: “Abgesehen davon, daß die zeiträumliche Form im Reiche des Geistes (z.B. in der Historie)
einen wesentlich anderen Sinn hat als in der physischen Natur, ist hier darauf hinzuweisen, daß jede einzelne
geistige Realität ihre Innerlichkeit hat, ein in sich geschlossenes „Bewußtseinsleben“, bezogen auf ein „Ich“,
sozusagen als einen alle einzelnen Bewußtseinsakte zentrierenden Pol, wobei diese Akte in Zusammenhängen der
„Motivation“ stehen.”
29

I will have more to say on the concept of intimacy in the next chapter when I turn to Husserl’s conception of
communities understood as personalities of a higher order. “[It] should also be pointed out that every single spiritual
reality has its own inwardness, a self-contained life of consciousness which is related to an ‘ego,’ so to speak, as a
centripetal pole of all particular acts of consciousness, whereby these acts stand in ‘motivational’ connections.”
30
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means, then, that members are motivated in the same ways. Communities are inwardly bound, on
this picture, based on features such as shared interests, ideas, or concerns.31 While an arbitrary
collection or aggregation of human beings could be accounted for from the perspective of thirdperson “exteriority” by simply tallying up the members of the group in question, a personal
community is unique insofar as it possesses a “surplus” of meaning beyond its headcount. This is
analogous to the surplus (Plus) Husserl describes in regard to the apprehension of individual
persons over and above their physiological existence, but in the present context this surplus is
one that belongs to the social subjectivity itself as an association, and not the individual person.32
Husserl in some places designates this intersubjective inwardness with the concept of
“communal spirit” or “shared mind” (Gemeingeist).33 On the face of it, this notion suggests a
“hive mind” in the sense of forces and factors operating behind the conscious awareness of
individual persons, leading them to unknowingly act in one way rather than another. On that
basis we would rightfully have reason to worry that Husserl was leading us to the difficulties
associated with holism, especially relating to the loss of individual agency in place of an
overpowering group agency. This is an avenue left open for a colloquial interpretation insofar as

Husserl, “Renewal: Its Problem and Method,” [Allen trans., p. 328-329] (Hua XXVII, p. 8). Regarding the inward
life of a social subject, see also VL, p. 273 and Ideas II, p. 206.
Cf. McIntyre (2013), p. 82: “True communities are interest-oriented.” This topic is returned to in Chapter III,
where I specifically argue that there is more to Husserl’s account of community membership than just shared
interests.
31

“But one thing is striking: the apprehension in which the human being is given to us in the human Body, the
apprehension in which the human being is given as a person who lives, acts, and undergoes, and of whom we are
conscious as a real person who behaves under the circumstances of his personal life now in this way and now in that
way, seem to contain a surplus [Plus] which does not present itself as a mere complex of constitutive moments of
apprehension of the type we have described.” Ideas II, p. 147.
32

33

Hua XIV, pp. 165-204; Ideas II, pp. 208-209, 219, 255; PRS, pp. 188, 190.
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we remain with popular conceptual connotations.34 However, Husserl’s usage of “communal
spirit” is less mysterious than this quick interpretation would suggest. To be a part of a social
subjectivity – belonging to a “communal spirit” – does not mean thinking and acting in an
identical fashion with others, but instead refers to a set of shared presuppositions, positions, and
constraints held between pluralities of individuals.35 By virtue of having any kind of shared
socio-cultural interests or values, we approach our worlds in similar fashion. It is not that there is
a dominating current that shapes a shared world for members; rather, there is here a shared
background that creates the space of expectations and possibilities for members. For example,
Husserl writes:
The common, associated personality as a “subject” of shared achievements is on the one
hand an analogue of the individual subject, but on the other hand is not only an analogue
but is an associated multiplicity of persons which has in its connection a unity of
consciousness (a communicative unity). Within the plurality of dispersed wills of
individuals, there exists for them all an identically constituted will, which has no other
place, and no other substrate than that of the communicative plurality of persons; and so
also for other “uniform,” socially constituted acts. Each ego is the subject of an action,
but each in a function, and such is the associated unity of any full subject. It is a common
substrate; as the ego, the person substrate is for their particular individual acts and lasting
acts, so the communicative personal plurality is substrate: it is no multiplicity, but a unity
founded in the multiplicities, and is a substrate for “acts” as particular acts and for
enduring acts, acts which are themselves constituted unities of a higher level, which have
their founding sublevels in the relevant individual personal acts.36
For example, Bryce Huebner writes from the perspective of experimental psychology that “people routinely
interpret the behavior of courts, churches, states, hiring committees, and corporations in ways that invoke intentional
ascriptions,” and that “people willingly ascribe beliefs and desires to human and non-human animals, robots,
supernatural agents, and groups.”
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The structure of such community constrains understood as constraints to the wills of community members are
addressed in Chapters III and IV.
Hua XIV, pp. 200-201: “Die gemeinsame, die verbundene Personalität als „Subjekt" der gemeinsamen Leistung ist
einerseits Analogon eines individuellen Subjekts, andererseits aber nicht bloss Analogon, sie ist eine verbundene
Personenvielheit, die in ihrer Verbindung eine Einheit des Bewusstseins (eine kommunikative Einheit) hat.
Innerhalb der Vielheit der auf die Einzelpersonen verteilten Willen hat sie einen für sie alle identisch konstituierten
Willen, der keinen anderen Ort, kein anderes Substrat hat als die kommunikative Personenvielheit; und so für andere
„einheitlich”, sozial konstituierte Akte, jedes Ich ist Subjekt der Handlung, aber jedes in einer Funktion, und so ist
36
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Husserl thereby understands a community as a unified, shared substrate with a shared
surrounding world analogous to an individual subjectivity with its surroundings.37 The
community exists as a subjectivity insofar as it represents a unity that holds between
multiplicities of associated persons. Such a unity at the community level is akin to the synthesis
holding together an individual subject’s temporally distinct experiences into the unified form of a
single life.
Inextricably correlated with the internal bonds of social subjects are what Husserl calls
social objectivities, that is, objects and states of affairs possessing their meaning as shared for the
members of a specific social subjectivity. Husserl captures the arrangement of this set as the
“surrounding world” (Umwelt) of culture, referring to sedimented socio-cultural and historical
meanings that characterize persons and objects that are given to members of a personal
association.38 For instance, Husserl suggests that a group of friends will have a privileged and
shared “external world.”39 In this way, the members of a personal association encounter

die verbundene Einheit aller Vollsubjekt. Es ist ein einheitliches Substrat; wie das Ich, die Person, Substrat ist für
ihre individuellen Akteinzelheiten und bleibenden Akte, so ist die kommunikative Personenvielheit Substrat: Sie ist
da keine Vielheit, sondern eine in Vielheiten fundierte Einheit, und sie ist Substrat für „Akte” als Akteinzelheiten
und für bleibende Akte, Akte, die selbst konstitutive Einheiten höherer Stufe sind, die ihre fundierenden Unterstufen
in den betreffenden einzelpersonalen Akten haben.”
37

More is said about this feature from the phenomenological side in Chapter III.

“As person, I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as subject of a surrounding world. The concepts
of Ego and surrounding world are related to one another inseparably. Thereby to each person belongs his
surrounding world, while at the same time a plurality of persons in communication with one another has a common
surrounding world.” Ideas II, p. 195.
38
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Ideas II, pp. 205-206.
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components of their world in similar fashion based on this bond.40 The surrounding world of a
group of mathematicians includes ideal mathematical objects that their non-mathematical friends
may not encounter (though they could in principle come to have that same surrounding world
through a mathematical education).41 It is not only the case that individuals have their own
sensuous surrounding worlds; according to Husserl, the community itself has its own
surrounding world.

But the most significant fact remains that the community is not a mere collection (nicht
ein bloßes Kollektiv) of its individuals, and community life and its achievements are not a
mere collection of individual life and individual achievements. Rather, through all
individual being and individual living there passes a unity of life, and although it is
founded in individual lives, there is a communal surrounding world (gemeinschaftliche
Umwelt) that passes over the subjective surrounding worlds of the individuals and is
founded in them, such that in the individual’s own achievement there is constituted a
founded total achievement.42

The different members of a particular community are then understood as accessing particular
aspects of the shared surrounding world in question.

Consider, for instance, a group of friends who are “in” on an inside joke. They may on this basis be more attentive
to certain components of their surroundings that remind them of this joke. These components, however, need not
stand out to others who are not privy to the joke.
40

41

Regarding the ideal world of the mathematician, see Ideas II, p. 203. Regarding the openness of different
surrounding worlds to non-members, see CM, pp. 132-133.
Hua XXVII, p. 48: “Die bedeutsamste Tatsache ist aber die, daß die Gemeinschaft nicht ein bloßes Kollektiv der
einzelnen und das Gemeinschaftsleben und die Gemeinschaftsleistung nicht ein bloßes Kollektiv der Einzelleben
und der Einzelleistungen sind; sondern daß durch alles Einzelsein und Einzelleben eine Einheit des Lebens
hindurchgeht, obschon ein in Einzelleben fundiertes, daß über die subjektiven Umwelten der einzelnen hindurchgeht
eine in ihnen fundierte gemeinschaftliche Umwelt, daß in Leistungen der einzelnen als ein Eigenes sich eine in
ihnen fundierte Gesamtleistung konstituiert.”. See also Ideas II, pp. 191-192. This is addressed in further detail in
Chapter III.
42
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For Husserl, social subjects and social objectivities are two essentially correlated sides of
the socio-cultural, spiritual world.43 These two sides are only separable when considered
abstractly; concretely, however, the two always occur together.44 Furthermore, social subjects
can also become their own social objectivities through such abstract reflection:

Included in the surrounding world of such a circle [of friends], or, in general, of a social
subjectivity […] is, once again, this very subjectivity itself insofar as it too can become
an Object for itself, when the association relates back to itself, just as each individual
subject in it can also become an Object.45

This reflexivity is not something that necessarily occurs for members. Husserl is clear that this
kind of explicit reflexivity whereby a communal “we” becomes an object for its members is
quite rare. It is, nevertheless, an essential possibility.
When two or more persons share a world in common through activities, interests, or
values, they establish a non-arbitrary personal association in the form of a social subject. We
thereby get an initial indication of what Husserl means in the passage from the “Kaizo articles”
when he refers to a community as a “many-headed yet interconnected subjectivity.”46 This social
subjectivity refers to “inwardness” in the sense that members share something in common
“We are in a relation to a common surrounding world—we are in a personal association: these belong together.
We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand there for us in a community, in an
intentional linkage of our lives.” Ideas II, p. 201.
43

44

In terms of abstract separation, this is what Husserl means when talking about the one-sided separability of
ourselves from the social: “Each person has, ideally speaking, within his communicative surrounding world his
egoistic one insofar as he can ‘abstract’ from all relations of mutual understanding and from the apperception
founded therein, or, rather, insofar as he can think them as separated. In this sense there exists, therefore, ‘one-sided
separability’ of the one surrounding world in relation to the other, and the egoistic surrounding world forms an
essential nucleus for the communicative one in such a way that if the former is ever to be separated off, the
processes of abstraction needed for it have to come from the latter.” Ideas II, p. 203.
45

Ideas II, p. 206.

46

Hua XXVII, p. 22.
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beyond their outward or external existence as a mere collection.47 The personal association is
non-arbitrary insofar as the inwardness of the social subjectivity refers to a socio-cultural
commonality amongst members. This social subjectivity is essentially correlated with a set of
social objectivities, that is, with a common surrounding world.48 The sense in which the analogy
between individual and community holds is seen insofar as the inwardly unified social
subjectivity is a pole or substrate for its own surrounding world, akin to the surrounding world of
an individual subjectivity. It can then also be the case that the binding of a social subjectivity
provides the venue for more robust forms of close community organization such as goal-oriented
joint actions.
Husserl’s account of the structure of the socio-cultural, spiritual world provides an
understanding of the ontological region to which communities belong. The more specific
ontological structure at this point remains underdeveloped until it is explained how individual
members fit into the community in regard to the structure of parts and wholes. Pinning down
essential, invariant properties of communities requires further analysis. I now argue that
engaging in an immanent development is necessary in the form of reading Husserl’s conception
of communities through the lens of his own mereology.

47
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Cf. Waldenfels (1971), pp. 160-161.

Objects of the surrounding world are not only social subjectivities, but can also be cultural artifacts such as books
and tables. While objects like books are social objectivities insofar as they possess socio-cultural sense for members
of a social subjectivity, they are not themselves social subjectivities insofar as they lack consciousness. Cf. Ideas II,
§56h.
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2.2 Parts, Wholes, and Founding
Husserl’s theory of parts (Teile) and wholes (Ganzen), that is, his mereology, is given in
the ‘Third Investigation’ of the Logical Investigations. Sokolowski motivates the importance of
Husserl’s mereology by pointing to a remark made by Husserl in the foreword to its second
edition. Regarding the ‘Third Investigation,’ Husserl there says:

I have the impression that this Investigation is all too little read. I myself derived great
help from it: it is also an essential presupposition for the full understanding of the
Investigations which follow.49
Sokolowski claims that neglecting Husserl’s mereology could be disastrous for understanding
other portions of his thought: “It serves as the skeleton for Husserl’s more elaborate
philosophical doctrines about subjectivity and its world.”50 I agree with Sokolowski on this
point, and believe that this is also the case for coming to understand Husserl’s theory of
community.
Husserl introduces his mereology formally, delimiting the logical relations between parts
and wholes for any type of object or grouping of objects whatsoever. Making sense of his
mereology in the context of communities, then, means showing the ways in which this formal
doctrine is operative in his writings on the specific material region of the spiritual, socio-cultural
world. More specifically, the task here is to show how Husserl uses his mereology to write about
the topic of community.

49

LI, p. 7. Referenced in Sokolowski (1968).

50

Sokolowski (1968), p. 537.

36
For Husserl, complex objects are objects with parts and every part has an actual or
possible whole to which it belongs.51 Parts of a whole can either be pieces (Stücke) or moments
(Momente), and Husserl frames this distinction as being between independent (selbständigen)
and non-independent/dependent (unselbständigen) parts.52 Pieces are independent or potentially
independent parts; they can be detached from the whole while nevertheless continuing to exist.53
An example of pieces in relation to a whole are parts of a tree such as its branches, leaves, roots,
and so forth. These are pieces of the tree understood as a whole insofar as they could exist apart
from the tree itself; I can trim a tree’s branches and rake up leaves that have fallen to the ground.
Moments, on the other hand, are non-independent (dependent), abstract parts; they cannot exist
individually without supplementation from something else. An example Husserl gives of
moments in relation to wholes are spatial extension and color. We can abstractly separate the
notion of extension from that of color, but extension necessarily exists as colored and color
necessarily exists as extended in space. I cannot rake the green of a leaf into a bag while leaving
the extension of the leaf on my lawn. These are mutually dependent moments that are separable
only in abstraction.
Husserl also provides his theory of the relation between mediate and intermediate parts in
relation to a whole, demonstrating a metaphorical “distance” that obtains between parts of a
whole.

51

LI, p. 4.

52

LI, pp. 6, 29.

53

LI, pp. 20-22, 29.

37
If P(W) is a part of the whole W, then a part of this part, e.g., P(P(W)), is again a part of
the whole, but a mediate part. P(W) may then be called a relatively immediate part of the
whole.54

This distinction between mediate (mittelbarer) and immediate (unmittelbarer) parts also goes by
the names of remote (ferneren) and proximate (näheren) parts, and it is through these notions
that Husserl’s mereological (i.e., non-spatial) account of proximity is given.55 For convenience, I
from here forward refer to Husserl’s account of mediate and immediate parts as his account of
“mereological proximity.” To concretize this distinction, Husserl appeals to the example of a
melody understood as a unified whole.56 A melody is made up of parts which are individual
acoustic tones. Each tone, furthermore, has its own parts, which in this case are the moments of
its quality, intensity, and so forth. Both the tones and the parts of those tones are included in the
whole that is the melody, but these parts do not belong to the whole in identical fashion:

It is evident that the quality in itself only forms part of the melody in so far as it forms
part of the single tone: it belongs immediately to the latter, and only mediately to the total
tone-pattern. […] The difference is, however, not merely relative: in every whole there
are parts which belong directly to the whole, and not first to one of its parts.57

While the quality and intensity of the tone are parts of the melody, they are not parts in the same
way that the tones are parts of the melodic whole. To use Husserl’s terminology, tones here are
proximate, that is, more immediate and logically closer to the whole of the melody. The
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LI, p. 30-32.
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More is made of these notions of proximity and remoteness in Chapters II and III.

56

LI, p. 31.

57

LI, pp. 31, 32
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moments of quality and intensity, on the other hand, stand in a relatively mediate relation to the
melody as a whole. They are mediated in relation to the whole insofar as they contribute to the
whole through their being parts of parts, that is, as being moments of the tones. In this sense,
there is more mereological remoteness between the note-intensity and the melody than there is
between the single notes and the melody.
On Husserl’s account, parts and wholes exist based on relations of founding
(Fundierung). Approached formally, Husserl defines founding in the following way:

A content of the species A is founded upon a content of the species B if an A can by its
essence (i.e., lawfully, in virtue of its specific nature) not exist, unless a B also exists.58

Furthermore, Husserl claims that this concept of founding allows him to properly account for
what it means to be a whole:

By a whole we understand a range of contents which are all covered by a unitary
foundation without the help of further contents. The contents of such a range we call its
parts. Talk of the unity of the foundation implies that every content is foundationally
connected, whether directly or indirectly, with every content.59
Let’s return again to the example of the melody to concretize Husserl’s account of the
relationship of founding and founded. The melody is a founded whole; it is a complex object that
is necessarily composed of parts that are unified in a certain way. This unity is not simply
accounted for by singling out each note as separate from the others; the notes are unified insofar
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LI, p. 34 [translation modified].

LI, p. 34/Hua XIX, p. 282. I am here appealing to Emanuele Caminada’s translation of this passage, whereby he
modifies the English translation by Findlay. Findlay renders einheitliche Fundierung as ‘single foundation.’ Cf.
Caminada and Summa (2015).
59
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as they are founding parts belonging to the founded melodic whole. While the notes could be
separated and played apart from their inclusion in the melody, the melody cannot exist apart
from the notes. The melody as a distinct object is founded on the basis of the organizational
association between notes. Although the playing of a melody occurs in time, founding does not
refer to a temporal succession. The ways in which parts and wholes are founded refers to their
static, ontological structure, and not to a temporal genesis. Higher order objects have an
ontological structure that necessarily depends on parts organized in a certain way while
nevertheless being more than the sum of these parts. The notes can exist on their own without
there being a melody, but the melody necessarily depends on the determinately organized notes.
Finally, regarding Husserl’s mereology, a mere collection of any group of objects
whatsoever is a “mere aggregate” (blosser Inbegriff), which he presents as a form of unity
belonging only to thought, but not legitimately existing as a whole.
‘Aggregate’ is an expression for a categorial unity corresponding to the mere form of
thought, it stands for the correlate of a certain unity of reference relating to all relevant
objects. The objects themselves, being only held together in thought, do not succeed in
founding a new content, whether taken as a group or together; no material form of
association develops among them through this unity of intuition, they are possibly ‘quite
disconnected and intrinsically unrelated.’ [an sich unverbunden und beziehunglos]60

For example, I can consider a random set of objects fished out of a junk drawer to be a group in
the form of an aggregation; I can think these things as existing in a unity together even if they
individually have nothing in common. On their own, though, these random objects do not form a
unified whole insofar as they do not have anything in common. Their co-existence is equal to the

LI, p. 38. Cairns points out that Inbegriff can also be translated as “sum,” though “aggregate” may be the best
translation. Both work for the sense I’m discussing in regard to communities. Guide for Translating Husserl, p. 73.
60
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sum of all aggregated parts. To return to the melody example, its notes and their relations are not
equal to all of the notes being aggregated and played all at once.
2.3 Applying Mereology to Community
I have introduced Husserl’s formal concepts of wholes, pieces, moments, founding,
mereological proximity, and aggregation. These concepts, as given in the Logical Investigations,
apply to any kind of object whatsoever, contributing to his account of formal ontology. These
concepts are relevant in the context of discussing communities because Husserl employs them
when he writes about communities. A community is a non-arbitrary personal association, and
this amounts to it being a unified whole. For Husserl wholes are unities that only exist on the
basis of relations of foundation. The community as a whole has parts, and for this type of object,
those parts are persons. The community, then, is understood as founded on its members.
Near the beginning of his Introduction to Phenomenology, Sokolowski makes the
following meta-philosophical remarks:

What often happens in philosophy is that something that is a moment is taken to be a
piece, taken to be separable from its wider whole and other parts; then an artificial
“problem” arises about how the original whole can be reconstituted. The true solution to
such a problem is not to fashion some new way of building up the whole out of such
falsely segmented parts, but simply to show that the part in question was a moment, not a
piece, and that it never should have been separated from the whole in the first place.61
If my reading of Husserl’s concept of community is correct, then an appeal to his theory of parts
and wholes already helps to clarify some of its complexities. Having Husserl’s mereological
resources at hand helps to clarify ambiguities in traditional ontological conceptions of
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Sokolowski (2000), pp. 24-25.
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communities if it is the case that pieces and moments are confused. Furthermore, these
clarifications shed light on disagreements regarding Husserl’s concept of community in the
secondary literature. My task now is to show precisely how this mereological structure is present
in Husserl’s concept of communities.
I start by considering the parts of the community. Insofar as persons are individuals, they
exist as parts in the sense of being pieces of a community whole. Persons are in this sense
independent objects.62 Put otherwise, persons exist and can be understood as members of the
community in regard to their own individuality. Just as a leaf can be separated from a tree while
remaining a leaf, so too can an individual person be separated from a community while
remaining an individual person. This understanding of pieces does not speak to the necessity of
an actual separation. A leaf can remain unified with the whole of a tree while still being
acknowledged as separable. A person can remain a member of a communal whole while being
acknowledged as a separable piece of that whole. The point of saying that a community is a
personal association of two or more persons speaks to this feature of communities, namely that
their parts are necessarily pieces understood as independent parts.
If Husserl’s concept of community was of a mere aggregate or collection, that is, if he
were an individualist regarding communities, then we could stop here, and the community would
be equal to the summation of its individual members understood as pieces. It is not only pieces,
though, that matter in the context of Husserl’s concept of communities. Husserl’s notion of
“moments” also factors into his conception of community. As he claimed in the “Kaizo articles,”
the community is an interconnected subjectivity, and this interconnection is indicative of a
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Cf. Boehm (1969).
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founded unity, not a mere aggregation. Husserl insists that a community is “not a mere
collective” (nicht ein bloßes Kollektiv)63, that it is “not a mere sum” (nicht eine bloßes Summe).64
For instance, the community as a whole is said to have its own values that do not come about “in
a summative way” (in summatorischer Weg) from the values of its members.65 The community is
not one further separable piece like persons are, but is a founded whole. That which is founded in
the case of a community is not an aggregation, but is the unity of persons who are more than
pieces. The nature of this surplus can be clarified by appeal to moments.
The internal unity or inwardness of a community was presented above under the heading
of Husserl’s notion of a social subjectivity. Social subjectivities are organized insofar as there is
something shared amongst members that coalesces them into the form of a unified personal
association.

All [personal unities of a higher level], as far as their communication extends, a
communication produced factually or one yet to be produced in accord with their own
indeterminate open horizon, do not constitute merely a collection of social subjectivities,
but instead they coalesce [schliessen] into a social subjectivity intimately organized to a
greater or lesser degree, which has its common opposite pole in a surrounding world, or
external world, i.e., in a world that is for it.66
Within Husserl’s mereology, this presents us with a situation he describes of two pieces sharing
something like a boundary in common. In such a case, that shared boundary is described by
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Hua XXVII, p. 48.
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Hua XXVII, p. 49.
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Hua XXVII, p. 48.
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Ideas II, p. 206 [Translation modified].
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Husserl as a shared moment.67 In the case of the inwardness of a social subjectivity (i.e., a
“communal spirit”), individuals share something with other members through their actual or
potential communication, something which is not fully shared with non-members. In the case of
socio-cultural communities, these communications refer directly or indirectly to common
interests, ideas, or activities. For example, in a tightly-knit community of philosophers, all of the
members are bound by their shared interest in philosophy.68 Beyond just a casual, passing
interest, these philosophers may have their ideas and ideals shape their cooperative philosophical
activities. Each part of this whole, then, is an individual person. These persons are themselves
unified wholes with their own parts, including the moment of being a philosopher. The
community exists as a founded entity that is more than the sum of its parts when moments such
as these are the same for a group of persons. The group of philosophers here exists as a
community whole insofar as all members possess similar interests, values, practices, and so
forth.69 Furthermore, this can even be considered a tightly-knit community if the members are
explicitly aware of the community itself. Correlated with this communicative inwardness, then,
is the community’s surrounding world, animated by a specific communal spirit.70
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LI, p. §17.
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I appeal to this example here first because it is one that Husserl discusses. Secondly, though, it is an example I
return to in Chapters II and III, insofar as it represents a specific community type as an “intimate community.”
69

I will have more to say about the role that features such as shared interests play in the structure of community in
Chapter II and III. For Husserl, interests influence the experiences that members of a community have, but he
provides a more sophisticated mechanism to account for this by appealing to his account of proximate and remote
parts of a whole.
70

My considerations here are ontological and not phenomenological. Chapter III addresses this structure of
community in further detail insofar as these components are given in the experiences of community members.
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To further support this reading of the community’s inwardness, consider Husserl’s
account of the identity of a community over time:

[The surrounding world] is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are
instead members of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which,
as wholes, have their own lives, preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the
joining or leaving of individuals, have their qualities as communities, their moral and
juridical regulations, their modes of functioning in collaboration with other communities
and with individual persons, their dependencies on circumstances, their regulated changes
and their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time,
according to the determining circumstances.71

If the addition or subtraction of members necessarily impacted the existence of the community,
then the community would be nothing more than an aggregate. The perseverance of a community
through the coming and going of members in these cases, though, speaks to the community’s
existence as including more than just persons considered as isolated pieces. Here the inwardness
of the community exists as a dependent moment that is communicable and presupposed amongst
members. For example, a community can be inwardly unified through status functions and norms
belonging to families, citizens, or club members. As Miettinen highlights, this feature of
persistence of a community over time despite the coming and going of members can come in
degrees; the birth of a child or the death of a spouse may fundamentally alter or even dissolve the
unity that exists in the case of a community such as a family.72 In these kinds of small
communities, independent pieces can matter more insofar as individual members are uniquely
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Ideas II, pp. 191-192 [Translation modified].
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Further attention is paid in the next chapter to different degrees in this sense.
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constitutive of the whole in question. This need not be the case, though, for larger, more
impersonal and anonymous communities.73
Consider, for example, the whole of a large political community and its citizens. If one
citizen is exiled from a state, she continues to exist as a person and is from that perspective a
piece of that political whole. However, she will no longer exist as a citizen of the state after the
exiling. The state as a whole will likely continue to exist as a unified whole even in the absence
of one citizen if it continues to be founded upon the lives of its other citizens. A person (as a
piece) can exist without possessing the status of citizenship (a moment), but an individual
instantiation of citizenship cannot exist without a person.74 As just one example, this draws
attention to the being of a citizen understood as a status that exists as one moment of a person. A
plurality of persons possessing the same socio-cultural moment, then, amounts to the founding of
a community on Husserl’s account. Groups of individuals sharing the same relation to sociocultural moments constitute a community on the basis of shared interests, values, or activities in
a shared surrounding world. They are not unified on the basis of being mere collections of
individuals understood as aggregated pieces.
Relations of dependence for Husserl are relations of foundation, and real wholes refer to
relations of foundation. For Husserl, the community as a whole is more than the sum of its parts,

Miettinen (2013), p. 229: “Naturally, there are gradations with regard to different forms of community. For a
family, a loss of member is probably a more shattering experience than, say, in the case of a nation – one that can
catalyze the extinction or dispersion of the “we”. Still, it belongs to the very notion of communal person that it has
the possibility to transcend the individual streams of consciousness: it is something that cannot be returned to
individual subjects.”
73
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I leave it to the side here wither non-human animals can/should be included as citizens of communities.
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and cannot be accounted for on the basis of treating individuals as pieces or “mere things.”75
While founded on its individual members which can be understood as independent parts, the
community as a whole is not reducible to the collection of its pieces. Persons can exist
independently without belonging to a community, but a community cannot exist in the complete
absence of the individual persons upon which it is founded. Within the framework that Husserl
provides in the third of his Logical Investigations, we can say that there is a necessary
connection here in the form of a founding relationship. Husserl says in his “Vienna Lecture” that
there can be a physical human body without spirit (Geist), but there cannot be spirit without a
physical body; he writes that analogously there can be an aggregation of individual human
beings without a community, but there can be no community in the absence of individual persons
as members. 76 The notion of founding here assures that the community depends on its individual
members, but it also precludes our ability to say that the community is nothing more than an
aggregation.
In my presentation of Husserl’s framework of the socio-cultural world, I highlighted that
social subjectivities involve a surplus of socio-cultural meaning that is irreducible to the
summation of the individuals making up such a collective subjectivity. Given the tools from
Husserl’s mereology, we can make sense of this socio-cultural surplus as a founded moment of
the communal whole insofar as its existence depends on individual persons who are bound by
actual and potential communications with one another. Since the socio-cultural components of
individual persons that are communicated are themselves moments in Husserl’s sense, the socio-
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cultural surplus of a community is a higher-order moment that is itself founded on moments.
“Communal spirit” exists, then, in the mode of a founded, non-independent part (i.e., a
dependent moment), intelligibly accessible to individual consciousnesses through abstraction but
not perceptible as a detachable piece.
So far, then, it is clear that Husserl’s account of parts and wholes provides the conceptual
resources for his descriptions of communities as seen in his use of pieces, moments, and
founding. “Mereological proximity” is also crucially important to Husserl’s concept of
community insofar as members understood as parts of the community whole can be understood
as “closer” or “farther” from the group to which they belong depending on the group in
question.77 A loosely organized (“headless”) social subjectivity can be a vague or anonymous
community insofar as members lack a direct or immediate awareness of the communal whole. I
can go my way and you can go yours, each of us pursuing only our own interests, and
encountering every other person as a stranger. Appealing to Husserl’s notion, there is here a
mereological remoteness between members and the community as a whole. On such a picture,
we would be hard pressed to understand the community as one pursuing its own group goal in
any focused or pre-meditated fashion. This amounts to relations between members and relations
of members to the community being mediated. In such cases, the mediated nature of such
communities would be indicative of members belonging to the whole, though with a large degree
of mereological proximity.78 On the other hand, a well-organized and focused social subjectivity
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This is something I turn to more directly in Chapter II when I examine the two specific examples of community
formations as depicted in his quote from the “Kaizo articles,” but I introduce it here to highlight the more extensive
presence of Husserl’s mereology in his concept of community.
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In Chapter II, I will focus on this phenomenon as an example of a community taking on the form of a
concatenation (Verkettung), another concept from Husserl’s mereology.
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can engage in deliberate joint actions insofar as there is mereological proximity between
members and the community as a whole. This amounts to relations between members and
relations of members to the community being relatively immediate; there is thereby a distinct and
jointly coordinated sense of the “we,” of “us” on the basis of the decisions, valuings, and actions
of members. Communities with members that stand in mereological proximity to the whole are
intimate communities.79
We can belong to many communities at once, and our belonging to some communities is
mediated or even masked by others. For example, in a direct democracy, individual citizens
belong immediately (in the mereological sense) to the workings of the political whole; in a
representative democracy, citizens belong in a more mediated sense.80 In the former case, there is
mereological proximity in Husserl’s sense insofar as members are in direct contact with the
community as a whole; in the latter, there is mereological remoteness insofar as members make
their impact (if at all) only insofar as they exert influence on a representative. Husserl, for
instance, writes in the “Kaizo articles” that engagement in a political community simply through
voting does not bring us close to understanding or collectively acting together as a genuine
community.81 Parts can belong to wholes in variegated ways, and different types of communities
can be illuminated by demonstrating the proximity or remoteness of parts to wholes (a task I
pursue in the following two chapters).

As Husserl claims, we’re capable of having experiences that present objects immediately in the sense of being
there for us in the flesh. We’re also capable, though, of having experiences of objects “only mediately” in cases such
as empathy, such that we experience another person not though access to their own conscious experiences, but as
expressed through their bodies. Cf. Ideas II, pp. 209-210.
79
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Under a totalitarian regime, this mediation is maximally amplified.
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Hua XXVII, p. 12.
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Husserl acknowledges instances wherein “my spiritual influence propagates without my
intention to unknown persons and environments that do not need to know of me.”82 In such
cases, my ability to be a member of the community still depends on my actual and potential
communications with others, but it is here a unique kind of communication insofar as it reaches
strangers. Living in communities with strangers are made sense of in Husserl’s work by appeal to
the notion of mediation, and I have claimed that this notion has its origin in Husserl’s account of
mereological proximity:

The institutions of personal associations must be considered in mediate [mittelbaren]
ways when the people remain ‘unknown.’ But it is in any case communities of will of
certain persons who are in agreement as willing-subjects, albeit as mediated
[vermittelt].83

These passages highlight ways in which the concept of more mediation (mereological
remoteness) or less mediation (mereological proximity) factors into Husserl’s discussions of
communities, especially insofar as that relative mediation dictates whether communities are
considered as anonymous or intimate. Communities of persons, for Husserl, are not infinitely
plastic, and they continue to exist only “as far as their communication extends.”84 Returning to
Husserl’s definition, recall that a whole is said to exist where there is a unitary foundation, such
that every content is connected with all of the others. As Husserl there claims, this kind of unity

Hua XIV, 195: “Meine geistige Wirkung pflanzt sich fort, ohne meine Absicht, in unbekannte Personen und
Umgebungen, die auch von mir nichts zu wissen brauchen (personale Wirkungsgemeinschaften ohne Einheit einer
umspannenden Gemeinschaftswollung und -handlung).”
82

Hua XIV, 182: “Esmüssen dann aber die Stiftungen von personalen Vereinigungen auf mittelbaren Wegen
erwogen werden, wobei die Personen „unbekannt” bleiben. Es sind aber jedenfalls Willensgemeinschaften
bestimmter Personen, die also als Willenssubjekte, wenn auch vermittelt, in Einverständnis sind.”
83
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Ideas II, p. 206.
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exists when “every content is foundationally connected, whether directly or indirectly, with
every other content.”85 Applied to stratified personal communities, this lends support to the idea
that we can belong to communities with others even when those others are strangers, that is,
where the foundation connection is indirect. The possibility of connected content in regard to
communities refers to connections of communication. If we exist as members of larger
communities with strangers, we are foundationally connected with strangers in an indirect,
mediated manner.86 This can be instantiated, for instance, on the basis of reciprocal tendencies of
acting kindly to unknown others in public.87 Such forms of etiquette provide unity to a group
without requiring all members to know or be “close” to one another personally.
On the basis of Husserl’s formal mereology alone, we can flirt with the possibility of a
community being a mere aggregation of persons, whereby such a community would be equal to
the sum of its parts taken solely as individuals understood as independent objects. Put otherwise,
if a community was simply an aggregation, then we could exhaustively account for it by simply
engaging in a headcount of community members. However, Husserl is adamant that a
community is an irreducible entity that cannot be accounted for only in terms of its individuals
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LI, p. 34.
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There is much more to say here regarding different types of community coming in the next chapter. Consider, for
example, LI, pp. 41-42: “It is an analytic proposition that ‘pieces’ considered in relation to the whole whose ‘pieces’
they are, cannot be founded on each other, either one-sidedly or reciprocally, and whether as wholes or in respect of
their parts. But, on the other hand, we cannot at all conclude from the content of our basic definition that it is
impossible that ‘pieces’ should enter into foundational relationships in regard to a more comprehensive whole in
which they all count as non-independent ‘moments.’”
Hua XV, p. 423: “Jeder friedliche Verkehr ist schon menschliche Vergemeinschaftung und setzt voraus einen
gemeinsamen Boden der Norm, sei es auch nur der Norm der allgemeinsten Menschenfreundlichkeit, der Norm
nicht zu betrügen etc.”
87
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understood as pieces.88 Husserl’s account of the spiritual world as a “sum total” (of social
subjectivities and social objectivities) is not summative simply of persons as pieces, but also
includes socio-cultural moments (shared interest, ideas, values, activities, etc.) belonging to its
members. There are “moments” to the extent that they depend on persons and relations between
persons. If these moments of individual persons are communicatively shared, then individuals
coalesce into a community.
§3. Conclusions
What kinds of objects are communities according to Husserl? Communities on Husserl’s
account are non-arbitrary associations of two or more persons belonging together within the
region of the socio-cultural, spiritual world. They are bound together within what Husserl refers
to as a social subjectivity, which is essentially correlated with a shared surrounding world of
culture, that is, with social objectivities. The community is thereby understood as a subjectivity
that is analogous to an individual subjectivity, a first person plural “we” analogous to a first
person singular “I.” This community is a whole that is founded on its members while irreducible
to them when understood as pieces. The terms Husserl uses in his descriptions of community
have specific, technical meanings, and this specificity is missed if approached on the basis of
colloquial interpretations of his writings. Clarifying these technical terms is an interpretive task
that can be accomplished by appeal to Husserl’s mereology. The community is a subjectivity
insofar as it is the substrate or bearer for a shared surrounding world, and insofar as the
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Ideas II, p. 206; Hua XXVII, p. 22.
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experiences of individual members do not belong to them alone.89 Experiences within a
community belong to the “we.” That which is common in the context of personal communities
will be the communicatively shared moments of the individual persons.
I have here explicated Husserl’s concept of community from an ontological perspective.
This refers to the sense in which a community can be considered as a distinct entity beyond the
summation of its members. I structured my appeal to mereology in terms of an argument
between two interpretive pathways, one colloquial and one technical. My investigation
proceeded by appeal to Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. The colloquial connotations of the
fundamental components found in the framework of Husserl’s theory carry sedimented baggage
that lead Husserl’s theory to inconsistent readings. Appealing to Husserl’s own theory of parts
and wholes, however, pins down the meanings of these terms.
In addition to guarding against the slippages in meaning from colloquial interpretations in
the context of Husserl’s ontology, I now return to the broader social-scientific and philosophical
problem regarding communities as introduced above. The conceptual pendulum here swings
between individualists and holists in the context of social relations. Both positions have their
difficulties, such as reducing communities to mere collections and thereby losing the ability to
account for identity over time (problems associated with individualism) or of emphasizing
collective agency at the expense of sacrificing individual agency (problems associated with
holism). It should be abundantly clear that Husserl is at pains to avoid the position of
individualism. He is adamant that a community is more than the sum of its parts, and that a mere
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Cf. Chelstrom (2013). This is not to make the further claim that communities themselves are conscious even
though Husserl does write in these ways in places.

53
collection of persons does not lead to the formation of a personal community. While Husserl’s
formal mereology allows for the possibility of a mere aggregation of objects, this possibility does
not extend to his ontological account of communities. This extension is not possible insofar as
communities belong to the region of the socio-cultural, spiritual world, meaning that this
objectivity includes the inwardness of a spiritual subjectivity. This inwardness belonging to
individuals includes moments that are shared by members, and these types of relations are
missed by considerations of persons solely as pieces. While not an individualist, he is also not a
holist. The community is founded on individuals and their social acts. Phenomena such as
sedimentation point to potential holist dangers such that we could unthinkingly take over
traditions and traditional forms of activity. It is in this sense that we saw Husserl warning against
a “degenerate nationalism.”90 For Husserl, though, this is not inevitable. He thereby leaves open
the possibility of reconciling individual agency with the community being more than the sum of
its parts.
Husserl, on my reading, espouses a unique ontological position regarding the structure of
community. The community here is an actually existing entity, and this entity is more than the
sum of its parts. Even though the community is a distinct entity, it necessarily depends for its
very existence on the individuals that are its parts. So while the community is more than the sum
of its parts, it is not entirely removed or separable from its parts. That is what it means to say that
communities are founded entities. Without associated individuals and their sharing of a

Hua XXVII, p. 5 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “Solche Klarheit ist aber keineswegs leicht zu gewinnen. Jener skeptische
Pessimismus und die Schamlosigkeit der unsere Zeit so verhängnisvoll beherrschenden politischen Sophistik, die
sich der sozialethischen Argumentation nur als Deckmantel für die egoistischen Zwecke eines völlig entarteten
Nationalismus bedient, wäre gar nicht möglich, wenn die natürlich gewachsenen Gemeinschaftsbegriffe trotz ihrer
Natürlichkeit nicht mit dunklen Horizonten behaftet wären, mit verwickelten und verdeckten Mittelbarkeiten, deren
klärende Auseinanderlegung die Kräfte des ungeschulten Denkens völlig übersteigt.”
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surrounding world, there is no correlated inwardness of a social subjectivity. This position differs
from both individualism and holism not simply by borrowing features from each and then
assembling them ad hoc into a chimera-like theory of community. Rather, his concept of
community arises on the basis of a unique theory of relations between parts and wholes.
The technical interpretation of Husserl’s theory of community has applications to the
philosophy of the social sciences considered broadly. Both ontological individualists and holists
as presented here can be read as erring in ways that can be explained (though not to say
corrected) in part by appeal to Husserl’s ontology. From a Husserlian perspective, individualists
err by emphasizing individual members as being nothing more than “pieces” of the community.
In this way, what we get in the individualist account of community is nothing but an aggregation.
Because of this, there is not conceptual room to include components of a community in the form
of shared moments. For Husserl, though, all socio-cultural realities including personal
associations require us to acknowledge the presence of moments of inwardness.91 Individualism
does not recognize the possibility of founding in Husserl’s sense by focusing on individual
persons without recognizing higher order unities that can come to depend on them.
On the other hand, holists err when considered from a Husserlian standpoint by taking
individual members as nothing more than vehicles for the community’s own interests and
agency. In this sense, there is an overestimation of the existence of the community as separable
from individual members. Following Sokolowski, we can here say that this is an example of a
philosophical error to the extent that moments are approached as though they were independent
parts. This position does not recognize the importance of founding by overly focusing on the
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Hua XXVII, p. 8.
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communal whole as independent from its constituent parts. For holists, individuals as pieces can
be unnecessary or interchangeable in comparison with the community.
This reading of the positions of individualism and holism on the basis of Husserl’s
mereology is not meant to suggest that Husserl should supplant work going on in the philosophy
of the social sciences. I claim, however, that Husserl’s concept of community can productively
enter into and act as a referee for portions of the debate on the basis of his theory of parts and
wholes. Husserl’s writings show that he did not just have a casual interest in describing
contingent features of personal associations, but that he provides a consistent theory of what he
takes to be the essential, invariant properties belonging to any community. This theory of
community arises on the basis of Husserl’s sophisticated ontology and avoids some of the pitfalls
that have traditionally been associated with competing theories of communities. The ability to
avoid these conceptual problems was demonstrated through implications from Husserl’s
mereology. The way I have focused on Husserl’s concept of community in this chapter is just the
tip of the iceberg regarding how he appeals to his mereology. The following chapters work to
now flesh this out further.

CHAPTER II
ONTOLOGICAL COMMUNITY TAXONOMY
ANONYMOUS AND INTIMATE ORGANIZATION
§1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I explicated the general ontological structure of Edmund
Husserl’s concept of personal communities. In this chapter, I examine different kinds of
community types within Husserl’s conception. Other writers such as Ferdinand Tönnies have
claimed that there is a distinct demarcation between the structures of tightly knit communities
(Gemeinschaften) and loosely knit societies (Gesellschaften).1 Argumentation must therefore be
given for Husserl’s conception of there being one ontological structure belonging to all
communities while there nevertheless being criteria for distinguishing between different types of
community that fall under that genus.2 I draw on Husserl’s concept of mereological proximity,
which delimits a spectrum of organizational relations between parts and wholes while
nevertheless maintaining the structure of part-whole unity. Drawing on this concept is not an
arbitrary interpretive strategy, but corresponds, as I show, to the criteria Husserl himself used in
his discussions of community. I begin by demonstrating different types of communities that arise
in Husserl’s writings and show how this has led to an inconsistent reception in the secondary

1

Tönnies (2000), pp. 17-19.

2

Without an account of community differences, we have only an indiscriminate blanket covering over all forms of
personal associations. To steal a phrase from Hegel, Husserl would then be providing nothing more than an account
of “the night in which all cows are black.”
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literature, especially regarding community understood as a “personality of a higher order” (§2). I
then appeal to Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes, focusing on his notions of intimacy and
concatenation as two poles along a spectrum of mereological proximity (§3). The upshot of the
chapter comes as I demonstrate how Husserl uses his own mereology to provide a taxonomy of
different personal communities, such that different types of communities are distinguished on the
basis of their loose or tight grouping (§4). In the end, I argue that Husserl’s concept of
community is clarified and that interpretational ambiguities are minimized if we approach this
domain by way of his own theory of parts and wholes (§5).
§2. A Variety of Communities and the Secondary Reception
2.1 Distinguishing Types of Communities
Husserl has a very large usage of the concept of community (Gemeinschaft) and its
cognates, encompassing group formations ranging from families and marriages to political states
and supranational federations.3 This breadth is nevertheless put forth by Husserl along with
criteria for distinguishing between different types and levels of groups. Husserl’s taxonomic
criteria are based in his mereology. An initial instance of a distinction between different types of
communities is seen in discussions of communities of lower and higher “levels.” For example,
Husserl makes reference to different levels of community groupings in his account of the sociocultural world, drawing attention to the “sum total of social subjects of lower or higher levels
[…] in communication with each other.”4 In the “Kaizo articles,” Husserl again describes
communities of varying types:
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Cf. Chapter I.
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Ideas II, pp. 206-207.

58
At times, a community functions as many-headed, yet is in a higher sense ‘headless’:
namely, without having the unity of a focused, willing subjectivity that acts analogous to
an individual subject. But it can also take on a higher form of life and become a
‘personality of a higher order,’ not as the carrying out of community performances that
are the mere combined formations of individual personal achievements, but in the true
sense of communal personal achievements as such, realized in their striving and willing.5
The first specification of a community type in this passage is of a “many-headed” or “headless”
community lacking a focused unity, yet still existing and functioning as a whole. This kind of
community is less organized or relatively unorganized, yet is still capable of functioning on
autopilot. “Headless” functionalism amounts to a community existing over time while being only
loosely organized or unorganized in regard to a shared goal, purpose, or explicit coordination of
wills.
The second example of community from this passage goes beyond a less organized yet
functional community to community understood as a highly organized and highly focused
“personality of a higher order” (Personalität der höheren Ordnung, hereafter designated as
PHO). As the passage suggests, there is more going on in a community understood as a
personality than there is in the case of the community considered as “many-headed” or
“headless.” The PHO is, as Husserl says, a “higher form of life.”6 This form of community is put

Hua XXVII, p. 22: “Die Gemeinschaft ist eine personale, sozusagen vielköpfige und doch verbundene
Subjektivität. Ihre Einzelpersonen sind ihre “Glieder”, funktionell miteinander verflochten durch vielgestalitige,
Person mit Person geistig einigende “soziale Akte” (Ich-Du-Akte; Befehle, Verabredungen, Liebestätigkeiten usw.).
Zeitweise fungiert eine Gemeinschaft vielkopfig und doch in einem höheren Sinne “kopflos”; nämlich ohne dass sie
sich zur Einheit einer Willenssubjektivität konzentrierte und analog wie ein Einzelsubjekt handelte. Sie kann aber
auch diese höherer Lebensform annehmen und zu einer “Personalität höherer Ordnung” werden und als solche
Gemeinschaftsleistungen vollziehen, die nicht blosse Zusammenbildungen von einzelpersonalen Leistungen sind,
sondern im wahren Sinne persönliche Leistungen der Gemeinschaft als solcher, in ihrem Streben und Wollen
realisierte.”
5

6

Hua XXVII, p. 22. Cf. Hua XIV, p. 201; CM, p. 132.
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forth as having a clear vision of its purpose and tasks; the achievements of the community are
explicitly understood as the byproducts of unified and focused joint activity of members.
Communities here exhibit cooperation and self-responsibility, with Husserl in some places
referring to them as genuinely ethical communities.7
In the case of a community of a lower level, members are capable of being included in a
community even without truly understanding the extent of their inclusion or their direct
contribution to the purpose of the community at large. Such community membership can exist
even when not contributing to an explicit shared goal. Husserl claims that community of a lower
level means that community functions “without having the unity of a focused, willing
subjectivity that acts analogous to an individual subject.”8 This automatic functioning is what I
refer to in what follows as the “anonymous” character of some communities.9
On the other hand, in communities understood as PHO, members are more “intimately”
intertwined with each other and with the community as a whole, which amounts to their
closeness to the activities, values, or interests relevant to the community.10 A community as a

Hua XIV, p. 204: “It [the ego] constitutes itself in the pure activity of subjects involved in associations and other
personalities of a higher order, self-aware (selbst-bewusste) and posited by themselves; supremely the idea of an
“ethical” humanity opposed to a mere community of influence.”
7

Hua XXVII, p. 22: “Die Gemeinschaft ist eine personale, sozusagen vielköpfige und doch verbundene
Subjektivität. Ihre Einzelpersonen sind ihre “Glieder”, funktionell miteinander verflochten durch vielgestalitige,
Person mit Person geistig einigende “soziale Akte” (Ich-Du-Akte; Befehle, Verabredungen, Liebestätigkeiten usw.).
Zeitweise fungiert eine Gemeinschaft vielkopfig und doch in einem höheren Sinne “kopflos”; nämlich ohne dass sie
sich zur Einheit einer Willenssubjektivität konzentrierte und analog wie ein Einzelsubjekt handelte. Sie kann aber
auch diese höherer Lebensform annehmen und zu einer “Personalität höherer Ordnung” werden und als solche
Gemeinschaftsleistungen vollziehen, die nicht blosse Zusammenbildungen von einzelpersonalen Leistungen sind,
sondern im wahren Sinne persönliche Leistungen der Gemeinschaft als solcher, in ihrem Streben und Wollen
realisierte.”
8

9

The technical sense of “anonymity” is developed in what follows.

10

This “intimacy” and “closeness” will be explained in what follows
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PHO knows itself as the community that it is through the explicit awareness of at least some of
its members:

Everywhere we have a plurality of people with many personal capacities, with many
streams of consciousness going into it and inserting many conscious acts – and yet there
is “a spirit,” a personality of a “higher level” as the ideal bearer of a character, of a
capability (a people’s style, the character of the people, etc.) with a consciousness that
encompasses all the individual consciousnesses in some select, chosen few, etc.11
While lower level communities lack the feature of having the “unity of a focused willing
subjectivity,” it is precisely this feature that is characteristic of a PHO. A less organized
communal “we” is described by Husserl as a whole by virtue of having a loosely organized
social subjectivity correlated with a shared surrounding world.12 This, however, is opposed to an
“intimate” community, which is said to have its own consciousness, self-consciousness,13 or selfawareness.14
As I show in what follows, the kinds of communities that Husserl describes as PHO
possessing a unified, focused willing are ones he also describes as more “intimate” (innig) or as

Hua XIV, p. 199: “Überall haben wir da eine Vielheit von Personen mit vielen personalen Vermögen, mit vielen
Bewusstseinsströmen, in sie eintretend und sich einfügend viele Bewusstseinsakte — und doch „ein Geist”, eine
Personalität „höherer Stufe” als ideeller Träger eines Charakters, eines Vermögens (Volksart, Volkscharakter etc.)
mit einem Bewusstsein, das alle die Einzelbewusstseine in einiger Auslese umgreift usw.”
11

12

Cf. Ch. 1.

Hua XXVII, p. 49: “Auch diese fundierten Subjektivitäten können verschiedene Stufen haben und in höherer Stufe
die Stufe der Personalität; eine Gemeinschaft als Gemeinschaft hat ein Bewußtsein, als Gemeinschaft kann sie aber
auch ein Selbstbewußtsein im prägnanten Sinn haben, sie kann eine Selbstwertung haben und auf sie sich richtenden
Willen, Willen der Selbstgestaltung.”
13

Hua XIV, p. 204: “Das Ich bekommt in Beziehung auf Vorgegebenheiten bleibende Eigenheiten, es entwickelt
sich für sich und entwickelt sich in Gemeinschaft mit Anderen. Es konstituieren sich in relativer Passivität
Gemeinschaften, die Einzelsubjekte als bleibend konstituierte und sich entwickelnde voraussetzen, aber sie auch in
ihrer Entwicklung bestimmen. Es konstituieren sich in reiner Aktivität der beteiligten Subjekte Vereine und sonstige
selbstbewusste und durch sich selbst gesetzte Personalitäten höherer Ordnung; zuhöchst die Idee einer „ethischen”
Menschheit gegenüber einer blossen Wirkungsgemeinschaft.”
14
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possessing “intimacy” (Innigkeit). This is a controversial claim for Husserl to make since
intimacy is a technical mereological notion for him, and since some of his statements regarding
the structure of intimacy suggest that it does not apply to relations between independent parts of
a whole such as the individual persons constituting a community. The unity of a personal
community, though, is achieved on the basis of individual persons as its parts. It is necessary to
read Husserl’s notion of intimacy and intimate communities through the lens of his theory of
parts and wholes. All forms of community according to Husserl possess the same ontological
structure, but communities differ amongst one another by way of ranging along a spectrum from
loosely bound, anonymous communities to tightly knit communities understood as intimate.
2.2 Conflicting Interpretations
There are numerous interpretations of Husserl’s concept of PHO. It would be confusing
to approach Husserl’s notion of PHO on the basis of the secondary literature alone since we
encounter ambiguities when comparing different receptions. Husserl indeed claims that PHO are
communities of a higher, pre-eminent level, but it is not immediately clear what criteria to appeal
to for understanding this pre-eminence. This has led some interpreters to set the bar high,
suggesting that PHO will be rare, while others set the bar lower, allowing it to be achieved more
easily.
Writers such as Philip Buckley, John Drummond, and Janet Donohoe suggest that PHO
exist primarily in the form of authentic communities, understood as communities of completely
self-responsible and rational individuals. Buckley presents PHO in regard to their founded
nature, and in that way brings Husserl’s concept of community into contact with part of his
mereology:
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The personality of higher order is founded on the individuals who form the basis for the
analogy. Higher order does not mean better or first, but founded. The community is
different from the individuals who form it, it is more than the mere sum of the individuals
who form it, it is in fact something new, but it cannot exist without the individual.15

At the same time, even though Buckley emphasizes the founded aspect of PHO, he elsewhere
suggests that these specific forms of community are only achieved in the case of authentic
communities:
The fact that “personality of a higher order” is linked to a vision of an authentic
community, rather than resolving a tension between the individual and the collective
which appears at the outset of Husserl’s reflections on personalities of higher order,
actually seems to increase it. “Authenticity” is, after all, a notion essentially linked with
individual existence and for Husserl it refers to a type of thinking which grasps itself,
which knows both what it does and why it does what it does. When this notion is
transferred to the “higher-order” individual—the community—it implies a collective
thinking that grasps the meaning of itself in its entirety, which means grasping the
meaning of the activity of each of its members.16

Buckley indeed appeals to the notion of intimacy in his discussion of communities understood as
PHO:
The criticism, which might be taken as saying that only small groupings can be
“authentic” communities (Gemeinschaften) while larger political groupings are merely
functional collectivities of convenience (Gesellschaften), does in fact address somewhat
the ambiguity in Husserl’s thought. Husserl’s reflections on the inauthenticity of most
collective existence really is an attack on the functionalism of such groupings, and is a
call for a more intimate and direct type of communal existence.17
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Buckley (1992), p. 114. Cf. Buckley (1992b), p. 220.
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Buckley (2000), p. 106. See also through p. 111.

17

Buckley (2000), p. 111.
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This reference to an intimate existence in the context of Husserl’s concept of community is
made, however, without further explication of the technical notion of intimacy from Husserl’s
Logical Investigations. Even though Buckley appeals to portions of Husserl’s mereology, a
difficulty remains in regard to how to distinguish between communities. Both authentic
communities and functional collectivities will be founded on their members. Focusing on the
notion of founding alone, though, is not enough to distinguish the organizations of different
social groups from one another if it applies to all groupings.
As Drummond suggests, at least some (but definitely not all) communities as Husserl
describes them are PHO, and this occurs when the community has “its own striving and willing
life, analogous to that of an individual person.”18 Drummond continues to make the following
two claims regarding Husserl on the topic of community. First:

The community [as opposed to society] is achieved in communicative, intersubjective
experiences which go beyond mere common understanding and mutual communicative
comprehension. These are the social acts in which one person seeks via a communicative
experience to influence not only the understanding but the actions of another, and in them
communities are formed.19

And second:
The community is fully achieved in these communicative, reciprocally interactive
experiences in which we experience others as companions, colleagues, and co-workers
[…] whose interpenetrating wills form a practical community of wills embodying a
shared understanding of the world.20
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Drummond (1996), p.238.

19

Drummond (1996), p. 245.

20

Drummond (2000), p. 35.
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The collective and comprehensive understanding of the community by authentic individuals
(Buckley) and the joint actions achieved by the interpenetrative wills of community companions
(Drummond) suggest a reading of Husserl’s concept of PHO where the bar is set high. It is here
not enough to simply influence others’ understanding or mindlessly function amongst one
another. The actions of others must be unified in some way with mine, and this must be done
with an insightful grasp of what the community itself is set on accomplishing. Janet Donohoe
shares this view insofar as she connects Husserl’s PHO to the ethical self-responsibility of
community members and their commitments to reason.21 As Donohoe claims:

Because the community is understood to be of a higher order, it must be grounded upon
the freely acting individuals that compose the community. This means that the
individuals cannot be absorbed into the community but must absorb the communal goals
into their own instead. This works against a communal domination of the individual.
What this depends upon is the “authenticity” of the individual, which can only be
maintained though the individual’s self-responsibility that is apparent through the
individual engagement in the process of renewal and critique.22

On the other hand, the writings of David Carr and Timo Miettinen suggest that the title of
PHO applies more broadly even to communities that would not ordinarily be considered as
authentic communities in the sense used by Buckley, Drummond, and Donohoe. Carr claims that
it is through collectively subscribing to a shared story or set of stories that a community,
understood as a PHO, maintains its unity over time.23 On this account, all it takes for a PHO to
exist is for a plurality of persons to endorse a collective narrative. Indeed, Carr even attributes
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the notion of a PHO to Husserl’s discussion of the master-slave relationship, which is put forth
as a version of a subordination-based community of will.24 Husserl here presents a form of
community where some individuals carry out the will of a master on the basis of a command. It
is unlikely, however, that Husserl or interpreters such as Buckley, Drummond, or Donohoe
would consider the master-slave relationship to be an authentic, ethical form of personal
community. The reading of Husserl’s PHO by Carr, then, is separate from an account of
authenticity.
Miettinen is similar to Carr in the way he describes the criteria for a community to count
as a PHO, claiming that “the idea of personality of a higher order does not say anything
substantial about the different modes of social or political co-existence but it merely points
towards the formation of a sense of commonness.”25 Communities understood as personalities of
a higher order “were to be understood as subjectivities that have their own personal existence, a
personal history (genesis) as well as a teleological structure.”26 The ground of Husserl’s concept
of PHO according to Miettinen is an interlacement that “is able to produce lasting “associations”
(Verbindungen), which, by manifesting itself in abiding habitualities, make possible the different
forms of practical co-operation.”27 The thematization of a sense of commonness and associations
involving practical cooperation as sufficient criteria for PHO contrasts starkly with the high bar
set by the first group of interpreters discussed above. It also calls into question the line between
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lower level and higher level communities, since commonness and practical cooperation are
compatible with what Husserl describes as the continued functioning of lower-level communities
when they are “many-headed” or “headless.”
Thomas Szanto and Emanuele Caminada provide more recent examinations of Husserl’s
conception of communities understood as PHO. According to Szanto’s interpretation of Husserl
on the topic of collective intentionality, a PHO arises when there are multiple community
members doing their part in pursuit of a shared goal, and when this has led to a higher order
“proper subject of collective intentionality” that is said to jointly pursue that goal. 28 Szanto
thereby holds a position that is stronger than Carr and Miettinen in regard to necessary criteria,
as the latter group of interpreters did not require members of a PHO to engage in the pursuit of a
shared goal.29 More generally, Szanto claims that while Husserl does not have any clear criteria
for community distinctions, we supposedly find enough textual evidence in support of a fourfold
taxonomy of social types. For Szanto, this taxonomy of social types for Husserl is of
intersubjective intentionality, socio-communicative intentionality, communal intentionality, and
collective intentionality.30 In what follows, I agree with the claim that Husserl provides us with a
taxonomy of social types, though I differ from Szanto on how to make sense of these distinctions
by focusing on Husserl’s mereology. Caminada, drawing on Husserl’s account of founding and
the different ways in which a whole can arise on the basis of its parts, claims that Husserl’s
account of PHO is of an emergent object arising from groups that are “founded in the acts of the
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subjects who endorse the position-taking of the group.”31 In this case, it is not just that members
of a community function together accidentally; they must rather explicitly endorse the positions
of the group as a whole.
What’s clear from an assessment of the secondary literature on Husserl’s concept of
community, and especially communities understood as PHO, is that they are inconsistent with
one another regarding necessary and sufficient criteria. Husserl’s notion of founding is
frequently cited in regard to the structure he puts forth for communities, but further detail is
lacking in regard to the role of parts and wholes of the community, and especially the role that
mereological proximity plays in the context of his theory of PHO.32 As I argue, Husserl himself
appealed to his notion of mereological proximity in delimiting different community types, and a
proper taxonomy of community types should disentangle how he structures his appeals to
mereology. Despite the ambiguity and conflicting interpretations found in the secondary
literature, I suggest that Husserl’s position is actually coherent. In what follows, I propose that
appealing more strictly to Husserl’s mereology clarifies Husserl’s concept of communities in
their different types, and especially communities understood as PHO. This provides a clearer
account of Husserl’s PHO than if we focused on the secondary literature alone.
§3. Husserl’s Mereology
The following recap of Husserl’s mereology acts as a presupposition for more
sophisticated mereological concepts such as mereological proximity that I argue are used by
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Husserl as criteria for distinguishing between levels of community organization.33 For Husserl,
complex objects have parts and every part has an actual or possible whole to which it belongs.34
Husserl distinguishes parts of a whole as being either pieces (Stücke) or moments (Momente).
Pieces are independent or potentially independent parts; they can be detached while nevertheless
continuing to exist.35 Moments, on the other hand, are non-independent, abstract parts; they
cannot exist individually apart from their inclusion in a whole.36 A whole exists insofar as there
is a foundational relation of dependence connecting all of the parts (both pieces and moments)
and the whole.37 Mereological relations of pieces to a whole are said to be associative or
combinatory (Verbindung), while relations between moments are interpenetrative
(Durchdringung).38 A whole exists on the basis of founding, insofar as there is a relation of
dependence unifying all of the parts (both pieces and moments) into the whole.39 According to
Husserl’s theory, a mere collection of any group of objects whatsoever is an “aggregation,”
which he presents as a form of unity belonging only to thought, but not legitimately existing as a
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whole.40 These objects potentially exist in a unity even if they individually have nothing in
common. On their own, though, these random objects do not form a unified whole insofar as
they do not have anything in common.
What I am most interested in developing in this chapter is Husserl’s mereological account
of “mereological proximity,” which provides an account of a metaphorical “distance” that
obtains between parts and the whole to which they belong.41 On this account, a part of a whole
can be considered as a more immediate (unmittelbar) part of a whole, but a part of a part of a
whole is a mediate (mittelbar) part of the whole (relative to less mediated, “closer” parts).42 This
distinction between immediate and mediate parts also goes by the names of proximate (näheren)
and remote (ferneren) parts in Husserl’s writing. Husserl claims that a part of a whole P(W) is
closer to that whole than a part of a part of that whole, P(P(W)).43 For example, if we consider a
tree as a unified whole, its parts include its leaves, branches, trunk, and roots, all understood as
pieces. These pieces also have parts, such as the green of the leaf, the spatial extension of the
roots, and so forth. The latter parts of the tree are moments in Husserl’s sense insofar as their
existence requires supplementation from something else. In this case, the green moment of the
leaf presupposes its spatial extension; the spatial extension of the roots similarly presupposes
being extended with a certain color. Both the leaves and the color of the leaves are considered as
parts of the tree as a whole, but Husserl’s account of mereological proximity claims that the
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pieces (leaves, roots, etc.) are “closer” to the tree as a whole than the moments of those pieces
(color, extension, etc.) are to the whole of the tree. There is greater mereological proximity
between the leaves and the tree than there is between the green of the leaves and the tree. Stated
inversely, there is greater mereological remoteness between the green of the leaves and the tree
than there is between the tree and the leaves themselves. The next two subsections (3.1 and 3.2)
further examine different ways of appealing to the notion of mereological proximity, setting the
stage for my argument that these directly factor into Husserl’s conception of the structures of
different community types.

3.1 Intimacy as a Mereological Concept
I first draw attention to the concept of intimacy as a mereological concept. Husserl
provides a precise account of what he means by intimacy, but it is not immediately clear how
that concept can apply to communities. Since Husserl characterizes PHO as intimate
communities, more must be said regarding the technical notion of the concept of intimacy. It is
instructive to first appeal to an extended quotation from Husserl’s Logical Investigations to
introduce its technical sense:
The unity even of independent objects is in consequence brought about by ‘foundation.’
Since they are not, as independent objects, ‘founded’ on one another, it remains their lot
to ‘found’ new contents themselves, and to ‘found’ them together; it is only in virtue of
this situation that these latter are thought of as unifying contents in respect of their
‘founding’ members. But the contents ‘founded’ on one another (whether one-sidedly or
reciprocally) likewise have unity, and a disparately more intimate unity since less
mediated unity [und eine ungleich innigere, weil weniger vermittelte]. Such ‘intimacy’
[Innigkeit] consists simply in the fact that unity is here not engendered by a novel
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content, which again only engenders unity since it is ‘founded’ on many members
separate in themselves.44

Husserl claims that there is intimacy of a greater degree when there are relations of foundation
between contents, either in one-sided fashion or in reciprocal fashion. The mereological concept
of intimacy here refers to a form of unity where there is mereological proximity in the context of
a founding relation. This founding is relatively immediate (or less mediated) as opposed to being
(more) mediated. Since Husserl’s notion of moments refers to contents that are essentially
founded upon one another (e.g., color and extension in regard to reciprocal founding or notes and
a melody for one-sided founding), such contents are said to possess the property of intimacy in
the mereological sense. Even though Husserl does not explicitly say so, I presume on the basis of
his concepts that reciprocal founding refers to a higher degree of intimacy than one-sided
founding.
An example Husserl gives of one-sided founding is in the unified whole of a melody.
While the notes of a melody can exist as distinct contents apart from the melody as a whole, the
melody cannot exist in the absence of the notes. The melody necessarily depends on the notes for
its existence in a way that is not reciprocated in the manner in which the notes themselves exist.
In the case of one-sided founding, then, there is less intimacy between parts and the whole to
which they belong insofar as the foundational dependency between the two is not reciprocal.

LI, pp. 36-37 (translation modified): “Folglich kommt auch die Einheit selbständiger Gegenstände nur durch
Fundierung zustande. Da sie, als selbständige, nicht ineinander fundiert sind, so bleibt nur übrig, daß sie selbst, und
zwar zusammen, neue Inhalte fundieren, welche nun um eben dieser Sachlage willen hinsichtlich der fundierenden
"Glieder" einheitgebende Inhalte heißen. Einheit haben jedoch – und eine ungleich innigere, weil weniger
vermittelte – auch die Inhalte, die ineinander (sei es wechselseitig oder einseitig) fundiert sind. Die "Innigkeit" liegt
gerade daran, daß ihre Einheit nicht erst durch einen neuen Inhalt hergestellt wird, der ja seinerseits Einheit nur
dadurch "herstellt", daß er in den vielen, an sich gesonderten Gliedern zusammen fundiert ist.”
44
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Notes and a melody do not depend upon each other in the same way that color and extension
depend upon each other. In the latter case, there is more intimacy because the moments mutually
depend upon each other. Independent objects, furthermore, present us with far less intimacy
insofar as they do at all not depend upon one another for their existence as pieces.
As seen in the passage above, the property of a whole and its parts being an “intimate”
unity is stated as their existing in the form of a “disparately more intimate” (ungleich innigere)
unity, and not simply as possessing intimacy or not. This suggests that the property of being
intimate in the mereological sense, of a whole possessing intimacy, is a relative property that
shows itself in the form of more-or-less. The more-or-less here is a relation of being mediated
(vermittelte), and for that reason is a relation of mereological proximity.45 In Husserl’s example
of a melody understood as a whole, the notes of the melody are said to be closer to the melody
than the moments of the notes such as their tone and intensity. The relation of the tones of the
notes to the melody as a whole, then, is mediated through the notes, whereas the notes
themselves have a more immediate relation to the melodic whole. Transposing this example by
appeal to the notion of intimacy, we can say that the relation between a note and the intensity of
the note is a more intimate unity than that between the intensity and the melody. The relation
between the intensity and the melody is, as the inverse of the passage above, a much less
intimate unity since more mediated. For these reasons, I suggest that Husserl’s notion of
intimacy is a relative term, where the relativity refers us to a spectrum or continuum of
mereological relations of mereological proximity.
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At first, Husserl’s notion of intimacy suggests that it is meant to apply exclusively to
relationships of foundational dependency, such as the reciprocally founded moments of color and
extension. Indeed, he says there is a more intimate unity in cases of one-sided or mutual
founding, and these are relations he initially attributes only to moments. Nevertheless, once he
has introduced his notion of founding, he reconsiders the ways in which independent objects
(pieces) can belong together in the form of a whole:
It is an analytic proposition that ‘pieces’ considered in relation to the whole whose
‘pieces’ they are, cannot be founded on each other, either one-sidedly or reciprocally, and
whether as wholes or in respect of their parts. But, on the other hand, we cannot at all
conclude from the content of our basic definition that it is impossible that ‘pieces’ should
enter into foundational relationships in regard to a more comprehensive whole
[umfassenderes Ganzes] in which they all count as non-independent ‘moments.’46

This passage asks the reader to consider pieces as moments under the circumstances of being
included in a more comprehensive whole, whereas the definitions of pieces and moments from
earlier on in the ‘Third Investigation’ presented the two as mutually exclusive. Husserl earlier
defines moments as non-independent (i.e., dependent) parts, such that their existence is
unthinkable in the absence of at least one other supplementary part. Pieces understood as
independent parts can exist on their own without supplementation. What changes in this passage,
though, is the inclusion of pieces into “a more comprehensive whole.” Husserl suggests that we
find examples of this possibility when we consider “empirically real natural connections” such as
natural laws of causality.47 To make this point, Husserl examines the unity of a series of causally
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unfolding events. When abstracting from temporality, we can thematize independent visual
contents, such as a thing’s spatial extensity. When considered not as an abstract time segment,
though, and instead as a unified temporal whole, formerly independent parts factor into
experiences as a whole as moments insofar as their causal unfolding depends upon components
from earlier time segments. Focus here is turned towards events as a whole instead of atemporal
considerations. It is in this way that Husserl presents what he means by “a more comprehensive
whole.”48 Beginning by thinking of things that are spatially and temporally separate, Husserl
says:

If a particular causal law involves that a concrete process of change in a time-segment t1t0, is necessarily succeeded by a certain new process in the neighboring time-segment, t2t1, the former thereby loses independence in regard to the latter.49

This means that there is a relation of dependence such that the outcome of the event depends on
circumstances that came before. Formerly independent things forfeit their independence and can
then “count as non-independent ‘moments.’”
Consider, for example, the visual components given through examination of a domino
standing upright, components such as its extension in space, its white surface, and its black dots.
Considered in abstraction from time, the domino as a whole can be considered as an entirely
independent object in my visual field. If we shift our consideration to a flow of events in the case
of a sequence of toppling dominos, however, things are different. If the comprehensive whole we

On Drummond’s reading, Husserl’s account of parts and wholes in the Logical Investigations “abstracts from the
temporality of the experiences analyzed.” Drummond (2008), p. 119. The passage appealed to here problematizes
that claim.
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consider is the unified whole event of falling dominoes, then the domino that was originally
considered as an independent object in relation to my visual field becomes a dependent object in
relation to the whole chain of events. It here loses its independence in the context of the event.
The mess of toppled dominos at the end of the sequence causally depended on the dominos
which were initially understood as independent pieces. It is in this sense that independent pieces
come to be considered as moments of a more comprehensive, temporally extended whole within
Husserl’s mereology.
What these examples demonstrate is that pieces are considered by Husserl to be moments
in some cases of temporally extended comprehensive wholes, such that independent pieces of a
visual experience that are independent at an earlier time are not similarly independent when
considered in relation to larger wholes. Since Husserl’s notion of intimacy is of foundational
dependency, this passage presents the possibility of independent objects (here understood as
moments) existing in relations of intimacy. In what follows, I focus on persons as independent
parts of a community whole. Given the possibility just examined regarding pieces considered as
moments at the level of formal mereology, persons will in principle have the opportunity to
count as moments of the community understood as a whole. If this is the case, then their
existence as dependent moments will be more intimate in relation to the community whole than
if they were merely independent pieces in abstraction from larger temporal contexts.
3.2 Concatenation and Anonymity
I now turn to Husserl’s concept of concatenation (Verkettung). This is again a concept
from his formal theory of parts and wholes that I argue factors into his conception of
communities. Not all communities according to Husserl are intimate communities. If it is true
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that Husserl’s concept of community is built on the framework of his mereology, then more
needs to be said about how mereology factors even into these less organized and more mediated
types of communities.
For Husserl, a concatenation refers to a grouping of two or more associations, that is, a
group of two or more groups of individual objects. In such a case, some of the members of the
whole are related to others in an immediate way, while others are related in mediated fashion. As
Husserl claims:

It often happens that a mode of association peculiarly unites two parts A, B into a partial
unity [Teileinheit] which excludes other parts, but in which, further, B and not A is
associated in just this manner with C. In this situation A is also associated with C, in
virtue, that is, of a complex form of unity [einer komplexen Einheitsform] constituted by
the two associations AB and BC. The latter association we then call immediate
[unmittelbare], while we say that the association of A and C, achieved in the form ABC,
is mediate [mittelbare].50

In this example, A and B form one association and B and C form another association. A
“complex form of unity” can then exist between the two associations, whereby the associations
AB and BC refer to two immediate associations, while the new “partial unity” of ABC involves
mediation. It is especially the case that mediation exists here between A and C. Given that these
are said to be relations of immediacy and mediacy, concatenations refer to one form of
mereological proximity, existing more precisely as mereological remoteness in the case of the
“distance” between mediated parts. While all complex objects for Husserl have parts,
concatenations are made up of parts that are themselves unified wholes with their own parts.
Husserl continues his discussion of the structure of concatenations:
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Two associations form a concatenation, when they have some but not all members in
common (i.e. do not coincide as when, e.g., the same members are united by several
associations). Each concatenation is on this showing a complex association. Associations
now divide into those which include concatenations and those which do not: associations
of the former are combinations of associations of the latter sort. The members of an
association that is free from concatenations are said to be immediately associated or
nearby [unmittelbar verknüpft oder benachbart]. In every concatenation, and therefore in
every whole containing concatenations, there must be immediately associated members,
which belong to associations of parts which include no further concatenations. All other
members of such a whole are said to be mediately associated with one another.51

The main aspect of concatenations that I draw attention to is their mediacy in regard to relations
between parts and the whole. Given Husserl’s concept of mereological proximity, the mediacy of
concatenation means that there is more mereological remoteness between members of the
concatenation and their concatenated whole than there is between the members of the
associations founding the concatenation. As a contrast concept to intimacy as a foundational
relationship of closeness or immediacy, I propose to refer to the mediated relations belonging to
concatenations as anonymous or as possessing the property of anonymity. While the language
Husserl uses to describe these communities is of their being mediated, and thereby as
embodiments of mereological proximity, I use the term “anonymous” in what follows when
referring to this formal-mereological concept in the context of personal associations.
The notion of “anonymity” or of something being “anonymous” shows up frequently in
Husserl’s writing.52 Husserl ordinarily uses the term “anonymous” (anonym) and its cognates to
refer to our quotidian, pre-reflective lifeworld. Such experiences contain components that remain
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hidden from reflective thematization in everyday life.53 That which remains hidden are the active
and passive syntheses such as identification and association that give sense to our world. For
example, our individual surrounding worlds are apprehended and lived through in a
straightforward fashion in what Husserl calls the “natural attitude,” such that we find ourselves
thrown into socio-cultural surroundings without having to voluntarily will them into existence. In
these situations, Husserl refers to the anonymous constitutive functioning of unthematic
consciousness.54 The process of reflection allows us, according to Husserl, to see beyond the
processes of anonymous functioning in their ordinary hiddenness.55 As Miettinen writes, other
persons are incorporated into the structure of my perception not initially as objects of the act of
empathy, “but as the anonymous [others] devoid of any spatio-temporal or personal existence.”56
The hiddenness of these processes in our everyday life despite their functioning in the unity of
consciousness makes Husserl’s notion of anonymity akin to the functioning of the loosely
organized, “many-headed” or “headless” communities from his “Kaizo articles.” As suggested
above, these communities are bound together in ways that need not be reflectively apparent to

CM, p. 47: “The phenomenologist, however, does not inquire with merely a naïve devotedness to the intentional
object purely as such; he does not consider the intentional object only straightforwardly and explicate its meant
features, its meant parts and properties. If that were all he did, the intentionality which makes up the intuitive or nonintuitive consciousness itself and the explicative considering, would remain ‘anonymous.’ In other words: There
would remain hidden the noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone,
and as their essentially necessary unitary doing, we have one intentional object, and always this definite one,
continuously meant – have it, so to speak, before us as meant thus and so; likewise the hidden constitutive
performance by virtue of which (if consideration then continues as explication) we find straightforwardly as
explicata of what is meant, such things as a “feature,” a “property” a “part” or mean these implicitly and can then
discover them intuitively.”
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individual members; they are mediate as opposed to immediate in regard to foundational
dependency. In the language of Husserl’s mereology, this means there is mereological
remoteness between parts and the whole. The processes that are operative in the functioning of
an individual subjectivity are mediate and require the careful reflections of the phenomenologist
in order to be clearly discerned. Husserl’s own usage of the notion of “anonymity,” while
admittedly not being used in the context of his writings on community, shares some of the
fundamental features belonging to his descriptions of loosely organized communities, such as
their existence in the form of concatenations. Given Husserl’s description of lower level, loosely
organized communities as managing to function on their own in the absence of purposive joint
actions, his description of anonymity at the level of individual subjectivity meshes well with the
functionalism of lower-level communities. This term is also helpful to use in this context insofar
as it carries with it the sense associated with interactions within a community, especially when
we do not know others very well.
Husserl’s mereological concept of intimacy refers to relations of mereological proximity
and immediacy whereas his concept of concatenation refers to relations of mereological
remoteness and mediacy. In the case of intimacy, we find closer relations of dependence between
parts and wholes, whereas concatenations refer to more remote relations of foundational
dependence. The mediation that exists in the case of concatenations is, in turn, akin to the
mediation of anonymity. I here use anonymity as a mereological concept (despite its absence
from the Logical Investigations) insofar as it is conceptually opposed to his notion of intimacy,
and insofar it embodies components of Husserl’s theory of mereological proximity that cross
over to matters of community.
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§4. Loosely-Knit and Tightly-Knit Communities
There are a number of components from Husserl’s mereology that are of relevance to
personal communities and some of this has been touched on already in Chapter I. Importantly,
his mereology highlights a type of unity that can belong to independent objects. Persons are at
least in part considered to be independent objects, that is, as pieces in the context of a communal
whole. A personal community is on Husserl’s account a higher order object, which is to say that
it is founded on its parts. The founding of a personal community is accomplished on the basis of
individual persons and their social acts, that is, on the basis of their existence and interactions as
independent objects. Husserl’s mereology, therefore, provides an applicable schema for the partwhole relationship belonging to community. This schema further lays out the ways that actually
existing communities can be distinguished from one another on the basis of their intimacy or
lack thereof.
With this account of Husserl’s mereology and the more specific concepts of intimacy and
anonymity in place, I now show how Husserl uses these concepts in the context of his
descriptions of communities and their various organizational levels. The relations between these
types of community levels correspond, on my reading, to different kinds of mereological
proximity of individual persons as parts in the context of a community whole. I first examine the
structure of loosely-knit, “anonymous” communities, and then examine tightly-knit, “intimate”
communities.
Husserl’s writings suggest a spectrum or continuum between levels of community
organization:
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All [personal unities of a higher level], as far as their communication extends, a
communication produced factually or one yet to be produced in accord with their own
indeterminate open horizon, do not constitute merely a collection of social subjectivities,
but instead they coalesce into a social subjectivity intimately organized to a greater or
lesser degree [mehr oder minder innig organisierten], which has its common opposite
pole in a surrounding world, or an external world, i.e., in a world which is for it.57
This structure of “greater or lesser” intimacy, of “loose or intimate” forms, shows up again in a
discussion of intimacy and community in manuscripts in Husserliana XV. Husserl there refers to
encounters in personal communities being organized in either a loose or an intimate form (in
loser oder inniger Form).58 It is once again seen in Husserliana XLII where he refers to
community members being “devoted” more or less intimately (mehr oder minder innig
hingegeben).59 Husserl’s characterization of intimacy in the context of communities in the form
of more-or-less is not an indication of imprecision or informal expression; given his earlier
writings on parts and wholes, we should read his use of intimacy as an indication of relations of
mereological proximity. This suggests an account of community organization operating along a
spectrum ranging from relations of relative immediacy between parts and wholes on the one
hand to mediate relations on the other. I start my examination of Husserl’s use of mereological
proximity in the context of his concept of community at the “lower level” of loosely organized,
anonymous communities.

Ideas II, p. 206 [translation modified]: “Alle solche Einheiten, soweit ihre faktisch hergestellte oder gemäß ihrem
eigenen, unbestimmt offenen Horizont herzustellende Kommunikation reicht, konstituieren nicht nur eine Kollektion
sozialer Subjektivitäten, sondern schließen sich zu einer mehr oder minder innig organisierten sozialen Subjektivität
zusammen, die ihr gemeinsames Gegenüber hat in einer Umwelt, bzw. zu einer Welt, die für sie ist.”
57

Hua XV, p. 59: “Indem auch neue Subjekte uns entgegentreten und mit uns zur Gemeinschaft des personalen
Lebens kommen, und in den verschiedensten Weisen und Stufen, in loser oder inniger Form, erwächst auch ein
immer neuer Gehalt, eine immer neue Gemeinschaftskultur, die Umwelt als "unsere" Objektwelt bereichernd.”
58

Hua XLII, p. 508: “Man lebt in Gemeinschaft und lebt mit – mehr oder minder innig hingegeben, eventuell aber
auch flüchtig und schnell wegsehend – ihr Unglück, ihre Schicksalsschläge und sieht, wie sie sich dabei verhalten.”
59
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4.1 Anonymous Communities
A mediated form of community, what I refer to as an anonymous community, is one
whose members are only loosely bound together, but which still manages to function as a whole
despite this loose binding. Mediation here refers to the kind of metaphorical “distance” Husserl
discusses in the context of mereological proximity. I suggest that anonymous communities
possess the formal structure of concatenations as found in Husserl’s mereology. One of the
places we find the language of community organizations being “loose” (loser) is in Husserl’s
Cartesian Meditations. Husserl there contrasts loose cultural communities (e.g., the European
community) with narrower cultural communities (e.g., the French community).60 By the
functioning of a loosely bound community, I here just mean that the community is capable of
remaining a unified whole and providing the background of beliefs, values, and actions for its
members understood as parts even when members do not explicitly reflect upon or act in direct
reference to the group. The notion of “loose” here refers to a relatively large degree of
mereological remoteness (as opposed to mereological proximity), such that the community does
not immediately depend on well-focused or cooperative, purposive joint actions. We can also
read this looseness as members of the community whole not being dependent for their existence
on the community. On Husserl’s account, the community itself is founded on its members, but

CM, p. 92. Cf. CM, p. 133: “Everyone, as a matter of apriori necessity, lives in the same Nature, a Nature
moreover that, with the necessary communalization of his life and the lives of others, he has fashioned into a
cultural world in his individual and communalized living and doing – a world having human significances, even if it
belongs to an extremely low cultural level. But this, after all, does not exclude, either a priori or de facto, the trust
that men belonging to one and the same world live in a loose cultural community – or even none at all – and
accordingly constitute different surrounding worlds of culture, as concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or
absolutely separate communities live their passive and active lives.”
60
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this need not also mean that members are thereby founded on the community in reciprocal
fashion.61
In “The Origin of Geometry,” Husserl focuses on geometry as a ready-made tradition,
remarking that the entirety of the socio-cultural world exists in the form of a tradition.62
Language and linguistic communities are examples of such a tradition. Husserl suggests that a
linguistic community (the group of those speaking and understanding the same language) is not a
PHO insofar as it lacks an element that is present in the latter understood as more “genuine
personal associations.” This does not, however, preclude it from being a personal community of
another type. As Husserl says:

There needs to be separation between personalities of a higher order as genuine personal
associations, and merely communicative communities as communities of influence; a
language does not arise as a state constitution in the parliamentary state.63

The linguistic community is not an intimately bound PHO insofar as it lacks a unified, focused
willing as a community agent. Individual persons can participate in a linguistic community for
their individual purposes, and not with an eye to the goals of the linguistic community
understood as a whole. Members of the linguistic community function as a unified whole without
requiring deliberation on what the community’s purpose is; rather, members ordinarily engage in
a linguistic community in an instrumental fashion, speaking, writing, and gesturing to one
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To foreshadow, such reciprocity will be the case for intimate PHO. That is, the PHO is founded on its members,
who are also founded on that whole.
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OG, p. 354.

Hua XIV, p. 201: “Da muss aber geschieden werden <zwischen> Personalitäten höherer Ordnung, echten
Personalverbänden, und bloss kommunikativen Gemeinschaften, Wirkungsgemeinschaften; eine Sprache entsteht
nicht so wie eine Staats Verfassung im parlamentarischen Staate.”
63
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another.64 While the existence of the linguistic community depends for its existence on its past
and present members, the members of the community do not depend for their entire existence on
the community. For example, all of the personal goals of an individual community member need
not be constrained by their belonging to a linguistic community.
A linguistic community represents an anonymous form of community in the mereological
sense insofar as it exhibits the features of a concatenation. Members of a linguistic community
here have immediate communicative relations with some individuals, but have mediated
relations or even no contact at all with other members (especially with members in the distant
past). This is confirmed in Husserl’s essay on “The Origin of Geometry.” The linguistic
community as described in this essay can be considered as an anonymous community insofar as
historical sedimentations stand as a form of mediation between us and the original meanings of
concepts.

One is conscious of civilization from the start as an immediate and mediate linguistic
community [unmittelbare und mittelbare Sprachgemeinschaft]. Clearly it is only through
language and its far-reaching documentations, as possible communications, that the
horizon of civilization can be an open and endless one, as it always is for men.65

Nevertheless, we are able to function in the linguistic community despite this mediation or
distance from the original meanings of linguistics concepts. There is here a forgetfullness of the
original meanings underlying such concepts.66 This is especially true, as Husserl points out, in
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The case would be different here if individuals were to band together in the project of constructing a new
language.
65
66

OG, p. 358.

Cf. Buckley (1992). Also, see Chapter V on the notion of such forgetfulness understood as a form of sociocultural crisis.
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the case of “written, documenting linguistic expression.”67 By writing expressions down, it
becomes possible to communicate without actually encountering other individuals through a
“personal address.”68 The concepts of mediacy and immediacy Husserl refers to in this essay are
the same as he developed in his formal mereology insofar as such mediation refers to a
mereological distance from what was self-evident prior to being written down. The linguistic
community here has the form of a concatenation, then, insofar as members are at a mediated
remove from understanding the linguistic community as a whole to which they belong.
Another example of an anonymous community in Husserl arises as he refers to
communities such as large political states where the vast majority of members are unknown to
others. Our primary mode of experience of the community as a whole, then, is by way of
encountering strangers. In these cases, Husserl acknowledges that “my spiritual influence
propagates without my intention to unknown persons and environments that do not need to know
of me.”69 For Husserl, a political community is often a unified whole of this sort where not
everyone knows one another; our primary encounter in this type of personal totality is with
strangers in public:

A state is a personal totality, even though not everyone knows everyone else, as also
happens in a bigger club. The manner in which a personal association is established
[herstellt], of course, must emanate from the actual empathy [aktuellen Einfühlung] and
the actual arrangement or arise in natural subordination, etc., emanating from the status of
personal contact or communication. However, the basis of personal associations must
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OG, p. 360.

68

OG, p. 360.

Hua XIV, 195: “Meine geistige Wirkung pflanzt sich fort, ohne meine Absicht, in unbekannte Personen und
Umgebungen, die auch von mir nichts zu wissen brauchen (personale Wirkungsgemeinschaften ohne Einheit einer
umspannenden Gemeinschaftswollung und -handlung).”
69
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then be considered in mediate ways [mittelbaren Wegen] when the people remain
“unknown” [unbekannt].70

The indirectness of our interactions with unknown others in public still refers to the existence of
a unified community whole, but this indirectness indicates that such a community is mediated by
factors beyond our concrete face-to-face interactions with others and beyond our immediate
relation to the community as a whole. In the case of a political state, the foundations of the
personal association are “indirect” such that even those who remain unknown are included as
members of the political community.71 This indirect foundation and the state as a personal whole
still, for Husserl, constitutes a practical community that includes all full citizens.72
Consider the difference between the members of a family and the members of a large
supranational community. In the former case, members will know one another as individuals. In
the latter case, it is likely that the majority of one’s interactions with others will be with
strangers. In such a case, our relation as individual parts to the supranational community whole is
far more mediated than our relation to fellow family members. This example is analogous, then,

Hua XIV, p. 182: “Ein Staat ist eine personale Ganzheit, obschon da nicht jeder jeden kennt, so wie auch schon in
einem grösseren Verein. Die Art, wie sich eine personale Verbindung herstellt, muss freilich von der aktuellen
Einfühlung und aktuellen Verabredung oder natürlich erwachsenden, aber im Status personaler Berührung oder
Mitteilung sich stiftenden Unterordnung etc. ausgehen. Esmüssen dann aber die Stiftungen von personalen
Vereinigungen auf mittelbaren Wegen erwogen werden, wobei die Personen „unbekannt” bleiben.” The role of
empathy in the context of community is turned to more fully in Chapter III. Also see Taipale (2016), “From Types
to Tokens: Empathy and Typification.”
70

Hua XIV, p. 182. It’s perhaps for this reason that Husserl considers these forms of community as “peculiar.” Cf.
Flynn (2012).
71

Hua XIV, p. 182: “Veränderungen natürlich erwachsender personaler Gemeinschaften (oder Personalitäten
höherer Ordnung) durch partielle Verwandlung in eine Willensgemeinschaft. Im Staat: eine Willensgemeinschaft
hinsichtlich aller Vollbürger. Die noch nicht Wahlberechtigten, noch nicht an den staatlichen Funktionen Beteiligten
bilden ein Heer von Heranwachsenden, sich bei entsprechender Reife frei Unterordnenden und sofern zur
Willensgemeinschaft Zugehörigen. Aber sie können durch ihren Willen nicht mitwirken an der Staatsverfassung
oder ihrer Veränderung. Doch das ist unzureichend und bedarf eigener Überlegungen.”
72
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to the example Husserl provides in his ‘Third Investigation’ regarding the difference of
mereological proximity between the notes belonging to a melody and the moments of those tones
and the melody. Larger, more mediated communities show the characteristics Husserl attributed
to concatenations in his formal mereology. A large supranational community will contain
different associations within itself, and it is possible that individual persons will have more
immediate relations to smaller personal associations than to the supranational community as the
concatenation of all of those associations and institutions.73
In the concatenated unity ABC of associations AB and BC, parts A and C are related to
one another and to the concatenated unity as a whole, but only mediately; there is mereological
remoteness in this unity. An example can help to concretize this. If one person, Anne, is friends
with Betty, and Betty is friends with Caroline, then there is a basis for saying that when all three
are engaged in an activity that Anne has an associative relation to Caroline even when the latter
two are not friends in the strict sense. Here, though, the relation of Anne to Caroline is as a
“friend of a friend,” which is mediated by their mutual friendship with Betty. In Husserl’s
language, there is here a “partial unity” (Teileinheit) between Anne and Caroline, and mediate
association between all three.74 Put otherwise, the two immediate associations of Anne-Betty and
Betty-Caroline together constitute the mediate association Anne-Betty-Caroline. In the case of
large-scale political communities, there are some individuals I know in a close, personal sense,
but I am also related to others in the community that are unknown to me by virtue of belonging
to the same whole. To reiterate, Husserl’s description of concatenations says that “Two
This feature of nesting is referred to as the “inclusiveness” of a social group by Gilbert. I return to this as a feature
of political communities in Chapter IV.
73

74

Cf. LI, p. 32.
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associations form a concatenation, when they have some but not all members in common.”75 For
a large political community, it is unlikely that I will have a close common bond with all fellow
members. I will know some members closely while others will only be encountered by me as
strangers. I thereby approach the latter as fellow citizens, but as members that are more remote
from me in terms of mereological proximity.
In his writings on supranational communities like “Europe,” Husserl recognizes the ways
in which some communities can be nested in others:
Personal life means living communalized as “I” and “we” within a community-horizon,
and this in communities of various simple or stratified forms such as family, nation,
supranational community.76

Furthermore:
Here the title “Europe” clearly refers to the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with
all its ends, interests, cares, and endeavors, with its products of purposeful activity,
institutions, organizations. Here individual men act in many societies of different levels:
in families, in tribes, in nations, all being internally, spiritually bound together, and, as I
said, in the unity of a spiritual shape.77

Even when anonymous communities exist in the absence of clear, enduring goals, we still find
that they can be bound together and unified according to looser criteria. Husserl suggests that
community life already exists when we encounter instances of interpersonal civility between
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LI, pp. 32-33.
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VL, p. 270.

77

VL, p 273.
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strangers.78 While communalization in the forms of civil procedures or etiquette do not speak to
explicit, goal-directed action, they still allow for anonymous community organization, as
individuals are mediated by overarching conventions. These norms are the norms of a
community, and not idiosyncratic rules for specific individuals.
I have here made a case for ways that Husserl describes some communities in their loose,
anonymous forms of organization. In these types of communities, we encounter the mereological
structure of concatenations. This refers to one pole of a spectrum of mereological proximity
regarding the parts and the whole of a community. Communities understood as loosely organized
or anonymous can now be contrasted with communities of a higher level, that is, with tightlyorganized, intimate communities.
4.2 Intimate Communities
Husserl characterizes the structure of some communities as analogous to unified human
personalities that are capable of valuing and acting as a unified whole. It is in these instances that
we encounter his notion of communities understood as PHO. We see examples of this in his
accounts of communities such as practical communities of will, communities based on personal
love, and some of the earliest philosophical communities. Husserl presents these communities as
intimate communities, and I argue that this property of intimacy used in these contexts should be
understood according to the meaning it has in Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes. As a
reminder, Husserl’s notion of intimacy refers to relations of mereological proximity such as
reciprocal foundational dependence and, to a lesser degree, in cases of one-sided dependence.
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Hua XV, p. 423
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The initial characterization Husserl provides of intimacy in his Logical Investigations
suggests that it applies to moments and not to pieces. On that basis alone, it would be a
surprising term for describing communities as founded on individual persons as their pieces.
Nevertheless, I demonstrated how Husserl allows pieces to be considered as moments in cases of
more comprehensive extended wholes that exist over a span of time.79 Understanding
communities as intimate will require showing how relations of one-sided or reciprocal
dependence exist, even when these relations are not as reciprocally dependent as moments such
as color and extension. The project of showing how intimacy is in play in regard to a community
is possible, however, insofar as it is a form of mereological proximity, and insofar as
mereological proximity refers us to a spectrum. I now highlight instances where Husserl directly
refers to communities as intimate. If my reading is correct, we should expect to find instances of
mereological proximity regarding relations between different parts of the whole and between the
parts and the whole itself. On that basis, I then focus on Husserl’s notion of PHO, since he often
refers to them as intimate communities.
One particular type of community described by Husserl as intimate is a community based
on personal love. What I want to guard against from the beginning of this discussion, though, is a
conflation of or ambiguity regarding love and intimacy. While love definitely can possess
emotional and sexual connotations, intimacy means something specific in Husserl’s philosophy,
and does not carry those connotations.80 The injunction to be wary of conflating love and
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LI, pp. 42-43.

To be clear, I am not engaging in a philosophical investigation of Husserl’s specific understanding of love. I am
taking the notion of love as something vague, involving emotional and/or sexual components. Husserl describes love
as a “lasting disposition,” a “lasting practical habit,” and as arising for the ego which is a “pole of affections and
actions” (Hua XIV, p. 172). As such, I am taking this notion of love to not be a technical term to the extent that
intimacy is. The topic of love is a complex topic in the context of Husserlian phenomenology. There is a debate that
80
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intimacy, then, is more than just a piece of cocktail party advice, but amounts to a mereological
category mistake. If we understand intimacy through Husserl’s mereology, then we can see the
possibility for intimacy in the absence of a strong emotional bond of love. Personal associations
of love can possess intimacy (in the mereological sense), but not all cases of intimacy (again in
the mereological sense) involve love.81
Some communities, according to Husserl, exhibit reciprocal (wechselseitig) relations
between members and between members and the community as a whole. When this reciprocity is
present in the context of joint actions, we get what Husserl refers to as a “practical community of
will” (Die praktische Willensgemeinschaft).82 Since Husserl has elsewhere referred to
communities as founded wholes, and since reciprocity plays a role in the existence of practical
communities of will, this lends support to my claim that Husserl is using his mereology in these
discussions. In these cases, it’s possible that we will have an intimate community to the extent
that my will is reciprocated by another person’s will and that we together found a community

has unfolded between James Hart and John Drummond that focuses on the intentional structure of the act of loving,
which amounts to a discussion of the intentionality of the emotions more broadly construed. I want to emphasize
that I am not here entering this debate. The reasons I feel I am able to bring up love in the way that I do without
entering this debate are twofold. First, I am not in this chapter addressing the topic of intentionality, and am
therefore not addressing a more specific account of the intentionality of love as an emotion. Rather, my approach is
of an ontological nature, asking what kind of object a community is, not how it is the correlate of intentional
consciousness. Second, my focus is on the love insofar as it exists as a unifying principle for a community, and am
not dealing with individual instances of love.
Hua XIV, p. 172: “The ego is the pole of affections and actions, as it is a unity pole passing through the striving of
the whole flowing consciousness. Striving in its various modalities makes the life of the ego; all intentionality that
constitutes the form of mental possessing, freely available, acquired units of existence, and of valuable or useful
existence, is a structure of striving and eventually the “conscious” will. However, I come with others in a
community of striving, so I live as I in him and he in me. But it then comes to the type and intimacy of this
community on the extent of the intertwined-security of I and Thou, to the extent of the relevant community of
striving and further on various other points. Not every community is a reciprocal community, and not every
reciprocity is a community of love.”
81

82

Hua XIV, pp. 169-170.
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through a joint action.83 When Husserl introduced his notion of intimacy in the Logical
Investigations, he claimed that there was intimacy between the non-independent moments insofar
as they were immediately and reciprocally dependent upon one another. This is seen most
strongly in the case of mutual dependency between color and extension; neither can exist without
the other. In the case of a shared practical action, “we” accomplish something as a group, even
though the group is founded on members as independent objects. Each member of the
community is then a part of the whole in the sense of an intimate unity, existing as “close” to the
whole in the mereological sense of mereological proximity. The whole in question, then, is not
the kind of whole approachable in an abstract time segment, but is in Husserl’s sense a “more
comprehensive whole.” I depend on your cooperation and you depend on mine in pursuit of our
shared task. Perhaps, furthermore, there is here a history of such dependence in the form of a
tradition. Without this reciprocity in the case of a cooperative practical community, the
community ceases to exist. This reciprocal dependency means an activity is one of reciprocal
foundation, and the comprehensive whole of our practical community of will is thereby intimate.
The reciprocity that is found in a practical community of will in general is extended to
examples Husserl provides of personal love, such as in the case of a marriage. A marriage is a
personal association characterized as a personal whole.84 In the context of a marriage, Husserl
suggests that there is a personal unity involving an “intimate linkage” (innige Verknüpfung)

Hua XIV, pp. 169-170: “Ist das Verhältnis gestiftet, so ist jede Handlung, in der es in Erscheinung tritt,
charakterisiert als aus der stiftenden Willensverflechtung der beiden Personen hervorgehend. Ich befehle, ich als
Herr, er folgt „pflichtgemäss” als Diener, im Bewusstsein des Sich-unterworfen-habens, Unterworfehseihs, und
hinsichtlich des Tuns im Bewusstsein seiner Pflichtgemässheit.”
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Hua XIV, pp. 182: “Eine Sprachgemeinschaft ist keine personale Verbindung, die ein personales Ganzes schafft,
wohl aber eine Ehe, selbst wenn sie eine „moderne” Ehe ist.”
84
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between the partners.85 Furthermore, Husserl describes marriage as “the most intimate unity”
(innigsten Einheit). Requests and agreements represent the emergence of a community that
comes together explicitly for the purpose of jointly accomplishing a task.86 In the general
structure of a practical community of will, Husserl claims that my will is thoroughly intertwined
with your will such that there is reciprocal fulfillment; my actions realize your will and your
actions realize my will. Our cooperation involves reciprocal dependency:

[In the] community of will, agreement can also be reciprocal, resulting in a reciprocal
arrangement. I fulfill your wish if you fulfill mine, I’m doing this to benefit you and you
do this for my benefit. Furthermore, we both wish that something should be done, so we
“share” our decision; I do one part and you do the other part. Etc. S1 and S2 want the
same G, not each for himself, but S1 wants G just as S2 equally wants it, the will of S2
belongs to that willed by S1 and vice versa. That the part D1 is realized by S1 and D2 by
S2 in turn lies in the will decided on by both, and is for both resolved as “means” (in the
broad sense), or as what belongs to its realization and to the intent.87

Hua XIV, p. 220: “Was ist hier Sinngebende, was schafft die engere personale Einheit mit Einheit des Lebens,
obschon sich die Personen nicht kennen und keine solche konkret anschauliche und personal so innige Verknüpfung
da ist wie bei einer Ehe, z.B.?”
85

Hua XIV, p. 170: “In the request, we have a temporary relationship; the communication of my desire will, I hope,
act as a motive for his will, my desire and my hope are addressed to them in that its acknowledgement by the
addressee will move him to obey it. The request regards his desire, his will, his conduct; so that it is not addressed to
him, but it is carried by the message through which the executive with her acknowledgment, and in the contact
between I and Thou.” “In der Bitte haben wir ein vorübergehendes Verhältnis; die Mitteilung meines Wunsches
wird, hoffe ich, als Motiv für seinen Willen wirken, mein Wunsch und meine Hoffnung, dass seine Kenntnisnahme
durch den Adressaten <ihn bewege, ihm Folge zu leisten >, sind an diesen gerichtet. Der Wunsch betrifft sein
Streben, Wollen, Tun; damit ist er noch nicht an ihn gerichtet, sondern er ist es durch die Mitteilung, durch die mit
ihr sich vollziehende Kenntnisnahme, und in der Berührung von Ich und Du.”
86

Hua XIV, p. 170: “Willensgemeinschaft, Einverständnis kann dann auch ein wechselseitiges sein, endend in einer
wechselseitigen Vereinbarung. Ich erfülle deinen Wunsch, wenn du den meinen erfüllst, ich tue das dir zugute, wenn
du dafür mir jenes zugute tust. Ferner: Wir wünschen beide, dass etwas geschehe, wir ent- schliessen uns
„gemeinsam”, ich tue davon den Teil, du den anderen Teil. Usw. S1 und S2 wollen dasselbe G, aber nicht jedes für
sich, sondern S1 will G als von S2 gleichfalls Gewolltes, der Wille des S2 gehört mit zum Gewollten des Si und
umgekehrt. Dass S1 den Teil D1 realisiert und S2 D2, das liegt wiederum im Willen beider beschlossen, und ist für
beide beschlossen als „Mittel” (im weiteren Sinn) oder als zur Realisierung gehörig, vorher aber zur Absicht.”
87
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In addition to reciprocal communities on the basis of explicitly agreed upon plans, Husserl
claims there are also instances of an implicit intertwining of wills. In his discussion of a
community of love, Husserl suggests that there is an intertwining of wills, such that the strivings
and willings of one member are immediately realized through the strivings and willings of
another member without the necessity of an explicit request. In the case of a community based
on implicit reciprocal love, I accomplish a task, and in that way I fulfill a task for you without
necessarily requiring a request.88 For example, Husserl writes that:

Each [of the lovers] produces not merely reciprocal communications, operates not merely
with regard to the community of knowledge with their common environment and the like.
But in that they have been connected to a community of love in a universal way, all
aspirations of the one are received in the striving of the other, and one has been received
from all, and vice versa. […] Even in the life activities of each of the lovers that are
taking place other than in contact, of which the respective other knows nothing in the
greatest extent, [each] lives implicitly the will of the other.89
Furthermore, in the case of communities based on personal love, Husserl says that “lovers do not
live alongside one another and with one another, but in one another (ineinander), actually and
potentially.”90 The members of this kind of community are so “close” in the sense of
mereological proximity that they are said to be “in” one another.
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Hua XIV, pp. 172-174.

Hua XIV, p. 173: “Vorher: Sie machen einander nicht bloss wechselseitige Mitteilungen, betätigen nicht <bloss>
Gemeinschaft der Kenntnisnahme hinsichtlich ihrer gemeinsamen Umgebung u. dgl. Sondern darin, dass sie sich zu
einer Liebesgemeinschaft verbunden haben, liegt, dass in universaler Weise alles Streben des einen in das Streben
des anderen eingeht bzw. ein für allemal eingegangen ist und umgekehrt. […]Selbst in den Lebensbetätigungen
eines jeden der Liebenden, die sich ausser Berührung abspielen, von denen in grösstem Ausmass der jeweilige
andere also gar nichts weiss, lebt imfilicite der Wille des anderen.”
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Hua XIV, pp. 173-174: “Wir können sagen: Liebende leben nicht nebeneinander und miteinander, sondern
ineinander, aktuell und potentiell.”
90
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If these descriptions are to be invoking anything more than artistic license, an account
must be given of how this interplay of extreme metaphorical closeness plays out. I believe that
Husserl’s mereological concept of intimacy can provide such an account. It is not that these
lovers are in each other in any literal sense (in the sense of pieces), but given the possible
relations of dependency between parts and wholes in Husserl’s theory, this is not the only option
for reading this statement. The lovers are reciprocally in their love-based personal association as
moments of the communal whole. Indeed, Husserl here even uses the term “interpenetrative”
(Durchdringung), a term he introduced in his ‘Third Investigation.’91 Interpenetrative relations
were there contrasted with combinatory relations, where relations of interpenetration refer to
relations of dependence and relations of combination refer to relations of aggregation. In the
context of the community of love, Husserl claims that there is a “loving interpenetration”
(liebende Durchdringung), indicating such relations of dependence between lovers in the
formation of their community.
Cases of personal love provide a venue where colloquial interpretations threaten to
prevent us from understanding Husserl’s ontological structure of communities in general and his
notion of intimacy in particular. From the perspective of an informal, colloquial interpretation,
we might read this discussion of communities based on personal love as a contingent
interpersonal relationship marked with emotional features. On the other hand, we can appeal to
Husserl’s mereology in order to clarify the notion of intimacy, whereby we see that this means
there is a less mediated relation between founding parts and the founded whole. Less mediated
relations in the mereological sense at least means that the whole directly depends on members in
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LI, p. 35.
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the sense of a one-sided founding dependence. In more intimate communities, the members may
in part depend upon the community for some component of their existence, in which case there is
a reciprocal founding. Given the sense that Husserl establishes for the concept of intimacy in the
Logical Investigations, I suggest that communities based on personal love are “intimate”
communities. This amounts to the individual members being in a relation of mereological
proximity to the whole, less mediated as opposed to mediate.
Husserl is explicit that some philosophical communities are capable of being intimate
communities. In his discussion of the origins of philosophy in ancient Greece, Husserl describes
the early philosophical community as an intimate community:

A new and intimate community [innige Gemeinschaft]—we could call it a community of
purely ideal interests—develops among men, men who live for philosophy, bound
together [verbunden] in their devotion to ideas, which not only are useful to all but
belong to all identically.92

Wholes can be interpenetrative (Durchdringung) in some respects and combinatory
(Verbindung) in others, and in this passage, we clearly encounter both relations. The
interpenetration here is indicative of community intimacy. This passage provides strong support
for the mereological interpretation insofar as the binding of the members of the philosophical
community is achieved on the basis of a shared commitment to ideal, theoretical interests. This
provides an example of a community bound together in an intimate manner through an identity
in the activities of the parts of the communal whole. We find the same structure of intimacy here
as was found in the case of an explicit practical community of will and in a marriage insofar as
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the individual members are “close” to the tasks pursued by the community as a whole; the
community’s achievements closely depend on the founding parts (the philosophers). The
philosophical community depends on the labor of philosophers, while individual philosophers in
part depend on the achievement of the community at large in pursuit of their philosophical goals.
If it is actually true that these individuals “live for philosophy,” then there is here reciprocal
dependency, and the community is intimate in the mereological sense.
I have here provided a few examples from Husserl’s writing that highlights the use he
makes of the terms “intimate” and “intimacy” to describe certain types of communities. Husserl
put forth these types of communities as having a focused, unified willing. Why does this matter?
I am suggesting that there is a property that is possessed by communities understood as PHO that
is not possessed by lower level communities such as linguistic communities or large,
supranational communities. That property, I claim, is intimacy, and this amounts to an immediate
or relatively unmediated mereological proximity of parts (individual persons) to the whole that
they have founded (the community). A PHO, unlike more anonymous communities, will not
have the mereological structure of concatenations. In an intimate PHO, there is one-sided or
reciprocal founding between parts and wholes, and this founding is “proximate” or “close.”
Husserl characterizes at least some personal communities as “personalities of a higher
order.” Husserl puts forth these PHO as a “pre-eminent” type of community, and he often
discusses them as existing on a higher level in comparison with lower level, “headless”
communities.93 Husserl presents a community understood as a PHO as a distinct, person-like
entity with valuings and actions of its own. For example, Husserl writes that:

93

CM, p. 132.

98

A [university] faculty has convictions, desires, volitional resolutions, it becomes
responsible for actions, as an association, a people, or a state. And also we can speak
strictly, but according to higher levels, speak of a capacity, of character, of disposition,
and so on.94

The valuings and volitions of this kind of community are founded on the lives of individual
members. A new, founded entity has come into being through the relations of individuals when
arranged in such a way that a personal community emerges.95 As a PHO, a university faculty
would be intimate if its existence was founded on individual members, and if the existence of
individual members depended in part on their community-based identification. For example, if
part of my personal identity means being a professor of philosophy in a specific academic
department, I am partially dependent on the existence of that higher order comprehensive whole
even when I am a founding member.
As Husserl allowed in his theory of parts and wholes, relations of foundational
dependence can exist not only in cases of one-sided or reciprocally founding moments, but can
also apply to independent objects when they are grouped together over time. In such cases, the

Hua XIV, p. 201: “Es ist also keine blosse Analogie, wenn wir von einem Gemeingeiste z.B. sprechen, kein
blosses Bild, ebensowenig als wenn wir korrelativ von einem Gebilde wie der Sprache sprechen oder der Sitte usw.
Eine Fakultät hat Überzeugungen, Wünsche, Willensentschlüsse, sie vollzieht Handlungen, ebenso ein Verein, ein
Volk, ein Staat. Und auch von Vermögen, von Charakter, von Gesinnung usw. können wir im strengen, aber
entsprechend höherstufigen Sinn reden.”
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Hua XIV, pp. 200-201: “Die gemeinsame, die verbundene Personalität als „Subjekt" der gemeinsamen Leistung ist
einerseits Analogon eines individuellen Subjekts, andererseits aber nicht bloss Analogon, sie ist eine verbundene
Personenvielheit, die in ihrer Verbindung eine Einheit des Bewusstseins (eine kommunikative Einheit) hat.
Innerhalb der Vielheit der auf die Einzelpersonen verteilten Willen hat sie einen für sie alle identisch konstituierten
Willen, der keinen anderen Ort, kein anderes Substrat hat als die kommunikative Personenvielheit; und so für andere
„einheitlich”, sozial konstituierte Akte, jedes Ich ist Subjekt der Handlung, aber jedes in einer Funktion, und so ist
die verbundene Einheit aller Vollsubjekt. Es ist ein einheitliches Substrat; wie das Ich, die Person, Substrat ist für
ihre individuellen Akteinzelheiten und bleibenden Akte, so ist die kommunikative Personenvielheit Substrat: Sie ist
da keine Vielheit, sondern eine in Vielheiten fundierte Einheit, und sie ist Substrat für „Akte” als Akteinzelheiten
und für bleibende Akte, Akte, die selbst konstitutive Einheiten höherer Stufe sind, die ihre fundierenden Unterstufen
in den betreffenden einzelpersonalen Akten haben.”
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independent objects take on the features of moments. Personal communities are founded on their
individual members which are independent objects. Since persons as independent objects
together found the new higher-order, complex objects which are communities that persist over
time, we must on Husserl’s account also consider persons as moments of the community whole.
§5. Conclusions
As these passages suggest, the unity of “personal unities of a higher level” comes in
degrees, and it is the notion of this “greater or lesser” that catches my interest. The unity of
community is here organized according to different levels of intimacy or anonymity. Both are
unified forms of community according to Husserl, but what separates them on my reading (and
what I have argued is Husserl’s strategy) is the mereological proximity between parts and
wholes. I have claimed that Husserl’s concept of communities understood as PHO are intimate
forms of community, and that this must be understood according to the sense it has in his theory
of parts and wholes. An intimate community, on that basis, amounts to individual members (the
parts) being in more immediate relationships of dependence with the community (the whole).
These arguments were given as I contrasted a colloquial interpretation and a mereological
interpretation of Husserl’s concept of community.
Community for Husserl is founded as a whole on persons who are parts, and their
founding gives rise to something distinct in the form of a community. If this founding is “loose,”
the community can be understood as an anonymous, lower-level community. Members here are
at a further “distance” from the whole in terms of mereological proximity. The structure of these
anonymous communities is akin to concatenated wholes. If the founding is “intimate,” then the
community is a PHO. Founding members of a PHO are “closer” to the community as a whole
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considered according to mereological proximity. For Husserl, communities exist along a
spectrum ranging between the extremes of anonymous and intimate inward organization.
How, then, do matters stand in regard to the conflicting interpretations of Husserl’s
concept of PHO in the secondary literature? I suggest that these secondary accounts are getting
something right, but they do not show the entirety of Husserl’s conception of community. I
highlighted above two main camps of interpretation. The first (including but not limited to
Buckley, Drummond, and Donohoe) was of interpreters who set the criteria for PHO at the high
level of individual and communal authenticity. The second (including but not limited to Carr and
Miettinen) was of interpreters who set the bar for PHO relatively low, at the level even just of a
sense of experiential commonness amidst community members. My hypothesis was that this
inconsistent secondary reception arose insofar as there was not enough attention paid to the role
of Husserl’s concept of mereological proximity in the context of his concept of community. On
the reading I have developed here, Husserl’s PHO exist when there is a mereological relation of
intimacy at play between individual persons as parts and the community as a whole. This lends
itself in part to the first group of interpreters insofar as the cooperative, authentic joint actions of
community members may be more immediately related to the unified community whole; the
community here directly depends on the activities and interactions of members. This dependence
can be even stronger in cases of reciprocal founding, where it is not only the community whose
existence is founded on individual members, but members partially depend upon the community.
The kinds of communities that Husserl describes as PHO are the same ones he describes as
intimate or more immediate. It is precisely in these kinds of communities (e.g., marriages, certain
philosophical communities, etc.) where their existence depends on the members, and members in
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part depend on the community for a component of their personal identity. The second group of
interpreters took Husserl’s notion of PHO as applying to a much wider range of community
formations. While my reading highlights that intimacy is a relation that Husserl uses in the form
of a spectrum, it is not clear to me that intimacy is the right notion for understanding all forms of
personal communities. As such, it is also less plausible that PHO in Husserl’s terms is the
concept to be appealed to in understanding all forms of community.
By appealing to Husserl’s mereological notion of mereological proximity, we can
taxonomize communities by showing both their internal dynamics and their relations to other
communities. I have suggested that Husserl’s concepts of community and his account of a
“personality of a higher order” hang together coherently, but only when close attention is paid to
the terminology developed in the context of his mereology.

CHAPTER III
THE EXPERIENCE OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP
§1. Introduction
This chapter argues that Husserl’s account of the first-person experience of being part of
a community is based on his formal theory of parts and wholes in a way that has been overlooked
in the secondary literature. I motivate my argument by rehearsing the main ways that Husserl’s
account has been interpreted by commentators (§2). I demonstrate Husserl’s account of
intentional experience as it applies both to coupling ourselves with other persons in the form of a
personal association, and, correlatively, to experiences of a shared surrounding world. In this
way, it is shown that Husserl has one general account of how membership is experienced within
all forms of communities. This is a phenomenological account in Husserl’s sense insofar as he
describes the correlations of consciousness with objects and states of affairs as they are
experienced by community members (§3). Appealing to Husserl’s ontological taxonomy of
community types (as argued for in Chapter II), I propose a reading of how communities are
experienced by their members. This reading hinges on showing the importance that Husserl
places on mereological proximity in his discussion of community. On the basis of Husserl’s
notion of mereological proximity, I argue that the structure of first-person experience of
belonging to a community follows directly from how a community is loosely or tightly
organized. This means that while Husserl provides one general account of the experience of
community membership, membership within loosely organized, anonymous communities has
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experiential features that are distinct from those of tightly-knit intimate communities (§4). In this
way, I reframe current interpretations in the secondary literature (§5).
In what follows, I use phrases such as “experiences of being part of a community,”
“experiences of community membership,” and “experiences of belonging to a community”
interchangeably. While these phrasings can be ambiguous (e.g., regarding different senses for
different genitives), Husserl’s framework simultaneously accounts both for experiences that
explicitly have community membership as their content in addition to experiences that one has
while belonging to a community yet which do not directly thematize the community itself. In the
latter case, this means that one can have experiences while existing as a part of a community
whole which nevertheless do not explicitly include an experience of “belonging” or
“togetherness.” On Husserl’s account, then, features of the experience of community
membership are found in places that they have not typically been sought.
§2. Experiences of Being Part of a Community in the Secondary Literature
Husserl’s descriptions of experiences of belonging to a community have been interpreted
in the secondary literature as being shaped by features such as shared interests, goals, or the
appropriations of traditions by community members. While such interpretations of Husserl’s
account are correct in highlighting these features in the context of our experience of others and
the way fellow members share a world, they do not, as I claim, get to the bottom of his account. I
first rehearse interpretations of Husserl on this topic as put forth in the secondary literature. The
specific Husserl commentators I focus on here are McIntyre, Drummond, Jacobs, Taipale, and
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Carr.1 While the authors who have addressed Husserl on the topic of intersubjectivity in general
and his conception of social groups in particular are increasingly numerous, I focus on these
specific interpretations insofar as they thematize features of the experiences that we have while
being a part of a community. On that basis, I indicate a strategy for how these interpretations can
be made more precise in relation to Husserl’s writings (a strategy which I flesh out in the
remainder of the chapter).
Ronald McIntyre examines a weaker and a stronger sense of community membership
found in Husserl’s writings. McIntyre connects experiences of belonging to communities with
Husserl’s notion of empathic pairing. The specific notions of “empathy” (Einfühlung) and
“pairing” (Paarung) as put forth by Husserl are laid out in detail below, but let it suffice for now
to say that empathic pairing refers to instances in which one person implicitly or explicitly
experiences being coupled together with one or more other persons on the basis of interpersonal
similarities. McIntyre rightly points out that for Husserl there is an essential correlation between
personal associations and their shared surrounding world.2 A weak sense of community
membership according to McIntyre involves a pairing between all human beings into the group
of humanity at large, that is, into a personal association with all other humans on the basis of
similarities as conscious, living beings.3 McIntyre claims that the group of all of humanity is too

1

In focusing on the accounts of community membership in these commentators, I do not claim to address their
articles and book chapters in their entirety. Rather, I am just abstracting out portions from the works of these
commentators that relate directly to the project of this chapter.
McIntyre (2013), p. 83. Cf. Husserl, Ideas II, p. 201. Husserl’s specific notion of the “surrounding world”
(Umwelt) will also be laid out in detail in the following section.
2
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McIntyre (2013), p. 82.
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general to count as a “true” community,4 and the upshot of his analysis is that for Husserl, “True
communities are interest-oriented.”5 Beyond the group of all human beings (which does not
seem to be interest-oriented in any definitive way), we experience membership within
communities in a stronger, truer sense according to McIntyre when shared valuing, planning, or
acting together factor into experiences of membership within narrower groupings.6 A community
of bird-watchers is constituted on the basis of the similarities between members such as a shared
interest in observing birds; a community of wine enthusiasts is constituted on the bases of
similarities such as shared interests and activities involving wine evaluation and consumption.7
McIntyre thereby suggests that shared interest and goals do the work of shaping our first-person
experience of belonging to a community by highlighting interest-based features of fellow
members and their surrounding world that are relevant and thereby salient to the particular
community.
In a series of articles, John Drummond puts forth a similar interpretation of Husserl.8 On
Drummond’s reading, personal associations are again experienced on the basis of empathic
pairing correlated with a group’s shared surrounding world.9 The experience of a shared
surrounding world for personal associations includes cognitive, evaluative, and practical

4

Cf. Drummond (1996), p. 245. This is a weak community insofar as it does not indicate any particular sociocultural similarities between members; it accounts for a broad sense of identity across all human beings but not of
intra-human group differences.
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McIntyre (2013), p. 82.
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McIntyre (2013), p. 82.
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McIntyre (2013), p. 87. Both of these examples are McIntyre’s and are not to my knowledge from Husserl.
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Cf. Drummond (1996; 2000; 2002). Also see Drummond (2003) on the structure of intentional experience in
general.
9

Drummond (1996), p. 244; Drummond (2002), pp. 142-143.
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experiences10, with the criteria of successful or incorrect experiences being based on shared
projects and shared practical interests.11 For Drummond, communication amongst persons brings
about a personal association in the form of a “society,” but this is (similar to McIntyre)
supposedly not yet a community in Husserl’s sense because “such associations are communities
only in a weak, imprecise sense.”12 While Drummond concedes that Husserl occasionally uses
the term “community” and its cognates for all forms of personal associations, he notes that
Husserl is at other times more careful to distinguish between the traditional categories of society
(Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft) in a fuller sense.13 Communities exist for Husserl
in the full sense, according to Drummond, when they include interactions that influence not just
mutual understandings between persons through communication (such as when we together
acknowledge that something exists for us in common, like the weather14), but when persons are
influenced in the coordination of their actions.15 For example, a community is said to exist in
Husserl’s technical sense when co-workers interact with one another in pursuit of a shared
goal.16 Drummond, like McIntyre, suggests that different forms of personal associations are
bound together on the basis of their shared interests and values, with Drummond especially
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Drummond (1996), p. 244.

Drummond (2003), p. 81: “The practical interest limits the goal of precise determination to those features relevant
to our interest in the object, and, at the same time, limits the degree of precision necessary in order for those interests
to be satisfied.”
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Drummond (1996), p. 245.
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Drummond (1996), p. 245. Cf. Tönnies (2001).

14

Drummond (2000), p. 35.
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emphasizing the community-constituting role of practical interests and goals.17 While not
requiring a strict identity of interests between members, groupings such as partnerships cannot
withstand a complete openness to the different interests of partners, and they face the danger of
rupturing if competing interests diverge too far.18
Commentators such as Hanne Jacobs, Joona Taipale, and David Carr highlight the feature
of the appropriation (Übernahme) of socio-historical traditions in the experience of community
membership according to Husserl, especially in the case of communities including indeterminate
or anonymous others.19 Indeed, for Husserl, the entire socio-cultural world exists in the form of a
tradition, so it is important to understand how the passing-down of traditions occurs across
generations.20 Experiencing being a part of a community does not, on Jacobs’s reading, require
empathy. What we find instead is an approach to understanding features of the experience of
community membership according to Husserl that does not thematize the experience of concrete
fellow members to the same degree that it is appealed to in the interpretations from McIntyre and
Drummond. Paraphrasing part of Jacobs’s argument into the language of necessity and
sufficiency, the empathic experience of concrete others (experiencing others originarily inperson) is not a sufficient criteria for experiencing community membership on Husserl’s account
insofar as membership requires the apprehension of the sense belonging to a surrounding world.
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Drummond (2002). Drawing on the work of Gurwitsch, Drummond highlights that persons unified in the forms of
partnership, membership, or citizenship find a shared identity in their practical means or the ends being sought.
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Drummond (2002), p. 144.

Jacobs (2013); Taipale (2014); Carr (2014). In this chapter, I use “indeterminateness” and “anonymity”
interchangeably. In this way, these designate a lack of clarity in regard both to the other members of a personal
association and in regard to the surrounding world. In Chapter IV, I follow Gilbert (2006) in distinguishing between
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Empathy is furthermore not a necessary criteria for experiences of community membership
insofar as our experiences of socio-historical traditions are influenced by other persons who are
either unfamiliar to us or are not even present.21 This means, as Jacobs continues, that a complete
account of the intentionality constituting the surrounding world “has to elucidate how my
experience of the world is enriched by others in a way that is not restricted to encounters with
concrete others.”22 Jacobs’s focus on Husserl’s notion of the appropriation of a socio-cultural
tradition (for instance, through language) provides inroads for such an elucidation of the
experience of community membership in the absence of empathy.
Taipale similarly suggests that an empathic experience of concrete others is not a
necessary condition in the context of community membership. Nevertheless, for Taipale, we still
represent others to some degree even when they are not present for us concretely. For example,
we represent absent others by way of our encounter with the surrounding world insofar as we
experience it as the same world that was previously experienced or would have been experienced
by others. The extent to which this amounts to empathy in Husserl’s sense will be addressed in
what follows.23 According to Carr, straightforward experiences of membership within

Jacobs (2013), pp. 6-7: “My awareness of the world is so diversified and sophisticated that the way in which I
experience the world cannot just be the result of encounters with concrete and individual others. That is, even
though the way in which I experience the world is shaped and influenced by concrete familiar others, not everything
is thus taken from concrete others.” Jacobs (2013), p. 8: “In short, the phenomenon of the intersubjective
appropriation of sense and validity is a broader phenomenon than the occurrence of the experience of empathy.
Thus, while empathy can occur without appropriation, appropriation can also occur apart from an empathic
awareness of a concrete other.”
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Taipale (2014), p. 107: “Apparently, with past persons we cannot share a world in the sense of reciprocity, but our
deceased relatives do not cease to belong to our kin. Rather, they are constituted as having witnessed the same world
as we do now, and in this temporally extended sense, we share the world with them. More generally, all past persons
are constituted as having walked the same earth, having witnessed the same sun and moon, and in this sense, we
constitute ourselves as members in a historical continuum of humanity.”
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communities can involve members going about their business uninterrupted according to a
community’s traditional norms.24 In those cases, community membership involves experiences
that are shaped by a tradition, although they need not include a thematization of the community
itself. In extraordinary circumstances, the community itself (even in a large community) can be
made thematic to members. Carr suggests that Americans experienced membership in terms of
acknowledging an explicit “we” in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001.25 In these cases, community membership is experienced explicitly; members
consciously identify with the community to which they belong and are bound together in
collectively experiencing such events as having historical import.26 Given that membership in
communities such as large political communities involves encounters with others who are either
unknown to me or experienced as anonymous others, empathic pairing is described by Carr as an
unnecessary component of the experience of community membership.27
What I argue is overlooked in these otherwise accurate interpretations is the sense in
which Husserl’s account of the experience of community membership draws from his notion of

Carr (2014), p. 49: “How should we characterize one’s relation to others in a shared scientific inquiry? They are
encountered as fellows, colleagues, co-participants in a common project. To be sure, this kind of encounter
presupposes the face-to-face relation, at least implicitly, since members of the scientific (or any other) community
are after all individuals interacting with one another. But while the face-to-face encounter has its own dynamic of
concerns, these are bypassed in the communal approach to these individuals. What counts about them for me is not
their inner life or their total existence, but merely their engagement in an activity that is oriented toward a goal that I
share. More is shared than just the goal, of course: There are explicit or tacit standards and rules about how inquiry
is to be conducted; shared notions of what counts as a valid contribution to the inquiry, and much more.”
24

25

Carr (2014), pp. 50, 58.

26
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Carr (2014), p. 49: “Clearly the standard terms for the intersubjective encounter do not apply here: The Other as
alter ego, autrui, appearing in a face-to-face confrontation, object of empathy or sympathy, returning my regard and
putting me to shame or reducing me to an object à la Sartre—all these terms seem inappropriate to the situation at
hand.”
27
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mereological proximity. This is not simply to say that there are differently-worded descriptions
used by Husserl, but amounts to the claim that Husserl’s account of experiences of belonging to
a community is more conceptually nuanced than these interpretations depict. Experiences of
belonging to a community according to Husserl refer to my being grouped with other persons in
relation to a shared socio-cultural surrounding world in ways ranging along a spectrum from
loosely-bound to tightly-knit communities. Husserl provides descriptions of such experiences in
the language of mereological proximity. Distinctions such as these refer to Husserl’s formal
mereology as put forth in his Logical Investigations, specifically to the ways in which parts of a
whole are said to be “mediated” (vermittelt). My claim, developed in what follows, is that
Husserl provides his account of the experiences of community membership by way of appealing
to his conceptualization of the relation between mediate/remote and immediate/proximate parts
of wholes. Even though it is undeniable that he makes references to group experiences as shaped
by shared interests, goals, or appropriations of a tradition, a focus on these features alone does
not provide a complete account of Husserl on this topic.
In their works, McIntyre and Drummond share the commitment (1) that loosely bound
social groups are to be distinguished from tightly knit communities, with Husserl’s technical
sense of community applying only to the latter. Furthermore, (2) different communities are
distinguished by way of their different shared interests and goals. In regard to the first point, I
argue below that there are phenomenological grounds for the claim that there is a single
experiential structure applying to all experiences of belonging to a personal association, and that
Husserl uses the term “community” broadly to account for all of these.28 In regard to the second

This forthcoming argument builds on my discussion from Chapter I. I there argue that Husserl’s ontological
structure of communities is broad enough to encapsulate both Gesellschaften and Gemeinschaften. The present
28
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point, I argue that Husserl’s criteria for distinguishing between communities is based on his
notion of mereological proximity, not just on differing interests and goals. One problem with
relying on shared interests and share goals for shaping experiences of community membership is
that they do not on their own indicate who is involved in the sharing or the specific ways those
individuals experience being bound together in their world. A shared interest in wine does not on
its own say anything about those who belong to a specific wine club with me, and it does not
specify the ways that members experience the contents of their surrounding worlds. Descriptions
of community membership given by Husserl do highlight these features, though, and I argue this
is done using his notion of mereological proximity.
Jacobs, Taipale, and Carr paint an accurate picture of Husserl by highlighting the
uniqueness of the experiences of belonging to socio-historical communities and appropriating
traditions amidst indeterminate others. I concede that taking over the content of a tradition
influences our experience of belonging to a community without directly thematizing an empathic
pairing of members with other concretely experienced members. As I argue below, though,
concrete empathy is not the only form of empathy appealed to by Husserl in the context of
experiences of community. Instead, Husserl provides an account of empathy being included as a
moment of experiencing community membership even in the absence of concrete encounters.
When he writes of this possibility, he refers to mediated forms of empathy, hinting that he is
working with his notion of mereological proximity.

chapter backs up this claim further by showing how there is a single structure for how we experience membership
within different types of communities.
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As a continuation of the arguments provided in Chapters I and II, the “mediation” of
mereological proximity here comes into play in the context of Husserl’s concept of community
not just ontologically but now also phenomenologically. The ontological organizations of
communities (e.g., being “intimately organized to a greater or lesser degree”29) run parallel to the
organizations of the experiences of community members therein. The statements that Husserl
makes regarding community membership are phenomenological claims insofar as he provides
descriptions of acts of consciousness as they are correlated with intentional objects as members
of a community experience them. Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes factors not just into
conceptualizing community as an object “from the outside,” but factors into the very ways that a
community is experienced by members “from the inside.” Ontological variations in community
types are thereby supported by the kinds of experiences had by the members of those
communities. In the final section of the chapter, I propose a strategy for re-framing the secondary
interpretations rehearsed here.
§3. Husserl on the Experience of Belonging to a Community
I argue in this section that Husserl provides a single account of experiencing being a part
of a community, where this singleness designates that the account is wide enough to apply to all
forms of personal associations. Husserl in some places compares the structure of intentionality as
it applies to experiences of other persons with the intentionality of perceptual experiences.30 For
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Ideas II, p. 206 [translation modified].

Crisis, p. 255. In the case of perception, the (noetic) act of perception is correlated with a perceptual (noematic)
object. The intentional experience as a whole simultaneously involves 1) the characterization of the perceptual
object just as it is perceived (e.g., as an object which is seen from this side with the other sides being co-perceived,
as related to my living body, etc.) and 2) a “noematic core” (noematischen Kern) that affords a sense of the “kind of
object meant, precisely as it is meant” (vermeinten Gegenständlichen, so wie es vermeint ist). Ideas I, p. 258. In the
latter case, there is the object we are conscious of which is the “something” (etwas) that can be the “bearer” (Träger)
of predicates (such as the characterizations of the perceptual object just as it is perceived). Ideas I, pp. 254-264. In
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experiences of belonging to a community, there is additional complexity beyond the perception
of material objects. For example, experiences of community membership include encounters
with other persons and groups of persons, such that empathy factors into our experiences; the
surrounding world is informed by the past, so discussions of memory and appropriations of sense
from traditions in the past contribute to experiences of membership. Despite this added
complexity, I argue that Husserl provides one general account of the structure of experience of
belonging to a community, and that this structure has two main parts. Since both parts of the
experience of community membership are said to be inseparable, they can be considered as
“moments” in Husserl’s technical sense.31
Pitched in the language of “personal associations,” Husserl’s account of the first-person
experience of belonging to a community applies to groupings of all types. Husserl condenses this
structure in the following passage:

We are in relation to a common surrounding world [gemeinsame Umwelt]—we are in
personal association [personalen Verband]: these belong together. We could not be
persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand there for us in a
community, in an intentional linkage [intentionalen Verbundenheit] of our lives.
Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the other.32

the case of perception, there is the object understood as an “object simply” (Gegenstand schlechthin), which affords
the possibility of various predicates related to its perceivability, that is, to the “object in terms of how it is
determined” (Gegenstand im Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten). Ideas I, pp. 259-260.
31

LI, p. 6.

Ideas II, p. 201. Cf., CM, p. 129: “Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the
“irreal” intentional reaching of the other into my primordiality is not irreal in the sense of being dreamt into it or
being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy. Something that exists is in intentional
communion [intentionalen Gemeinschaft] with something else that exists. It is an essentially unique connectedness,
an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of
men and things.”
32
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More tersely (though less precisely) stated, Husserl writes in a manuscript that, “We have
immediately shared experiences in the commonality of empathy.”33 For different community
types and the experiences of members within them, there are variations in the ways that fellow
members are characterized with a noematic sense and the community’s surrounding world is
characterized with its own noematic sense. I here briefly focus on these two moments, before
turning to them fully in the following sub-sections.
On the one hand, community membership is experienced insofar as I concretely
encounter or otherwise intend fellow community members, other persons grouped together in a
personal association. The experience of community membership in this way emphasizes that
membership is with other persons. I consider this moment of community membership to be
metaphorically “centripetal” or inwardly-oriented insofar as attention is drawn to experiences of
others persons coupled with me within a specific group.34 For Husserl, analyzing experiences of
other persons is done with recourse to the act of empathy, which has as its correlate other persons
as fellow experiencers of a world along with me.

Hua XIV, p. 223: “Wir haben unmittelbar gemeinsame Erfahrungen, in der Gemeinsamkeit der Einfühlung.”
While empathy here is said to lead to shared experiences, what will need to be clarified in what follows is if the
inverse of this statement also holds, namely, whether shared experiences are open to more mediate forms of
empathy, such as with others who are not experienced concretely.
33

I here borrow this language of “centripetal” and “centrifugal” from Merleau-Ponty, who applies the terms to his
phenomenological account of bodily spatiality. Rather than speaking of the living body, I here re-deploy them to
community. Cf. The Phenomenology of Perception, Landes translation (2012), pp. 55, 114, 123, 442-475. This
distinction is similar to the one discussed by Miettinen as between “the intrapersonal collective and its
accomplishments, that is, the difference between community (Gemeinschaft) as a habituated form of individual
activities and culture (Kultur) as the objective accomplishments of this community.” Miettinen (2014), p. 161. In
Chapter I, this centripetal moment of communities was discussed from an ontological perspective under the heading
of what Husserl calls “social subjectivities” possessing their own “inwardness” or “communal spirit.” In the present
context, I turn to the question of how social subjectivities are correlates of the experiences of their members.
34
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Husserl’s inclusion of empathy as a moment in the experiences of community
membership is quite strong. He goes so far as to insist that empathy is a fundamental component
of all intersubjective experiences, writing that, “The intersubjective world is the correlate of
intersubjective experience, i.e., the experience mediated [vermittelten] by ‘empathy.’”35 I take it
that the “intersubjective world” and “intersubjective experience” are wide enough notions to
include all experiences that make reference to other human subjects.36 If the experience of being
part of a community according to Husserl belongs to the class of intersubjective experiences, as I
assume37, it must be mediated in some way by empathy if he is to remain consistent relative to
this claim. What is initially clear is that Husserl’s account here faces a problematic
interpretational difficulty, especially since commentators such as Jacobs, Taipale, and Carr have
drawn attention to ways that Husserl accounts for the experience belonging to a community in
the absence of concretely empathized others. One way to avoid this difficulty is to say that
Husserl changes his mind and eventually comes to no longer believe that all intersubjective
experiences are mediated by empathy. As I argue below, though, there is textual evidence
suggesting that Husserl’s conviction regarding the mediations of empathy is sustained through
his writings.

Ideas I, p. 303. Hua III/1, p. 352: “Die intersubjektive Welt ist das Korrelat der intersubjektiven, d.i. der durch
"Einfühlung" vermittelten Erfahrung.”
35

36

Husserl later describes the intersubjective world as the world that has the sense of being there for others and not
privately for one subject. CM, p. 91.
37

This seems to me to be an uncontroversial assumption. Challenging this assumption amounts to saying that the
experience of being a part of a community is not an intersubjective experience that is, that it in no way makes
reference to other subjects.
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In addition to the centripetal moment of experiencing others in a personal association,
community membership is experienced on the basis of Husserl’s account of the experiences of a
common or shared socio-cultural surrounding world.38 I here argue that this moment of our
experience of community membership should be considered “centrifugal” since it draws
attention to a world that exists exclusively as the correlate for the members of a personal
association. While fellow community members and the community as a whole can be a part of
the surrounding world, this moment includes a wider class of objects, with Husserl referring to it
also as the locus of all socio-cultural objects such as books, churches, and political states. The
experiential moment of the surrounding world is outwardly-oriented to the extent that it is
directed to objectivities that are correlates of the consciousness of members.
To reiterate, the ultimate argument of this chapter is to show how Husserl’s account of
experiences of belonging to a community have their footing in his mereology. By first
explicating these two moments and showing how they factor into the experience of community
membership for Husserl in general (3.1 & 3.3), my argument proceeds (in §4) to his descriptions
that show his reliance on notions of mereological proximity. Regarding the moment of empathy,
furthermore, I here present four of the main ways in which Husserl discusses being paired with
others in a personal association (3.2). In this way, I lay the ground for an interpretation of
Husserl on the experiences of belonging to a community as mediated by empathy even in the
absence of concrete others.

38

This moment of communities was discussed in my earlier chapters from an ontological perspective under the
heading of what Husserl calls “social objectivities.”
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3.1 Empathy and Pairing in Personal Associations
Empathy (Einfühlung), for Husserl, is one of the ways through which we are related to
other persons.39 Husserl distinguishes between presently-presenting acts and re-presenting acts.40
The act of empathy belongs to the latter group, of what is translated as “presentifications” or “representations” (Vergegenwärtigungen). While presently-presenting acts such as perception
present objects to consciousness originarily, re-presenting acts are non-originary insofar as they
apperceptively refer to something that is not intuitively present “in the flesh.” The act of
empathy, similar to memory, is not put forth by Husserl as a source of originary experiential
evidence, but is rather described as providing non-originary or “derived” (abgeleitet) evidence.41
In the case of an act of memory such as the memory of a tree, Husserl claims that there is a representing of a past perception in the present; I perceived the tree in the past, and having a
memory of it is to re-present that originary perception in a non-originary, modified form after the
fact. In the case of empathy, then, I have not just my originary perceptual awareness of objects
and states of affairs in the world, but I also have an awareness of the other’s awareness of the
world. I can reflect on my own consciousness of objects in “an originary way,” but I am
precluded in principle from accessing the consciousness of another person “in the flesh.”
In some places, Husserl refers to the act of empathy as representing another conscious
subjectivity like my own on the basis of the expressivity of the other’s living body (Leib).42 The

39

CM, p. 92.

40

BPP, pp. 83-84.

41

Ideas I, pp. 279-282.

42

Ideas II, p. 358.
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other’s living body acts as a kind of expressive “passageway” (Durchgang) to the other’s
subjectivity.43 I empathically intend the expressive living body of another person while
simultaneously apperceiving their conscious lives as expressed in a non-originary fashion.
Husserl writes that:

It is characteristic of empathy that it refers to an originary Body-spirit-consciousness
[Leib-Geist-Bewusstsein] but one I cannot myself accomplish originarily, I who am not
the other and who only function, in regard to him, as a comprehending analogon.44

In this way, I experience the other as an embodied, conscious person like myself. The intentional
horizons in my consciousness of other persons are distinct from those belonging to my
experience of non-conscious material objects such as trees or stones. In the case of empathy, I
associate what my experience of the world is like as centered “here” from my living body with
what the other person consciously experiences of this same world from over “there.”45 As
Miettinen puts it, we here find “a unique inner depth” when faced with another person.46 The act
of empathy represents the other person, and my observing or otherwise interacting with them can
teach me something about the type of personal character they have, including their habituated
patterns of thinking, valuing, and acting.47 While some of Husserl’s descriptions of empathy

43

Ideas II, p. 358. Cf. Heinämaa (2010).

44

Ideas II, p. 208. Cf. Ideas I, pp. 9-10.

CM, p. 117: “I apperceive him as having spatial modes like those I should have if I should go over there and be
where he is.”
45

46
47

Miettinen (2013), p. 184.

As Darian Meacham suggests, these patterns of character and style should be understood as a referring to a
“formal inclination” that we have towards certain ways of living as persons based on our histories and our passive
and active constitution of the world. Cf. Meacham (2013), p. 11.
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refer to others as experienced concretely in person, other descriptions involve an empathic
characterization of others despite their absence, that is, without an encounter with another
embodied individual. This latter possibility is addressed further in §3.2.
Husserl’s account of what I am calling the “centripetal” experience of community
membership includes not just a one-sided experience of other persons, but refers to an empathic
“pairing” (Paarung) with those other persons into the form of a personal association. For
Husserl, “pairing” in general (not just empathic pairing) refers to “any forming of a plurality
(Mehrheit).”48 This configuration of groups occurs through a passive synthesis in the form of an
intentional association (Assoziation), which for Husserl means that objects are grouped together
in experience insofar as they exhibit the sense of belonging together on the basis of their
similarities (Ähnlichkeiten).49 This experience is passive to the extent that one does not need to
explicitly think, reflect, or make an inferential judgment. To appeal to two quick examples
provided by McIntyre, there is a pairing that leads me to experience multiple and connected
bananas as a unified “bunch” of bananas; I see a left and a right glove as “a pair” of gloves as
opposed to just two unrelated pieces of fabric.50 The passive synthesis of association means that
separate objects are taken as belonging together on the basis of their observed similarities.

CM, p. 112. The most comprehensive account that Husserl gives of “pairing” is in his Cartesian Meditations,
though there are also discussions of the concept in Husserliana XIV, XV, and the lectures forming the Analyses
Concerning Active and Passive Syntheses. We find more support for this notion, though, in Husserl’s account of the
motivations of association in Ideas II, §56.
48

“Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as ‘association,’ in contrast to passive
synthesis of ‘identification.’ In a pairing association the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two
data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis – essentially,
already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed) –, as data appearing with
mutual distinctness, they found phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted as a pair.”
CM, p. 112.
49

50

McIntyre (2013), pp. 74-78.
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Empathic pairing, as a species of pairing in general, is such that the experience of another
person is simultaneously the experience of a personal association that one is included within.51
Instances of empathy are in this way understood as “relations of mutual understanding”
(Beziehungen des Wechselverständnisses) between individuals.52 When encountering another
person, the other is experienced as being similar to myself at the very least to the extent that we
are the same kinds of conscious beings. I here have a conscious awareness of the other’s
awareness of the world in general, and it is within this shared world that we are paired. On
Husserl’s account, I thereby passively pair us together as belonging to the community of all
human beings.53 More narrowly, a group of scientists working together in a laboratory towards a
shared goal may consider themselves to be a distinctly paired group of cooperating researchers as
opposed to some other group of researchers outside the pairing. In this case, members are aware
of others’ awareness not simply of the world in general, but of a more narrowly encapsulated
socio-cultural surrounding world which motivates the paring.54 Members of the group remain
distinct individuals through the pairing, but the empathic pairing includes a blending or fusion
[Verschmelzung] of members into a personal association:

Every overlapping-at-a-distance [Fernüberschiebung], which occurs by virtue of
associative pairing, is at the same time a fusion and therein, so far as incompatibilities do
As argued in Chapter I, Husserl’s notion of community taken in its widest sense is indicative of his notion of all
personal associations.
51

Hua XXVII, p. 8: “Ferner, die einzelnen, getrennten Realitäten, bzw. ihre Ichsubjekte, treten zueinander in
Beziehungen des Wechselverständnisses („Einfühlung“); durch „soziale“ Bewußtseinsakte stiften sie (unmittelbar
oder mittelbar) eine völlig neuartige Form der Vereinigung von Realitäten: die Form der Gemeinschaft, geistig einig
durch innerliche Momente, durch intersubjektive Akte und Motivationen.” Kaizo 1, p. 329.
52

53

I would like to reiterate here that Husserl is operating with a very wide notion of community, which encapsulates
all forms of personal associations. See my discussion of this in Chapter I.
54

More is said on this in 3.3.
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not interfere, a similarizing [Verähnlichung], an accommodation of the sense of the one
member to that of the other.55

According to Husserl, the fusion of a personal association can make the group itself an object
that is explicitly recognized by its members (recall the example given by Carr), but one’s
community membership itself can also remain pre-reflective or unthematic through the coupling.
For instance, it is unlikely that every encounter with another person will explicitly evoke
experiences of the human community at large; I am not perpetually thinking of the group of all
other human beings even though I am always a member of that group. Nevertheless, the
experience of community membership according to Husserl allows for ways in which we
implicitly refer to other fellow members of a community. This pairing in the form of a personal
association persists so long as relevant similarities persist amongst members, though specific
pairings can dissolve in cases of conflict. More is said on the topic of conflict and community
membership below.
3.2 Types of Pairing
On the basis of Husserl’s writings, I here delimit what I take to be four main ways in
which he talks about empathic pairing and the noematic sense belonging to empathized others
within personal associations.56 While there are limitless factual possibilities for empathic pairing

CM, p. 118 (translation modified). Cf. Zahavi (2014), p. 133: “When I encounter another, my self-experience will
serve as a reservoir of meaning that is transferred onto the other in a purely passive manner. As a result of this, a
phenomenal unity is established. We are apprehended as a pair, as being alike and as belonging together, while still
being separate and different (Husserl 1985: 225); that is, the coupling or pairing entails no fusion.” While I am in
agreement with Zahavi here that empathic pairing refers to a unity despite differences, there is a fusion, as the
Husserl quote above stipulates, to the extent that a new unified whole has been founded on the basis of members as
its parts.
55

56

By highlighting these four types of empathic pairing, I do not mean to suggest that there cannot be other types.
The four given here occur in Husserl’s writing. A demonstration that there are further types would bolster my
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depending on the inclusion of different individual persons or as based on different kinds of
similarities, there are a number of general possibilities found in Husserl’s writings regarding
types of pairing in the form of personal associations. Husserl refers to noematic descriptions as
those that highlight the specific sense (Sinn) that belongs to objects just as they are experienced,
including levels of determinateness and the attributes of objects.57 Husserl claims, for instance,
that descriptions of noematic sense refer to ways in which objects are experienced in terms of
their clarity and distinctness58, and in terms of what is “genuinely perceived and the excess”
(eigentlich Wahrgenommenen und dem Überschuß).59 In the case of empathy, which Husserl
characterizes as a type of re-presenting, it has already been shown that one of the things I can
genuinely perceive is the other’s living body, unified with the “excess” of their conscious
subjectivity. I originarily perceive an expressive living body, and at the same time nonoriginarily represent their inner life. While this non-originary component of empathy seems to be
an essential component in Husserl’s descriptions of empathy such that I am consciously aware of
the other’s awareness, his descriptions are more ambiguous when it comes to what can here
count as being genuinely perceived while still being a case of empathy. As indicated above,
empathy in some places refers to my encounter with another person as an embodied individual.
There are other place, however, where Husserl refers to empathy in the absence of a concrete
encounter with another embodied individual. For Husserl, noematic correlates are essentially

overarching argument that Husserl’s account of community members is more fine-grained than hitherto
acknowledged.
57

CM, p. 36.

58

CM, p 36.

59

CM, p. 122 (translation modified).
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different in different kinds of intentional experiences, as seen in the ways that noematic sense
varies according to different characterizations of an object.60 In regard to empathy specifically
and its intending of other persons, different possibilities arise based on the sense characterizing
the persons with whom I am paired.
It is important to note the differences between these types first because Husserl suggests
that empathy plays a fundamental role in intersubjective experiences, and second because he
refers to empathy in distinct ways in the context of different experiences of community
membership. I suggest that the following four types of empathic pairing can be arranged into a
quadrant based on the intersection of the axis of concretely versus non-concretely experienced
others and the axis of determinately versus indeterminately experienced others. These are
phenomenological possibilities in Husserl’s sense insofar as they refer to different ways in which
there is a noetic-noematic correlation in experiences of community membership. While Husserl
himself does not systematically make this fourfold distinction, he discusses each of these in his
writings. One place where Husserl explicitly mentions distinctions regarding types of empathy is
in his essay on “The Origin of Geometry”:
We are co-conscious of the people in our external horizon in each case as ‘others’; in
each case ‘I’ am conscious of them as ‘my’ others, as those with whom I can enter into
actual and potential [aktuellen und potenziellenl], immediate and mediate [unmittelbar
und mittelbar] relations of empathy; there is here a reciprocal understanding with others
and on that basis I interact, enter into particular modes of community with them, and then
know, in a habitual way, of my being so related.61
60

Ideas I, p. 181.

OG, p. 358 [my emphases, translation modified]. Hua VI, p. 369: “Mitbewußt sind dabei die Menschen unseres
Außenhorizontes jeweils als „Andere”; jeweils „mir” bewußt als „meine” Anderen, als mit denen ich in aktuellen
und potenziellen, unmittelbaren und mittelbaren Einfühlungskonnex treten kann, ein wechselseitig sich mit Anderen
Verstehen und aufgrund dieses Konnexes mit ihnen Verkehren, mit ihnen in irgendwelche besonderen Weisen der
Gemeinschaft Eingehen und dann habituell von diesem Vergemeinschaftetsein Wissen.”
61
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This passage shows that Husserl is mindful of distinguishing between different ways in which I
can be empathically paired with others in the context of different types of communities. He
elsewhere refers to empathy as capable of being instituted in different ways, “in different
magnitudes and directions.”62 More is said about Husserl’s use of “mediate” and “immediate” as
concepts from his mereology in what follows, but in this sub-section I just highlight these four
types as general possibilities for empathic pairing in personal associations. This sets the stage for
more comprehensive analyses of the experiences of belonging within such communities in the
next section.63
As a first possibility, some experiences of belonging to a community with others include
a pairing with other concrete and determinate individuals. There is concreteness when I
originarily encounter other persons on the basis of their living bodies, that is, as they are
experienced face-to-face or “in the flesh.” I here encounter other members “genuinely.” There is
determinateness in this kind of empathy to the extent that the other persons belong to the
personal association as the particularly known individuals they are, and not as strangers. One
here is empathically paired with persons one knows personally. As one example of this
possibility (which is returned to later), Husserl discusses marriages and family communities in

Hua XIV, p. 200: “So haben wir im allgemeinen Bewusstseinszusammenhang, der durch Einfühlung in
verschiedener Weise, in verschiedenen Umfängen und Richtungen gestiftet sein kann, eine Schicht eines
allgemeinen, überpersonalen, und doch personalen leistenden Bewusstseins, in allen beteiligten Personen lebendig,
durch sie hindurchströmend oder von ihnen vielmehr ausströmend und doch durch sie hindurchströmend, als ob eine
Einheit der Person wäre, mit einem Bewusstsein und einem personalen Leisten.”
62

63

Insofar as Husserl is committed to the idea that personal associations are correlated with their own surrounding
worlds, each of these four possibilities of empathic pairing will entail an experiential relation to the surrounding
world for its members.
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light of the determinate functions and obligations that each concretely encountered individual
member has as a paired member of a specific community whole.64 There is here an awareness of
the other’s awareness of the family’s world and their place within it.
As a second type of empathy, communities can include a pairing with concrete yet
indeterminate others.65 Fellow members are again encountered “genuinely” in-person, but I am
not thereby guaranteed to know them personally. Husserl discusses this possibility of pairing
when he writes of the empathic relation that we have to unknown others such as strangers in the
case of large clubs or political states.66 In this case, I have an awareness of others’ awareness in
my empathic encounter with them, but the world we share is more public and impersonal than in
the case of family life. These first two possibilities refer to a pairing of myself with concrete
others, of being coupled with those I encounter “in the flesh.” In the following two possibilities
for empathic pairing, those with whom I am paired are characterized as being experienced nonconcretely. While there continues to be some awareness of others’ awareness given that empathy
is a specific kind of re-presenting, there is no longer a genuine encounter with the others as
embodied.
The third possibility for empathic pairing is of non-concrete encounters with determinate
others. Well-known historical communities are prime representatives of these types of pairings in

64

Hua XIV, pp. 175-179.

65

In the community of students attending a large university, for instance, others on campus are encountered
originarily (concretely) as embodied fellow students, though I need not, and likely will not, know each student
personally (determinately). This can of course be combined with the previous possibility. To appeal again to the
example of fellow students on a university campus, some will be encountered concretely and indeterminately,
though some can be concrete and known to me as distinct individuals.
66

Hua XIV, p. 182.
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Husserl’s writings, where those persons with whom I am empathically paired are represented not
as simultaneously living with me but as having lived previously in historical succession. I here
belong to a community with determinate others in the past while being precluded from concrete,
“genuine” interactions with them.67 Husserl describes this possibility, explicitly referring to
empathy, in regard to a community of determinate philosophers pursuing philosophical goals
over the course of history.68 One is here aware of another person’s awareness of the world
through some medium other than the expressive “passageway” of his or her living bodies. For
instance, I can here be empathically paired with another person whose conscious awareness of
the world is represented through his or her written works.
Rounding out types of empathic pairing, the fourth possibility is of communities that
include non-concrete and indeterminate others. In this case, I do not experience others “in the
flesh.” I here take myself as belonging to a personal association with others even when I am not
“genuinely” experiencing them bodily. As characterized by indeterminacy, I may represent
others as exemplars of groups with indeterminate or generally considered characteristics. 69
Husserl invokes this possibility in regard to linguistic communities, such that I find myself in
both a linguistic and empathic relation to unknown previous speakers and writers of a

67

For instance, I count both Husserl and myself as belonging to a certain group as members of the
phenomenological community in the form of a specific philosophical tradition. Although a concrete, empathic
encounter with Husserl as a living, embodied person is now impossible, he is represented by me as having been a
determinate and embodied individual person with whom I share certain interests and goals.
Hua XIV, p. 198: “Alle Einheit des historischen Geistes als historischen ist eine einseitige Beziehung. Mein Leben
und das Platons ist eins. Ich setze seine Lebensarbeit fort, che Einheit seiner Leistungen ist Glied in der Einheit
meiner Leistungen; sein Streben, sein Wollen, sein Gestalten setzt sich in dem meinen fort.”
68

69

This can be the case, for instance, if I have read or have been told things about a group to which I belong such that
I attribute characteristics to a vague group (e.g., of one’s distant ancestors) without knowing anything determinate
about former group members as individuals.
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language.70 In belonging to a linguistic community, I need not encounter all fellow members
concretely in-person. It is also here not necessary to represent all fellow members as those I
know personally. Experiences of belonging with others in a linguistic community includes an
awareness of another awareness, but it is not necessary for me to have a genuine encounter with
another embodied person while nevertheless being paired with others.
One of the essential moments of the experience of community membership for Husserl is
my experience of the other members belonging to a personal association. This kind of experience
of other persons is accounted for in Husserl’s work with the help of empathy. It is important to
include this centripetal, empathic moment in the context of explicating Husserl’s account of the
experience of community membership insofar as he makes the claim that all intersubjective
experience is in some way mediated by empathy. Husserl’s claim is not persuasive if empathy
applies only to others we experience concretely, since some of the communities we belong to are
shaped by anonymous or absent others. His claim is more persuasive, however, once we take into
account the different ways that he characterizes empathy. This at the very least means including
the four types of empathic pairing delimited here.
3.3 A Community’s Surrounding World
Through empathic pairing, I am to some degree aware of the awareness of those with
whom I am paired. What is included in the content of such an awareness of an awareness? On
Husserl’s account, to be paired with other persons in a personal association is simultaneously to

70

OG, p. 360. As an additional example of this kind of pairing, Husserl writes that contemporary Europeans are the
heirs to a task that was initially instituted by the ancient Greeks. In referring to “the Greeks” in connection with
contemporary European society, Husserl gestures to a personal association that is both non-concrete and
indeterminate.
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experience a shared surrounding world (Umwelt).71 With his technical notion of the “surrounding
world,” Husserl refers to what members of a community experience of the objects and states of
affairs around them, including other persons, groups of persons, practical use-objects, artworks,
and other socio-cultural products.72 The surrounding world is not encountered neutrally as
though given through bare sense-perception, and is said to be “the locus of all our cares and
endeavors.”73 This surrounding world is not merely my own, according to Husserl, but is
essentially intersubjective. It exists potentially and actually for other persons along with me in a
personal association, and inherently possesses the sense of being a world that is “ours” and not
just mine. There are different surrounding worlds according to Husserl, but they have the
property of being shared with others. On the one hand, then, I have my individual surrounding
world from the perspective of my living body. On the other hand, the community itself has its
own surrounding world such that objects appear to all of us in a similar fashion.74 For Husserl,
there is one surrounding world that I share with all other “normal” human perceivers as the

71

Ideas II, p. 195.

“This surrounding world is comprised not of mere things but of use-Objects (clothes, utensils, guns, tools), works
of art, literary products, instruments for religious and judicial activities (seals, official ornament, coronation insignia,
ecclesiastical symbols, etc.). And it is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members
of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which, as wholes [Ganze], have their own lives,
preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals, have their qualities as
communities, their moral and juridical regulations, their modes of functioning in collaboration with other
communities and with their individual persons, their dependencies on circumstances, their regulated changes and
their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time, according to the determining
circumstances.” Ideas II, pp. 191-192.
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surrounding world of nature75, and there are more exclusive socio-cultural surrounding worlds
containing socio-cultural objectivities.76 It is only the latter that I focus on here.77

Hua XIV, p. 197: “Das ist freilich die fundamentale Unterstufe, die nähere Erörterung verdient: Wie das
Einzelsubjekt seine Umwelt mit offenen Horizonten hat, so hat eine kommunizierende Subjektvielheit eine
gemeinsame Umwelt als die „ihre”. Jeder einzelne hat seine Sinnlichkeit, seine Apperzeptionen und bleibenden
Einheiten; die kommunizierende Vielheit hat gewissermassen auch eine Sinnlichkeit, eine bleibende Apperzeption
und als Korrelat eine Welt mit einem Unbestimmtheitshorizont. Ich sehe, ich höre, ich erfahre nicht nur mit meinen
Sinnen, sondern auch mit denen des Anderen, und der Andere erfährt nicht nur mit seinen, sondern auch mit meinen
Sinnen; das geschieht durch Übermittlung der Kenntnisnahmen.” On the distinction between the human community
at large and community life in a “narrower” sense, see Hua XIV, p. 219: “Inneneinstellung: Wir Menschen, wir in
der Einheit; so weit sie reicht, wieviel unbekannte Personalitäten sie umfasst, so weit reicht das „wir Menschen” und
so weit reicht die Einheit unseres gemeinschaftlichen Lebens — im weitesten Sinn. Aber-wie konstituiert sich ein
Gemeinschaftsleben in einem engeren Sinn, das einer Ehe, Familie, eines Stammes, eines Volkes, einer
verstaatlichten Gemeinschaft, mindestens einer Polis, eines Vereins — all das, solange es im Stande der
Eigentlichkeit eines durchgehenden und in jedem einzelnen bewussten Gemeinschaftslebens verbleibt und nicht in
Veräusserlichung versinkt?”
75

Hua XIV, p. 198: “Doch gehen wir zur wahrhaft höheren Stufe über, zur Stufe der gemeinschaftlichen
Persönlichkeit und der sozialen Welt, der Welt personaler Leistungen, der Kultur in niederem und höherem
Verstände.” Zahavi also points out this distinction in Husserl as being between two different levels of objectivity.
On the one hand, there is an objectivity limited to specific groups of subjects, and on the other hand, there is an
objectivity that applies to all cognizing subjects. Cf. Zahavi (2001), Chapter IV.
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On Husserl’s account, there is a rudimentary form of a community that we experience with a shared surrounding
world understood as the entire material, sensible world (Hua XIV, pp. 196-197). By rudimentary, I mean that the
human community at large is indeterminate in regard to the specific socio-cultural values and practices of a specific
community. Indeterminacy here amounts not to a lack of socio-cultural sense, but refers to the surrounding world
that is accessible to all regardless of the culture to which they belong. Husserl claims that the “transcendental wecommunity,” as my own subjectivity fused with the experiences of all other co-subjects, constitutes one objective
world that is there for everyone. (Epilogue, p. 421. Cf. Crisis, Appendix III, p. 328: “We already have a certain
‘community’ in being mutually ‘there’ for one another in the surrounding world (the other in my surrounding
world)—and this always means being physically, bodily ‘there.’”). For example, Husserl writes: “In my
appearances, the sensible world that is mine is constituted as opposite me and for me, and to some extent in me. But
the encroachment of the other is peculiar to consciousness such that a world is that one for both of us, and the
correlate of “both,” ultimately as the correlate of an open multiplicity [offenen Vielheit].” Hua XIV, p. 202. Cf. Ideas
II, p. 207: “This world of things is, at its lowest level, intersubjective material nature as common field of actual and
possible experience of individual spirits, solitary ones and ones in a community of experience.” This lower-level
shared surrounding world is what Husserl means by “nature” (“The first thing constituted in the form of community,
and the foundation for all other intersubjectively common things, is the commonness of Nature, along with that of
the Other’s organism and his psychophysical Ego, as paired with my own psychophysical Ego.” CM, p. 120. Cf.
Zahavi (2001), p. 93.). By this, Husserl does not mean that the world is experienced naturalistically in the sense of
exhibiting mathematically exact properties, but rather that there is a materiality, experienced in its perspectival
inexactness, which is experienced by all perceivers. It is on this basis that Husserl claims that there is a
communalization (Vergemeinschaftung) of perception (Crisis, pp. 161-165.), such that the sensible world is
experienced as accessible to an indefinite multiplicity of others (Cf. BPP, p. 86 [Hua XIII, p. 191] “Thus nature is an
index for an all-inclusive normativity, encompassing all streams of consciousness that stand in an experiential
relation to one another through empathy.”). We can here speak of experiences of membership within the human
community in the sense of the grasp that all persons have of the sum total of perceptible objects in their material
surrounding world. This is a shared surrounding world insofar as it is characterized with the sense of existing for
anyone at all, for both concrete and non-concrete, determinate and indeterminate others. Husserl claims that this
77
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Founded on the intersubjectively shared surrounding world of material nature, Husserl
provides an account of surrounding worlds considered as “narrower” (enger), where narrower
indicates that these surrounding worlds are accessible exclusively to particular groups of
subjects, and not that there is less content within them.78 There are additional requirements
beyond having adequate sensory faculties for experiencing socio-cultural surrounding worlds.
While necessarily founded on their natural properties, Husserl puts forth an account of more
restrictive surrounding worlds of personal communities, such as the surrounding world of a
group of friends,79 a group of mathematicians,80 of all Europeans, or more narrowly of all French
citizens.81 Narrower socio-cultural surrounding worlds possess exclusivity, such that their sense
exists for a more determinate group of members.82 The written words that one encounters on
billboards are accessible as markings of colors and shapes for all normal perceivers, but the full
meaning of those writings is something experienced only by members of the relevant linguistic
community. Husserl suggests that there is a “deeper understanding” (tieferes Verständnis)
available to members of a socio-cultural community, whereas there is a barrier to the full
meanings of the surrounding world and objects therein from the perspective of non-members.83

character of the surrounding world of nature is trans-historical for all human beings having the same sensibility (OG,
pp. 375-378.).
78

CM, p. 92. For more on Husserl’s notion of founding, see Chapter I.
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Ideas II, pp. 205-206.
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Ideas II, p. 203.
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CM, p. 92.
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Cf. Taipale (2014), pp. 90-91.

CM, p. 133. Cf. TS, p. 107: “The natural interest in a flower is different than the botanist’s interest, and thus in the
two cases the best appearances are different, and the full givenness, in which the interest is satisfied, is essentially
very different in each case.”
83

131
Consider, for instance, a small group of friends who are all “in” on an inside joke.84 If the group
of friends encounters something that evokes a reference to their inside joke while walking down
the street together, there will be an accessibility to that content in their surrounding world which
is not similarly meaningful to outsiders who are not part of the joke. In this case, a component of
the shared surrounding world of the group of friends will be characterized not just as existing as
a visible object but as funny in a way that is (at least initially without some kind of explanation)
closed off from those outside the group.
The experience of belonging to a community according to Husserl includes the members
of a particular personal association relating to the same shared surrounding world.

The world is my surrounding world. That is to say, it is not the physicalistic world but the
thematic world of my, and our, intentional life (including what is given to consciousness
as extra-thematic, co-affecting, and accessible to my thematic positings: my thematic
horizon).85

Each member necessarily has her or his own embodied standpoint on a surrounding world, but
the particular surrounding world is experienced as being shared with along with fellow
members.86 To use Husserl’s terminology, the “noematic core” of a surrounding world is the
same for all members of the community, while allowing for different characterizations of the
noematic sense; the “What” of the experiences remains the same for members that belong to the
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This is my example, not Husserl’s.
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Ideas II, p. 230, my emphasis.
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Ideas II, p. 207.
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same community, but the “How” of our experiences within that community vary.87 All of the
members that belong to the same personal association have experiences within the same
surrounding world, even though there is a necessary diversity when it comes to how that world is
experienced by each member. Each member will experience the surrounding world from their
own distinct “here,” bringing together a unique set of perspectives within and potentially of the
community. At the same time, though, members of the same community will experience their
surrounding world as shared on the basis of the community’s theme (e.g., the world as similarly
seen by a group of friends, by mathematicians, by botanists, etc.).
Insofar as it is shared, a surrounding world includes (in some fashion) a reference to those
with whom it is shared. In a supplement to Ideas II, Husserl brings together the moments of
empathy and a shared surrounding world in support of this point:

The subject is a person among persons, a citizen of a state, a legal subject, a member of a
union, an officer, etc., and, as such, is affected by the Objects now given in his
surroundings, feels their force and, in turn, acts upon them. This living subject is the
subject of actual life, standing towards his congeners in a nexus of empathy, in
accordance with which he acknowledges the other and himself as first experiencing one
and the same common surrounding world, though each has his own subjective ways of
givenness of this common world.88

As a legal subject or a citizen of a state, the lawful surrounding world or the surrounding world
of the state will be experienced as including constraints that are applicable to anyone within the
personal association and not merely to those who I am concretely encountering. In encountering
members of a union or police officers, even if we do not know them as determinately as we
Ideas I, p. 181. Cf. Ideas I, p. 188: “The kinds of acts are different, and considerable free space for
phenomenological distinctions still remains—yet the noematic ‘What’ is identical.”
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Ideas II, pp. 382-383.
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know our closest friends, they are at least determinate as exhibiting their socio-cultural roles. The
sharedness of the surrounding world need not be explicitly acknowledged, but part of what is at
least implicitly experienced of objects in the surrounding world is that they exist also for fellow
members.89
To quickly summarize before proceeding to the formal notion of mereological proximity,
Husserl puts forth a single account of experiences of being a part of a community. According to
Husserl, these experiences of belonging to a community have the correlative moments of
empathic pairing in a personal association (centripetal experiences) and a shared socio-cultural
surrounding world (centrifugal experiences). These experiences can be differentiated in
Husserl’s descriptions in terms of community membership with concrete and non-concrete,
determinate and indeterminate others.
My discussion so far has focused primarily on experiences of belonging to a community
where all is “going smoothly.” This is not to suggest that Husserl is committed to the overlyflowery picture that conflict or dissent is impossible within the experiences of community
membership. Zahavi, Miettinen, and Szanto, for instance, have highlighted how Husserl
integrates dissent into discussions of a community.90 As already demonstrated in Husserl’s quote
on experiences involving the “fusion” of associative empathic pairing, this only occurs insofar as
“incompatibilities do not interfere.”91 Husserl emphasizes that experience of a harmonious world
in common with others can be enriched and not destroyed through reciprocal corrections
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What is either co-apprehended (mitbewusst) or co-intended (mitgemeint) with fellow community members is a
shared, socio-cultural surrounding world. BPP, p. 67 [Hua XIII, p. 172].
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Cf. Zahavi (2001); Miettinen (2013); Szanto (2016).
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CM, p. 118.
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amongst members.92 In some cases, experiences of community membership are said to be
conflicted to the extent that membership involves a subjugation of some members’ wills. One
might, as Husserl recognizes, experience belonging to a community that involves suffering if the
prospect of leaving such a community could involve a greater form of suffering than the current
membership arrangement.93
In more dramatic fashion, Husserl provides an example of reluctant community
membership and of disagreement disrupting a practical “community of will” in the case of
relations between a master and a slave.94 When the relation between master and slave is running
smoothly, there is a harmonious practical community of will to the extent that directives given by
the master are carried out by the will of the slave as an extension of the master. This amounts, on
Husserl’s account, to a form of agreement between the parties as long as orders are acted upon.
This is clearly not an agreement in the sense of individuals freely deliberating and agreeing to
undertake a task, but of a conflicted form of membership here nevertheless involves “going
along” with the arrangements of the specific community despite one’s reservations.95 In such
cases, Husserl accounts for this as an experience of membership where there is an acceptance or
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CM, pp. 125-126.

Hua XIV, p. 177: “Es kann aber auch sein, dass auf die fremde Subjektivität keine Rücksicht genommen, dass der
Genuss gegen ihren Willen erzwungen, ihr damit Leid aufgezwungen, ja dass sie vernichtet wird. Dann fällt die
höhere Freuden- und Wertschicht nicht nur weg, sondern es tritt an ihre Stelle ein Negativum, von dem zu fragen ist,
ob es nicht einen Wertwiderstreit herbeiführt, der nicht nur den Wert mindert, sondern aufhebt. Es kommt dann in
Frage: der Zwang, zu Willen zu sein (also Willensunterwerfung des Anderen), und das den Genuss Erzwingen unter
Gegenwillen des Anderen, ohne dass dabei auch nur erzwungene Einwilligung, Willensunterwerfung statthat. Es
kann sein, dass auf der gezwungenen Seite zwar kein Wunsch bestand, aber in der Unterwerfung Lust erwächst und
Wunsch geweckt wird und danach Befriedigung. Es kann sein, dass keine Lust statthat, sondern Leid, das in Kauf
genommen wird zur Vermeidung grösseren Leides.”
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Hua XIV, pp. 175-182. Cf. Hua XIV, p. 223.

Hua XIV, p. 177: “Erdulden ist zwar auch ein Widerstreben, aber doch zugleich enthält es eine Hinnahme im
Gemüt, die im ungebrochenen und unnachgiebigen Aufbäumen fehlt.”
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acquiescence (Hinnahme) on the part of members. Reluctant experiences of membership exist
according to Husserl so long as there is a lack of an unbroken and unyielding rebellion against
such a community arrangement. It can happen, as Husserl points out, that this community is
disrupted and even dissolved on the basis of a rebellion by the slaves. Rather than the kinds of
intersubjective corrections that enrich a sense of a surrounding world in common, challenges
such as an unyielding slave rebellion can be considered as attempts to dissolve the interpersonal
constraints and arrangements of a particular surrounding world. As Husserl writes, “The escaped
slave is no longer really a slave (setting aside the legal question).”96 Through such a rebellion,
one’s existence as a certain type of part is separated from the context of the whole. This
dissolution amounts to a break in the underlying agreement that constituted the community of
will. In this way, we can see that Husserl’s account of experiencing being a part of a community
includes the possibility of disagreement, and demonstrates how large disagreements can go so far
as to dissolve the experience of community membership.
§4. Mereological Proximity and Distinct Experiences of Belonging to a Community
As Miettinen writes on the topic of different community gradations as found in Husserl’s
writings: “For a family, a loss of member is probably a more shattering experience than, say, in
the case of nation.”97 Although I agree with this point, more can be said regarding the way that
Husserl draws distinctions within these gradations. With the general account of experiences of
community membership in place, I now advance the main argument of the chapter, that Husserl

Hua XIV, pp. 181-182: “Der entlaufene Sklave ist nicht mehr wirklich Sklave (von der Rechtsfrage, die hier noch
nicht spielt, abgesehen).”
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Miettinen (2013), p. 229. Gilbert makes this same point in the context of her plural subject theory of political
obligations, and I return to her approach to this discussion in the following chapter. Gilbert (2006), p. 100.

136
distinguishes experiences of membership in a fine-grained fashion on the basis of his notion of
mereological proximity. Applied to community, this notion refers both to the different ways in
which members are grouped together and to their relation to a shared surrounding world. I argue
that Husserl’s account of the experience of belonging to a community exhibits specific noematic
senses for different organizational levels of communities, and that he describes the experiences
of these different levels by appealing to his notion of mereological proximity. For this reason,
experiences regarding the addition or subtraction of members in a family community are distinct
from the same changes in members of the community of a large nation insofar as the cases
represent distinct ways in which members are integrated as mediate or immediate parts of a
community whole.
“Mereological proximity” for Husserl refers to relations between parts and the wholes to
which they belong, where some parts are considered as “closer” to other parts or to the whole
while others are “further” away. As explained in my earlier chapters, I am using the term
“mereological proximity” as shorthand for referring to Husserl’s account of the relation between
mediate/remote and immediate/proximate parts of a whole.98 The designations of remoteness
and proximity are to be taken in a metaphorical and not a spatial sense. As Husserl writes:

If P(W) is a part of the whole W, then a part of this part, e.g. P(P(W)), is again a part of
the whole, but a mediate part [ein mittelbarer Teil]. P(W) may then be called a relatively
immediate part of the whole [ein vergleichweise unmittelbarer Teil]. The distinction is a
relative one, since P(W) may itself again be a mediate part, in relation to another part of
the whole in which it is contained as a part.99
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LI, §§. 18-21. For more on Husserl’s notion of mediate and mediate relations, see Ideas I, §141.
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LI, p. 30.
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When parts of a whole are closer or “proximate” (näheren) in relation to their whole, they are
designated by Husserl as being more immediate (unmittelbar) parts. This proximity is also used
to describe relations of parts to other parts of a whole. On the other hand, parts that are “remote”
(ferneren) or metaphorically further in relation to their whole are designated as more mediate
(mittelbar) parts.100 This remoteness is again used as a descriptor for parts in relation to other
parts of the same whole. In Husserl’s example of a melody understood as a unified whole, the
melody’s individual tones are described as more proximate to the melody than, for instance, the
qualities of those tones. This means that the tones are more immediate parts of the melody while
the qualities of those tones are more mediate parts of the melody as a whole. The qualities of the
tones are more remote parts relative to the melody, while being proximate relative to the tones.
They are more “mediated” in relation to the whole insofar as they exist as dependent moments of
the tones prior to being parts of the melody as a whole. The qualities of the tones, in other words,
are remote insofar as they are parts of parts. The tones, then, are more immediate parts of the
whole relative to the qualities of the tones as mediate parts.101
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LI, p. 30-32.

Husserl appeals to the example of the melody in an ontological-mereological context to talk about relations
between mediate and immediate parts. He again appeals to the example of a melody in his manuscripts to describe
these features phenomenologically, highlighting the possibility of experiencing concatenations: “Listening to the
sounds is not the same as listening to the music, and listening to the music as a concatenation of individual
harmonies is not the same as hearing the symphony, the quartet, etc., in its actual sense and in the peculiarity of its
real being in itself.” Hua XV, p. 228: “Die Laute hören ist nicht die Musik hören, und die Musik als eine Verkettung
von einzelnen Harmonien hören ist nicht die Symphonie, das Quartett etc. in seinem wirkliehen Sinn und seiner
Eigenart wirklichen Seins in sich aufnehmen.” It is here possible to listen to a piece of music as a mere
concatenation of notes and harmonies. Experienced in this way, though, we do not experience the larger whole to
which the harmonies belong. Husserl provides a similar example in his descriptions of experiencing written marks
on a page without moving through them as words to the whole of what they express. APS, p. 27. As an application
of this notion of concatenation to the social sphere, experiences of the other indeterminate persons with whom I am
paired is not the same as thematically experiencing the community as a whole. While I am using the example of the
melody here to explicate Husserl’s usage of mereological proximity in the context of experiences of community
membership, there is clearly a disanalogy here insofar as it becomes about how a listener relates to tones as part of
the melodic whole. A closer analogy could be had in the direction I am going if individual tones were conscious, and
could themselves experience the way in which they existed as parts of the melody to which the belong. I will leave it
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Loosely coordinated communities are anonymous in the sense of being relatively more
mediated, which amounts to their existing in the mereological form of concatenations.102 Husserl
refers to communities exhibiting mereological closeness as “intimate communities.” Individual
persons as parts are intimately related to the community whole in cases where the community is
considered as a temporally extended, “more comprehensive whole.”103 Anonymity and intimacy
represent two extremes along a spectrum that Husserl appeals to for understanding different
community types. Husserl accounts for these extremes in terms of mereological proximity. I here
argue that Husserl accounts for the experience of belonging to these different types of
communities based on the mereological proximity exhibited within them. Argumentative support
for this conclusion is given by looking at the ways Husserl describes experiences of membership
in different community types. More specifically, the conclusion is supported by recognizing that
Husserl’s descriptions of belonging to a community refer to notions such as “closeness” or
“farness,” “proximity” or “remoteness,” and “mediate” or “immediate” relations. For example,
writing of traditions that belong to a “broadest we-community” (weitesten Wir-Gemeinschaft),
Husserl employs mereological terms in describing the kinds of community relations that hold
between members of the present and the “most proximate and most remote ancestors” (den

to the creative minds at Pixar to further pursue this in a visual medium. Similarly, experiencing one of the
associations that makes up a concatenation is not the same as experiencing the whole of the concatenation itself. The
experience of membership in the form of community concatenation is instead mediated in Husserl’s mereological
sense insofar as we experience aspects of the community only by way of interacting with indeterminate others. In
this way, members are founding parts of the community whole, but there is an experiential “remoteness” to the
extent that not all individuals relate to their valuing and acting to the community as a whole. This mediation or
remoteness is characteristic of experience of membership in anonymous communities.
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Cf., Chapter II.
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LI, pp. 41-42. Cf. Chapter II, especially the example of dominoes.
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nächsten und fernsten Vorfahren).104 These experiences in general include the correlative
moments of being paired with others and having a shared surrounding world. While it is more
apparent how empathic pairing occurs in communities involving concrete encounters (such that I
genuinely encounter another embodied person), I draw attention to passages where Husserl refers
to community and empathy in the absence of a genuine encounter with an embodied individual.
When he writes of this possibility, he refers to “remoteness” or “mediation.” This supplements
interpretations of Husserl’s account of the experience of being a part of a community based on
features such as shared interests, goals, or appropriating traditions without supplanting them. Put
otherwise, I claim that such features should be re-framed in Husserl’s framework of the
mediations of mereological proximity.
4.1 Anonymous Community Membership
The question I pursue in this section is how members experience belonging to
anonymous, concatenated communities according to Husserl. Put otherwise, I here discuss the
noematic sense that Husserl attributes to experiences of membership within anonymous
communities. The ontological structure of an anonymous community for Husserl, as suggested in
Chapter II, is of a concatenation (Verkettung), where a community contains other personal
associations within itself and where there is mereological distance between parts and their whole.
Considered formally, Husserl describes concatenations as two or more associations that are
combined together into a larger association. Those combined associations, furthermore, have
“some but not all members in common.”105 This ontological structure of concatenations as
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Hua XIV, p. 223.
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LI, p. 48.
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present in anonymous communities is supported in Husserl’s writings by phenomenological
descriptions of the experiences of members within such groupings. These descriptions refer to
the experiences that community members have of some though not all fellow members, of
membership along with indeterminate others, and experiences of a socio-cultural surrounding
world as experienceable for indeterminate others. Experiences of belonging to an anonymous
community include the community as on object only pre-reflectively in the experiences of
members. In this way, the community as a whole to which one belongs is a “remote” part within
the experiences of members. Insofar as concatenations are indicative of anonymous
communities, and since this involves descriptions of “mediation” and “remoteness,”
concatenations refer to Husserl’s notion of mereological proximity. In the categories introduced
above, the centripetal experience of being a part of an anonymous community includes being
empathically paired with indeterminate others, where these indeterminate others are experienced
either concretely on non-concretely. Correlatively, the socio-cultural surrounding world for an
anonymous community is characterized as existing for an indeterminate group. Given Husserl’s
account of noematic descriptions as referring to objects and states of affairs in their experiential
determinateness or indeterminateness, or their clarity and distinctness, his descriptions of
indeterminate other (strangers) who belong to a community with me are here taken as noematic
descriptions.
The example I used to illustrate the structure of concatenation in the intersubjective
sphere in the previous chapter is a large group of persons, where some members of the group are
close friends while others are friends of friends. Instances of friendship tend to be described by
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Husserl as “intimate,” so a different example is needed for anonymous communities.106 Husserl
frequently refers to concatenations in the context of relations between historical generations.
Some (though not all) historical communities are anonymous communities. As a simple
representation of this in the context of intergenerational concatenations, suppose that members of
a community A in the present are influenced by the traditions of past generation B, who were
themselves influenced by generation C, and so forth. In this case, living members of community
A may belong to the same historical community as predecessors in generation C (forming the
historical, concatenated unity of ABC), with the relation to members of former generations being
mediated by generation B. The historical unity ABC in this case is a concatenation insofar as its
parts are the associations AB and BC. Husserl writes in his manuscripts, for instance, of the ways
in which persons exist in the context of an “open endlessness” of “concatenated” generations.107
The surrounding world as historical has been handed down and shaped by a chain of generations
before me, though I need not explicitly trace or otherwise experience the historicality of a
community as a whole while living in it. Objects in my surrounding world, including other
persons, are experienced not as mere things, but are expressive of a socio-cultural sense.108
In the present, we experience ready-made objects as final products, even though they
depend on a larger historical arc understood as a generative whole. I can use words to convey
meaning to others without having to know the etymological developments of those words.

Husserl’s mereological notion has already been addressed in Chapter II, and will be returned to here in the
following sub-section.
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Cf. Hua XV, pp. 178, 219, 499, 583; Zahavi (2001), p. 98.

As Husserl writes, purely material realities are “history-less realities” while psychic realities bear their histories
within themselves. Ideas II, p. 144.
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Despite the ready-made nature of such objects, Husserl suggests that their histories can be made
salient through phenomenological analysis.109 Indications of the possibility of such analyses are
seen in Husserl’s writings in regard to linguistic communities and communities of those who are
learning mathematics, though as highlighted above, he is clear that entirety of the socio-cultural
world exists in the form of a tradition. Members do not always acknowledge the dependence of
linguistic or mathematical objects upon a larger historical whole. For Husserl, it is this very lack
of recognition in the face of sedimentation that calls for the rehabilitating process of
“explication” (Verdeutlichung). Linguistic objects spoken or written by members of a linguistic
community do not need to be explicated in regard to their original meanings in order to be
practically useful. Similarly, Husserl writes of the ways in which geometrical theorems are
typically taught and learned in the present. Geometry in its ready-made form exists in the form of
a tradition.110 Instead of having students re-trace the entire history of various theorems, some
textbooks instead present students with ready-made geometrical formulae. As sedimentations of
a geometrical tradition, these formulae are mereologically distant from the whole historical arc
into which they fit. We can learn geometry from textbooks without going to the origins of those
concepts with their originally intuitive ideality.111 Mereological distance regarding the
appropriations of traditions is part of the experience of such community members in the present
insofar as there is a grouping with non-concrete and indeterminate others. Objects such as books

Cf. Donohoe (2004), p. 33: “Each noema contains within itself the history of its own past occurrences. It is the
task of genetic phenomenology to provide a more complex explanation of each noema based upon a revealing of
that history.”
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written in a certain language possess the sense of being meaningful and expressive for past,
present, and future members of that linguistic community. Mathematical objects have their full
sense as being understandable to those others with the requisite mathematical knowledge, though
I need not know those others personally.
Some members of an anonymous community will be experienced as “indeterminate”
insofar as everyone does not know them personally. Furthermore, fellow anonymous community
members can on Husserl’s account be experienced concretely or non-concretely, as evinced in
the variety of ways he employs his notion of empathy. In concrete experiences of indeterminate
others, others are apperceived as strangers or as indeterminate bearers of socio-cultural roles.
These experiences involve an empathic pairing of myself with the other indeterminate persons
with whom I share a surrounding world. I am here aware of others’ awareness to the extent that I
take them to belong with me in this world. Even non-concrete experiences of indeterminate
others allow for the possibility of empathic pairing. Husserl explains these possibilities by way
of an analogy regarding determinacy and indeterminacy in the perception of a material object:

Just as every ego-subject has an original perceptual field within a horizon that can be
opened up through free activity, which leads to ever new perceptual fields, repeatedly
mapped out through a combination of the determinate and the indeterminate [bestimmtunbestimmt]: so every ego-subject has his horizon of empathy, that of his fellow subjects,
which can be opened up through direct and indirect commerce with the concatenation of
others [direkten und indirekten Verkehr, mit der Verkettung der Anderen], who are all
others for one another, for whom there can be still others, etc. […] every other ego is
already intentionally implied in advance by way of empathy and the empathy-horizon.112
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Crisis, p. 255. Translation modified.
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The perception of an object such as a desk includes the determinate sides that are currently seen
in addition to the other un-seen sides which are apperceptively co-intended, though only
indeterminately. Husserl here indicates the kinds of empathic experiences one has of both
determinate and indeterminate others in the mereological form of a concatenation, which I have
argued is the structure of anonymous communities. Both direct and indirect interactions with
others here belong to my horizon of empathy, such that the shared surrounding world does not
require a concrete empathic encounter with another person “in the flesh” in order to nevertheless
include a reference to empathy.113
For Husserl, the experience of belonging to an anonymous, concatenated community like
a linguistic community usually only includes the sense of the community as a whole prereflectively. For example, Husserl writes that even though a linguistic community is a form of
community, it is unlike grouping such as marriages insofar as the former does not bring about the
sense of being a “personal whole” (personales Ganzes).114 One is aware of determinate and
indeterminate others and there are experiences that implicate the existence of the fellow
members with whom a surrounding world is shared, but this does not require an explicit
intending of the linguistic community itself as an object. Husserl often writes that members
“know” (wissen) of their membership, using scare quotes to indicate a form of community
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As Molly Brigid Flynn suggests, encountering a new person is ordinarily an apperception of them not as a new
member to the community, but as a heretofore unknown member of the community. “Because this community for
me incorporates many members indeterminately, as unknown but potentially known, when I meet a new person I do
not encounter him as a new member, but as a previously unknown member.” Flynn (2012), p. 34. Taipale provides
an argument for this point with the example of communication with someone at a distance via email. While it is here
not the case that I encounter another person bodily “in the flesh” through my email, I nevertheless represent them as
embodied beings who will receive my message. Taipale (2014), p. 89.
Hua XIV, p. 182: “Eine Sprachgemeinschaft ist keine personale Verbindung, die ein personales Ganzes schafft,
wohl aber eine Ehe, selbst wenn sie eine „moderne” Ehe ist.”
114
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membership that does not explicitly involve apprehending the community as a thematically
experienced object. For instance, Husserl writes:

Thus the actual surrounding world of any person whatsoever is not physical reality pure
and simple and without qualification, but instead it is the surrounding world only to the
extent he “knows” of it, insofar as he grasps it by apperception and positing or is
conscious of it in the horizon of his existence as co-given and offered to his grasp—
clearly or unclearly, determinately or indeterminately—precisely in accordance with the
way it happens to be posited by consciousness.115

Furthermore:
Each individual, as a subject of possible experiences, has his experiences, his aspects, his
perceptual interconnections, his alteration of validity, his corrections, etc.; and each
particular social group has its communal aspects, etc. […] But each individual “knows”
himself to be living within the horizon of his fellow human beings, with whom he can
enter into sometimes actual, sometimes potential contact, as they also can do (as he
likewise knows) in actual and potential living together.116

When he uses scare quotes in these ways, he is usually referring to intersubjective experiences
that can be understood as anonymous. This kind of tacit or “implicit knowledge” for Husserl is
tied to the ways in which ready-made traditions are experienced in the present even when we do
not attempt to explicitly understanding the original meanings of traditions.117 Experiences of
belonging as a part to the whole of an anonymous community are mediated in the mereological
sense insofar as one’s experiences involve interactions with indeterminate others as parts of the
Ideas II, p. 195. Furthermore: “Sociality is constituted by specifically social, communicative acts, acts in which
the Ego turns to others and in which the Ego is conscious of these others as ones toward which it is turning, and ones
which, furthermore, understand this turning, perhaps adjust their behavior to it and reciprocate by turning toward
that Ego in acts of agreement or disagreement, etc. It is these acts, between persons who already “know” each other,
which foster a higher unity of consciousness and which include in this unity the surrounding world of things as the
surrounding world common to the persons who take a position in regard to it.” Ideas II, p. 204.
115
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Crisis, p. 164.
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Husserl here writes of implicit knowledge which can nevertheless be made explicit. OG, p. 355.
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whole but not the community whole itself. Even though the community is only experienced prereflectively, it is nevertheless experienced indirectly by way of the sedimented noematic sense of
the surrounding world that exists for a particular personal association.
As a species of community, an anonymous community is founded on its members, but the
community as a whole does not necessarily found aspects of the lives of its members in a
reciprocal fashion to the same extent as intimate communities. In anonymous communities, there
is only a one-sided founding relationship between members and anonymous communities
understood as wholes. This one-sidedness factors into Husserl’s descriptions of community not
just ontologically but also phenomenologically in regard to the experiences of members. For
Husserl, reciprocal founding relationships such as color and extension are said to be proximate,
while one-sided founding relationships involve remoteness. Appealing to this notion of
“remoteness” which is indicative of his theory of mediate and immediate parts, Husserl writes:

Each communalized ego has not only his consciousness, but has a view into the other and
with the other into a universal connection of consciousness with a many-headed
subjectivity, but, of course, not as a losing of oneself into indefiniteness. For each, there
is a horizon of remoteness [Fernhorizont]: the openly indeterminate multiplicity of others
besides those whom I actually embrace and their consciousness; the indeterminate,
uncontrolled consciousness of the others beyond what I really know of them, which is
connected with the consciousness of others, etc., all the horizons into which one can
penetrate more or less.118

Hua XIV, p. 218: “Jedes vergemeinschaftete ego hat nicht nur sein Bewusstsein, sondern seines als in die
Anderen hineinschauendes und sich mit den Anderen zu einem universalen Bewusstseinszusammenhang mit
vielköpfiger Subjektivität verbindend, aber freilich sich ins Unbestimmte verlierend. Für jedes ist ein Fernhorizont;
die offen unbestimmte Vielheit Anderer ausser denen, die ich wirklich einverstehend umgreife, und ihr Bewusstsein;
das unbestimmte, noch unumspannte Bewusstsein der Anderen über das hinaus, was ich davon wirklich
einverstehend weiss, das sich verbindend wieder mit dem Bewusstsein Anderer etc., lauter Horizonte, in die man
mehr oder minder eindringen kann.”
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This passage highlights experiences that members of anonymous communities have (members as
Husserl says of a many-headed subjectivity) where other fellow though indeterminate members
of the whole are experienced according to a certain kind of remoteness. The remoteness at play
here is clearly not a reference to spatial remoteness. In one of Husserl’s other examples, a large
state is founded on its members as parts, but not all or even any of the experiences of its
members have to be had by members as indicative of the state considered as a whole.119 In the
language of mereological proximity, most members of anonymous concatenated communities
like states are “remote” from the community as a whole, and this is experienced with a
phenomenologically discernible noematic sense. Centripetally, not all other members are known
personally, and unknown others are characterized with a sense of indeterminateness. The
surrounding world is, centrifugally speaking, experienced with the sense of being accessible for a
limited though indeterminate group of others. Individual members of anonymous communities
still contribute to the existence of the community whole, but they do not explicitly experience the
whole as close to who they are as its parts. Put otherwise, members found anonymous
communities as wholes, but these communities do not abide as wholes in the experiences of
members such that members could be said to be constrained by a recognition of the whole in a
strong sense. Phenomenologically, this amounts to experiences of membership as being amidst
determinate and indeterminate others within a community, yet where our shared surrounding
world is not one that exhibits the coordinating force of a shared goal.
While there is unity in an anonymous community, Husserl points out that the influence
that the individual exerts within or upon the community as a whole may not be experienced
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Hua XIV, p. 182.
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clearly in its relation to the whole. The impact of individuals upon one another and the whole
may only involve implicit as opposed to explicit relations to the whole.120 In the case of
anonymous communities having their own histories, Husserl writes that membership is
experienced as being shaped by traditions that are taken over second-hand, perhaps even falsely,
from testimony, newspapers, or other sources:

In practical life I have the world as a traditional world, no matter where the tradition
comes from; it may even come from second-hand scientific acquisitions, even false ones,
which I get from the newspaper or from school and which I may transform in one way or
another in my own motivations or [through] those of my fellows who accidentally
[zufällig] influence me.121

Similar to experiences of community membership where individuals as parts only implicitly
influence the community as a whole (and where the community as a whole does not strongly
influence members as its parts), Husserl here refers to accidental or coincidental influences
between parts and the community whole. In mentioning elsewhere the kind of “accidental
acquaintance” that can be had with others in a community, Husserl refers to interpersonal

Hua XIV, p. 183: “Im weitesten Sinne in der Einheit einer „Tradition”, in einer personalen Ganzheit, in einer
Personalität höherer Ordnung wirkt Ich auf Du. Durch das Du hindurch geht der Wille des Wirkens, als personales
Wirken, und im Funktionär wirkt der personale Wille aller anderen Funktionäre implicite.” Cf. Flynn (2012). In the
older version of Ideas II, Husserl writes that persons within a community are influenced by indeterminate others,
whether or not the individual is aware of the impact of those others. Ideas II, p. 281. These passages are not included
in the new edition.
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Crisis, p. 326. Cf. Hua XIV, p. 183. Husserl provides a very similar example in his essay on “The Origin of
Geometry”: “Consider, for example, the way in which we understand, when superficially reading the newspaper,
and simply receive the ‘news’; here there is a passive taking-over of ontic validity such that what is read
straightaway becomes our opinion.” OG, p. 364. And again in his ‘Second Book’ of Ideas: “Here also are the acts in
which he places himself in a communicative relation toward his fellow men, speaks with them, writes them, reads
about them in the papers, associates with them in communal activities, makes promises to them, etc.” Ideas II, p.
191. It would be interesting to compare these remarks in Husserl with Anderson (1983), who claims that experiences
of belonging to “imagined communities” such as nation-states were brought about in part by the emergence of
printing presses.
121
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relations that involve “remote influences” (Fernwirkungen).122 Such accidents again lack an
intentional reference to the community as a whole. While one can responsibly appropriate a
tradition, taking over functions or callings within the community and mindfully making them
one’s own, tradition can also according to Husserl be passively promulgated across historical
generations without an explicit endorsement of them.123 In the latter case, there are influences
that arise not directly from the concrete experience of other persons, but from traditional
demands that are issued to members by an “indeterminate generality” (unbestimmter
Allgemeinheit).124 There is here an implicit reference to other persons, although the noematic
sense of indeterminateness and generality make it clear that there is not empathy in the concrete
sense. This sheds light on what Husserl means in his manuscripts by attributing a “community
memory” (Gemeinschaftserinnerung) to “many-headed” communities, which exists in the form
of a historical tradition.125 Just as the dangers Husserl describes regarding the “seductions of

Hua XIV, pp. 222-223: “Wir können unabhängig voneinander denselben Gedanken haben, sind aber nicht
vergemeinschäftet, nicht vereinigt durch das Bewusstsein dieser Gemeinsamkeit in den verschiedenen Formen:
Übemalune, in mir aus der Einwirkung des Anderen, aus seiner Lehre oder aus seiner offen unbestimmt gerichteten
Äusserung oder durch zufällige Bekanntwerdung durch mich ohne Richtung an mich, oder gemeinschaftlich durch
gemeinschaftliche Kritik und Arbeit auf Grund schon gemeinsamer identischer Bestände. Ich bin und jedermann ist
im Horizont des Wir, und dieser Horizont ist zugleich Horizont für viele Gemeinschaften und für alle die, denen ich
in Sonderheit zugehöre und denen jedermann seinerseits zugehört. Und darüber hinaus ein weiteres Ausstrahlen von
uneigentlichen Gemeinschaften als Gemeinhaben und von Fernwirkungen von Personen auf Personen, von
Gemeinschaft auf Gemeinschaft etc. ausstrahlenden Wirkungen.”
122
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For Husserl’s account of the dangerous implications of this approach, see Kaizo 1.
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Ideas II, p. 281. While this specific reference is not in the new edition of Ideas II, I am leaving it in insofar as
Husserl speaks in this way elsewhere on the topic of appropriating a tradition in the context of an “indeterminate
generality.” Cf. Hua XIV, p. 222: “Diese unbestimmte Allgemeinheit umfasst mich, und in mir erfahre ich die
Erfüllung der im Schriftlichen ausgedrückten, im Buch sich bekundenden Intention des unbestimmt-leer vorstelligen
Autors.”
Hua XIV, pp. 220-221: “Es heben sich hervor „vielköpfige” Dauereinheiten vergemeinschafteter Personalitäten
oder gegenüber den momentan vergemeinschafteten mehreren Personen die dauernden, zu denen gehört ein
dauerndes Wissen von dieser Dauereinheit dauernd verknüpfter, vergemein- schafteter Personen, Einzelpersonen,
und ein Wissen in der Form, die Wissen der Gemeinschaft von sich selbst heissen kann. Korrelativ eine nicht
vorübergehende, sondern dauernde Einheit des verbundenen Lebens als überpersönlich das Persönliche
125
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language” mean that we can communicate with one another without having to go back to the
original sources of the concepts we are speaking about when we use language126, so too can we
experience being members in an anonymous community through implicit or accidental
influences without having to clarify the structure, origins, purposes, or ends of the community in
question. In these cases, the community lacks a unified form of valuing or willing together, even
when it continues to possess its own form of unity.127
While Husserl is not clear in his essay on “The Origin of Geometry” in regard to how
exactly empathy factors into the context of his discussion of sedimentation of history in a
community, he nevertheless accounts for intergenerational ideal objectivity as arising from the
“function of empathy and fellow mankind as a community of empathy and of language.”128 It is
just prior to this passage (as was highlighted above) that Husserl refers to empathic relations with
other persons who I encounter potentially or actually, and in immediate or mediate relations of
empathy. Given these different ways in which empathy can be brought about, it would be too
quick to suppose that empathy is dispensable in the experiences of a membership within an
anonymous community such as that of a socio-historical tradition.
As another example of empathy experiences of membership within anonymous
communities, Husserl writes of how we share membership with strangers in large clubs or large
political states. These are communities that typically involve experiences of interacting amidst

verbindendes Leben. Durch dieses dauernde Gemeinschaftsleben geht hindurch eine Einheit der
Geineinschaftserinnerung, der historischen Tradition.”
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OG, p. 362.
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Hua XXVII, p. 22.
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OG, p. 360.
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indeterminate others. A state, according to Husserl, is a unified whole despite the fact that not
everyone knows one another. These forms of personal associations must, as he says, nevertheless
be mediated by empathy in some fashion:

The manner in which a personal association is established [herstellt], of course, must
emanate from the actual empathy [aktuellen Einfühlung] and the actual arrangement or
arise in natural subordination, etc., emanating from the status of personal contact or
communication. However, the basis of personal associations must then be considered in
mediate ways [mittelbaren Wegen] when the people remain “unknown” [unbekannt]. But
in any case there are communities of will of certain persons who are in agreement as
willing-subjects, albeit as mediated [vermittelt].129
Husserl’s phrasing here supports the claim from Ideas I regarding the necessity of intersubjective
experiences being mediated by empathy. The personal association must be established on the
basis of empathy, and must be considered in mediated ways especially when the other people
remain “unknown,” that is, when they are given to us as strangers. According to Husserl, there is
an agreement that coordinates the interactions of members130, but the relation we have to others
in the form of an agreement is “mediated” in ways that are different from communities where we
know the other members more determinately. For example, when I have the experience of
encountering a stranger within a large, anonymous community, I have not engaged in any
agreement with them in particular. However, I at least tend to abide by certain background rules

Hua XIV, pp. 182: “Die Art, wie sich eine personale Verbindung herstellt, muss freilich von der aktuellen
Einfühlung und aktuellen Verabredung oder natürlich erwachsenden, aber im Status personaler Berührung oder
Mitteilung sich stiftenden Unterordnung etc. ausgehen. Esmüssen dann aber die Stiftungen von personalen
Vereinigungen auf mittelbaren Wegen erwogen werden, wobei die Personen „unbekannt” bleiben.”
129

Hua XIV, p. 198: “Doch gehen wir zur wahrhaft höheren Stufe über, zur Stufe der gemeinschaftlichen
Persönhchkeit und der sozialen Welt, der Welt personaler Leistungen, der Kultur in niederem und höherem
Verstände. Wo immer wir uns im Einverständnis, im einseitigen oder wechselseitigen, so verbunden wissen, dass
Einheit der leistenden Aktion auf die gemeinsame Umwelt bezogen erscheint (in die sich alsbald jedes
Leistungsprodukt einordnet, immer höherstufige Umwelten mitschaffend), da leistet zwar die einzelne Person, aber
sie umgreift bewusstseinsmässig das Leisten wie Geleistetes der anderen Personen.”
130
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regarding interpersonal conduct and expect the same from others. Instead of making reference to
constraints imposed upon me by determinate others, the surrounding world is here the bearer of
the sense of social constraints that I take to apply to members even when they remain unknown.
The noematic sense of objects and states of affairs in the surrounding world of an anonymous
community is characterized as “ours” where the boundary of the “we” to which this sense is
correlated is indeterminate. For example, there is a linguistic community of English speakers
such that written and spoken English sentences are characterized with the sense of being more or
less understandable to all members of the community.131
How exactly are anonymous community constraints experienced in the surrounding
world for members? For communities ranging from linguistic communities to the unity of
European culture (i.e., anonymous communities in the sense I have characterized them), Husserl
describes experiences of peacefully going about our business by appeal to our being constrained
by norms (Normen). He embeds these norms, furthermore, in descriptions of the experiences
within a shared surrounding world:

Each instance of peaceful commerce [Verkehr] is already human communalization and
presupposes a common ground of norms, even just the norm of general kindness, the
norm not to deceive, etc.132
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One potential counterargument to what I have just said could fasten upon the language Husserl uses in the
previous block quote. After all, Husserl says that personal associations are “established” (herstellt) on the basis of
empathy, but why should we think that continues to be the case after the establishment of a community, for instance,
in regard to socio-historical communities? As I have demonstrated, though, Husserl appeals to different forms of
empathy even when he accounts for our membership within traditions, so empathy factors into experiences of
community membership even beyond the initial establishments of communities.
Hua XV, p. 423: “Jeder friedliche Verkehr ist schon menschliche Vergemeinschaftung und setzt voraus einen
gemeinsamen Boden der Norm, sei es auch nur der Norm der allgemeinsten Menschenfreundlichkeit, der Norm
nicht zu betrügen etc.”
132
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This general communalization is similar to the descriptions Husserl gives of experiences of
community membership influenced by an “indeterminate generality.” For both linguistic
communities and large communities such as Europe, Husserl is clear that these are not intimate
communities. As more akin to concatenations, they exhibit a mereological distance between their
members as parts and the wholes to which they belong. Phenomenologically speaking, shared
norms within anonymous communities are experienced as components of our surrounding world
insofar as others are characterized as possessing a sense of responsibility in relation to their
potential treatment of me.133 One here anticipates a general benevolence or at least implicitly
trusts that others will refrain from inflicting unprovoked harm. The sense of other persons as
constrained by norms is a component, according to Husserl, in the sense of a community’s
surrounding world. For members of such anonymous communities, valuing and acting are
constrained by the specific content of the shared surrounding world. These constraints in the
form of generalized norms amidst indeterminate others are indicative of the experience of
anonymous community membership.134

Hua XV, pp. 422, 423: “Der Mensch hat sein gesamtes Leben in seiner Lebensumwelt habituell konstituiert als
jeweils überschaubares, als beständig im jeweiligen Dahinleben lebendigen Horizont. […] Die Selbstverantwortung
hat ihr Feld in der Totalität des Seins, in der Totalität des Lebens, und wieder bezogen auf die Totalität der
Lebensumwelt. Wille, das feste Vermögen auszubilden, jeder Frage nach dem Warum — nach der gültigen Norm
als der Recht begründenden — Antwort stehen zu können.”
133

There is additional support for the experiences of anonymous community membership in Husserl’s discussion of
the “random” (regelmässige) clientele expected by a store owner, or the typical audience member that is anticipated
by an orator. While Husserl does not here appeal to the terms from his notion of mereological proximity, these
descriptions are in the same vein of his discussions of encountering unknown others where that vernacular was
directly used. Husserl writes that a store owner has both their regular customers (who they presumably know
determinately enough) and their “random” customers. In the latter case, this does not mean they appear to the owner
as completely indeterminate individuals. Rather, there is an “average” (durchschnittliche) character type attributed
to both actual and possible customers in this community. In the experience of membership within anonymous
communities, I apprehend strangers as bearers of general character types that have their sense in the context of the
community as a whole. In anonymous communities, both my own will and the wills of others are taken as being
constrained by social rules and norms, and these constraints are exhibited both in the senses I have of other persons
and in the specific surrounding world. Cf., Hua XIV, p. 183; Taipale (2016).
134
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4.2 Intimate Community Membership
Less mediation amidst parts and between parts and wholes is representative of
mereological intimacy, and thereby of those communities considered to be intimate in Husserl’s
sense.135 Intimacy in this sense is opposed to the concatenations of anonymity. As Husserl says
in his formal mereology, “The members of an association that is free from concatenations are
said to be immediately associated or proximate [unmittelbar verknupft oder benachbart].”136
Such a lack of mediation, such that there is reciprocal founding dependence between parts and
wholes, is how Husserl describes the feature of mereological intimacy. According to Husserl,
[…] contents ‘founded’ on one another (whether one-sidedly or reciprocally) likewise
have unity, and a disparately more intimate unity since less mediated unity [und eine
ungleich innigere, weil weniger vermittelte]. Such ‘intimacy’ [Innigkeit] consists simply
in the fact that unity is here not engendered by a novel content, which again only
engenders unity since it is ‘founded’ on many members separate in themselves.137
Intimate communities exhibit mereological proximity insofar as members are “closer” to one
another and the community as a whole. Rather than parts of the community being mediated as
was the case for anonymous communities, members of intimate communities are more
immediate parts of the whole. Mereological relations of independent pieces to a whole are
described by Husserl as associative or combinatory (Verbindung), while mutually dependent
moments are said to be interpenetrative (Durchdringung).138 It is the property of parts being
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For a fuller discussion of Husserl’s concept of intimacy, see Chapter II.
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LI, p. 33.
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LI, pp. 36-37.

“The same whole can be interpenetrative in relation to certain parts, and combinatory in relation to others: the
sensuous phenomenal thing, the intuitively given spatial shape clothed with sensuous quality, is (just as it appears)
138
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interpenetrative that most properly, for Husserl, represents his notion of intimacy. Appealing to
the quadrant I introduced above, I propose that Husserl’s descriptions of experiencing
membership within intimate communities includes both a pairing with other determinate persons
and a surrounding world that refers to these determinate others. The determinacy of other
persons and of their surrounding world contributes to the intimacy of a community insofar as this
determinacy makes it more likely for the community as a whole to be a thematic component of
the experience. Knowing and acting with fellow members in a close, personal way increases the
likelihood of thematically experiencing the “we” to which members belong. As exhibited in
Husserl’s writings, determinate others can be experienced concretely or non-concretely.
The first feature of experiences of intimate community membership that I focus on
involves the proximity of experiences of reflexivity between individuals as parts and the
community whole. As discussed in Chapter II, Husserl’s notion of a “personality of a higher
order” is of a community that exhibits characteristics that are ordinarily attributed to individual
persons.139 For instance, Husserl puts these types of communities forth as having their own selfconsciousness140 or self-awareness.141 Members of such communities engage in explicitly
communal activities, and not just their own individual activities.142 In regard to the experiences
of community members, Husserl draws attention to the kind of apperception through which we

interpenetrative in respect of reciprocally founded ‘moments’ such as color and extension, and combinatory in
respect of its ‘pieces.’” LI, p. 35.
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Hua XXVII, p. 22.
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Hua XXVII, p. 49.
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Hua XIV, p. 204.
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Hua XXVII, p. 22.
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are reflexively presented with the community to which we belong, such as when we apperceive it
as similar to a large-scale individual.143 Each member of such a community has their own values,
decisions, and actions, but there are also explicitly shared values, decisions, and actions that are
features expressive of the community at large.144 In these cases of members explicitly
experiencing the “personality of a higher order,” the community is itself intended as akin to a
unified personality insofar as members explicitly cooperate in their shared valuings and actions.
The community is here analogous to an individual personality insofar as members jointly engage
in a single task, such as in the pursuit of a shared goal, in a way that resembles the unified selfconsciousness of an individual. Just as an individual can consciously decide to pursue a goal and
then engage in that act on their own, so too does Husserl claim that a community can pursue its
own goals as founded in the shared decisions and strivings of its members. In regard to the
experience of membership within these kinds of intimate communities, there is an explicit
reflexivity such that the community as a whole is experienced as a unified, person-like
component of the surrounding world for its members. The reflexive experience of one’s
community, while pre-reflective for anonymous communities in the sense that one only

Hua XXVII, p. 4 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “Ebendasselbe werden wir, ohne uns durch einen schwächlichen Pessimismus
und ideallosen „Realismus“ beirren zu lassen, auch für den „Menschen im Großen“, für die weiteren und weitesten
Gemeinschaften nicht unbesehen für unmöglich erachten dürfen, und die gleiche Kampfesgesinnung in Richtung auf
eine bessere Menschheit und eine echt humane Kultur werden wir als eine absolute ethische Forderung anerkennen
müssen.”
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Hua XIV, pp. 192-193: “Jedes Einzelsubjekt als Gemeinschaftsglied hat seine Vorstellungen, seine
Liberzeugungen, seine Wertungen und Wollungen (Entschlüsse), Handlungen. Aber im
Gemeinschaftszusammenhang habe ich Überzeugungen (wie vorher schon Vorstellungen) als bleibende, auf Grund
meiner Erfahrung und evtl, vermittelter Anderer Erfahrung entsprungene, die ich zugleich als Überzeugungen
Anderer erfassen kann: d.i., sie haben, wie ich weiss, auch Überzeugungen (sei es in ihnen selbst entsprungene, sei
es übermittelte, evtl, erst von mir ihnen übermittelte), die mit den meinen stimmen: Sie meinen, glauben dasselbe,
und umgekehrt wissen sie, dass das (in bezug auf bestimmte Gehalte) auch für mich der Fall ist.”
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implicitly “knows” of the community, is at the fore in intimate forms of community. On this
experiential possibility of group reflexivity, Husserl writes:

Included in the surrounding world of such a circle [of friends], or, in general, of a social
subjectivity (an association of subjects, constituted through communication), is, once
again, this very subjectivity itself insofar as it too can become an Object for itself, when
the association relates back to itself, just as each individual subject in it can also become
an Object.145

Members of such groups have a less mediated (more immediate) experience of membership
within the community as a whole, where this amounts to experiences of membership that are not
concatenated by way of membership with groups of indeterminate others. As Husserl claims,
membership within a “personality of a higher order” involves “the unity of a focused, willing
subjectivity that acts analogous to an individual subject.”146 While members of anonymous
communities lack a mereologically close relation to the whole, and are influenced more readily
by an “indeterminate generality,” members of intimate communities share an awareness of the
community as a whole as it founds their activities as its parts. Such community experiences lack
mediation in Husserl’s mereological sense insofar as members directly engage in joint actions as
a whole, having the experience of their individual actions contributing directly to the
community’s goals. For example, individual members can in this sense engage in actions in the
name of the community.147 As exhibited in Husserl’s writings, mereological intimacy is
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Ideas II, p. 206.
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Hua XVII, p. 22.
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Cf. Hua XXVII, p. 49.
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experienced both in communities with determinate concrete others and in communities with
determinate yet non-concrete others.
The experience of the community as a unified whole is, according to Husserl, a “natural
feeling” and an “everyday apperception.”148 While commentators such as Alfred Schutz have
criticized Husserl for his notion of such higher order entities149, the possibility of their arising in
the experiences of members is no more phenomenologically mysterious than the kind of
apperception involved in perceiving a material object. I only see one side of the table at any
given time, but my experience is of the table as a whole. Analogously, I may encounter just a
handful of individual persons in a community, but on that basis, it is possible to apperceive an
intimate community as a whole, such as when we jointly pursue a shared goal. Even when I do
not concretely encounter other individuals in an intimate community, I can imagine or remember
them in their determinate relation to the whole.
One place that this experiential structure of intimate communities is found is in Husserl’s
discussions of small family communities and small groups of friends. In the case of experiences
within “normal marriages” and “normal friendships,” Husserl refers to them as being intimate,
and indeed as some of the most intimate forms of unity (diese innigste Einheit).150 In these

Hua XVII, p. 5 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “So spricht vorweg ein natürliches Gefühl, das offenbar in jener Platonischen
Analogie zwischen Einzelmenschen und Gemeinschaft verwurzelt ist. Diese Analogie ist aber keineswegs ein
geistreicher Einfall eines das natürliche Denken hoch übersteigenden oder gar verstiegenen Philosophen, sondern ist
nicht mehr als der Ausdruck einer alltäglichen, aus den Aktualitäten des menschlichen Lebens natürlich
erwachsenden Apperzeption.”
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Schutz (1975), pp. 38-39.

Hua XIV, p. 219: “In der normalen Ehe, in der normalen Freundschaft. Zwei Menschen, die eine Lebenseinheit
bilden, nicht zwei Leben nebeneinander, sondern zwei Menschen, zwei Personen, deren jede ihr Leben lebt und
doch auch Anteil am Leben des Anderen hat, ein Mitleben, ein Eigenleben, das sich mit dem anderen Eigenleben
verbindet, es mitumgreift und umgriffen wird. Für das ego ist der alter nicht nur überhaupt ein Jemand, der noch da
ist, unbestimmt vorgestellt als Subjekt eines Bewusstseins oder nach einzelnem seines Lebens zufällig erfasst und
selbst davon noch bestimmt, sondern der Intention nach gehört das Gesamtleben des alter auch „mit” zu dem
150
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communities, fellow members are not experienced indeterminately, but rather, there is said to be
a merging of one life with the other’s life. Given Husserl’s mereological understanding of
intimacy, such a merging should be understood in terms of a mutual dependence between
members of the group in their relation to the group whole. As discussed in Chapter II, intimacy is
seen most straightforwardly for Husserl in regard to mutually dependent moments such as color
and extension, though he allows for independent parts (pieces) to be considered as moments of a
whole in the case of a temporally extended, “more comprehensive whole.”151 In the case of the
experiences of members within such small intimate communities, then, individual members are
experienced as dependent moments of such wholes insofar as those wholes would not exist in the
same ways without them. This is different from the experiences of other persons in larger,
anonymous groupings insofar as other strangers may be experienced only as separable,
independent parts of the community whole. The larger group in such a case would continue to be
experienced as what it is in the absence of some individual members. Husserl considers families
to be intimate communities in his mereological sense, furthermore, since he refers to their form
of unity (Einheit), their existence as a whole (Ganzes), to be one in which members are
associatively interpenetrating (verbindend durchdringen) with each other; family members are
here “living and working in the other.”152 In the family, each individual member directly relates

meinen, und das meine zu dem seinen. Das Prinzip dieser innigsten Einheit ist zu bestimmen, diese innigste Einheit
der Zweieinigkeit näher zu beschreiben.” I will not here speculate about what Husserl means with the descriptor
“normal.” In discussing marriage earlier in this line of manuscripts, it’s worth pointing out a potential contrast case
to this, where he refers to a form of personal association that exists “even if it is a “modern” marriage” (p. 182).
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LI, pp. 41-42.

Hua XIV, p. 179: “die Ichheit des einen ist nicht neben der des anderen, sondern lebt und wirkt in der anderen.”
This language of experiencing an interpenetration of wills is the same that Husserl uses in his descriptions of
communities of love. Hua XIV, p. 173. For a discussion of Husserl on communities of love as intimate communities,
see Chapter II.
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to the whole by way of their specific functions.153 There is intimacy in the context of the family
to the extent that each individual knows each of the other individual members with whom they
are paired as similarly belonging to the family community and as acting in the name of the
family. Centripetal interactions between members in family communities are then both concrete
and determinate.
Husserl claims that being a member of a family community means more than just living
in the spatial vicinity of other members, but refers to “a community of life having life rules with
a social character” (eine Lebensgemeinschaft mit Lebensordnungen, die sozialen Charakter
haben).154 These social rules refer to the experiences that members have of their familial
surrounding world. Each family member has their own individual function within the family
community (as mother, father, sister, etc.), but the community as a whole also has its own goals
or purposes, which in this case is the promotion of the lives of its members.155 Husserl draws
attention to the constraints that are imposed upon members of the family vis-à-vis their functions
where these constraints are components in their shared surrounding world. For example, the
failure to take care of the matters belonging to one’s position within the family through neglect
or selfishness is to be met with criticism and further instruction.156 The “I-can” (Ich kann) that

“Everyone knows themselves and every other as subjects of their functions.” Hua XIV, p. 179: “Jeder weiss sich
und jeden anderen als Subjekt seiner Funktionen.”
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Hua XIV, p. 178. Cf. Taipale, p. 102.

Hua XIV, p. 181: “Funktion bezeichnet die praktische Bestimmung des Subjekts, die Hinordnung auf einen
Zweck, und zwar unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines besonderen Zweckes, der dienend ist für einen umfassenden Zweck
des gesamten sozialen Verbandes, hier der Familie. Die Familie selbst hat an und für sich keine Funktion, sondern
nur etwa im Volksleben u.dgl. Aber in der Familie hat der Vater die Funktion des Hauptes, die Frau die Funktion der
Gattin und Mutter etc. Im Ausdruck Pflicht und Sollen klingt der Durchgang durch das Negativum an: die
Abweichung stört die Willenseinstimmigkeit und bedingt die Reaktion des Tadels.”
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Hua XIV, p. 180: “Die Unterlassung der natürlichen Fürsorge durch Übersehen, durch momentanen Egoismus,
durch Unvernunft u.dgl. führt zur Kritik und dann zur personalen Aufforderung, zum Befehl usw. Es erwächst das
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161
Husserl often appeals to in his discussions of the experience of practical bodily possibilities here
takes on the form of the “I-should” (Ich soll). I take it that this means that the surrounding world
for family members is experienced not just in terms of my individual bodily possibilities and
constraints (e.g., I see an incline as easily surmountable or a barbell as too heavy to lift), but
includes specifically community-based constraints (e.g., I see an incline as something I should
not attempt to climb with a toddler, or I see a barbell as moveable if we work together).
The family community, like other communities as conceptualized by Husserl, is founded
and thereby dependent on the lives of its members. Family members are at the same time
dependent on the community whole by way of being constrained by the family. Put otherwise,
the possibilities of individual members as parts are reciprocally founded on the existence of the
community as a whole. The family community could not exist in the absence of its constituent
members, but once it exists, it reciprocally influences those very members to which it owes its
existence. The family community can be considered as an intimate community insofar as family
members understood as parts are close, in mereological proximity, to the family community
whole. The members of a family belong to their community not by way of belonging to some
other associations internal to it in the form of a concatenation. It is also an example of an
intimate community to the extent that there is a reciprocal founding relation. While Husserl’s
strictest sense of intimacy applies to mutually dependent moments such as color and

Sollen: das „er soll” und von seiten dessen, der die Zumutung erfährt und übernimmt, das „ich soll”. Es fehlt auch
nicht für den Hausvater an Motiven des „ich soll” bzw. vorher der Selbstbeurteilung; das eigene Versäumnis z.B.
wird ihm empfindlich, und die verkehrt gegebene Anordnung schädigt seine Angehörigen und ihn selbst. Die ganze
Handlung, in der er selbst als Leiter sich selbst objektiv war und in der Erinnerung ist, ist tadelhaft, und er als ihr
Urheber. Er entschliesst sich zu anderen, besseren Anordnungen, die den Charakter der nicht nur bessern, sondern
gesollten haben.”
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extension157, he allows for the possibility of intimate founding amidst pieces of a whole
considered as moments of a temporally extended, more comprehensive whole.158 Family
members are not founded upon one another and the community as strictly as color and extension,
but their experience of membership roles in the family still exhibit dependence on one another in
the extended sense arising from the community existing as a temporally enduring whole. How
exactly is membership within an intimate community experienced by its members? Husserl is not
here forthcoming with robust noematic descriptions, but we can use what he provides to consider
an example. Consider the experience of belonging to a family within the surrounding world of
the family’s home. Objects in the surrounding world will be characterized with the sense of
being “ours.” There are some objects that belong to the family understood as a whole, and not,
for instance, only to individual members of that whole. This is “our” kitchen table, or “our”
backyard. Even fellow members exhibit to one another the noematic sense of belonging to the
specific community.
In addition to the family community, Husserl writes that certain philosophical
communities exhibit the mereological feature of intimacy. In the narrative from his “Vienna
Lecture,” Husserl describes the members forming the earliest philosophical community as
existing in an intimate form of community:

A new and intimate community—we could call it a community of purely ideal interests—
develops among men, men who live for philosophy, bound together (verbunden) in their
devotion to ideas, which not only are useful to all but belong to all identically.159
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LI, pp. 36-37.
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LI, pp. 41-42. Cf. Chapter II.
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VL, p. 287.
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On the basis of this quote, it is tempting to suggest that Husserl is only accounting for the
experience of belonging to a philosophical community as shaped by shared philosophical
interests and goals. At the same time, though, these “ideal interests” which are shared by
philosophers are described alongside the mereological structure of intimacy. While shared
interests influence our experiences of community membership, such interests (or goals or
appropriations of a tradition) should be reframed according to Husserl’s mereology if we are to
understand his account completely. After all, one can have interests in philosophy while
nevertheless not being a part of any sort of close-knit and self-reflexive philosophical
community. The mereological structure of intimacy exists here insofar as the individual members
are so “close” to the tasks pursued by the community taken as a whole that their joint task is
taken to be sufficiently similar for all members.
The intimate philosophical community need not be limited to those who are currently
working on philosophical problems or even those who are still living. In the language introduced
above, there can be an intimate philosophical community in the absence of concrete empathic
pairing. This is seen in the way Husserl writes that his life and Plato’s life are empathically
unified:
All unity of historical spirit as historical is a one-sided relationship. My life and Plato’s
are one. I continue his life’s work and the unity of his achievements is a member in the
unity of my achievements; his striving, his willing, his form continues through mine.
Science as a historical unity is a correlate of the unity of the production which passes
through a multiplicity of persons who later practice empathy with the life of the former
[die späteren üben Einfühlung in das Leben der früheren], insofar as they understand
their achievements as achievements, provided that they understand the history of ideas to
which those in their theories ultimately also wanted of what has remained open in them
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and what needs to be improved now that we descendants continue, improve, and want to
bring to an end.160
Shortly after in this passage, Husserl refers to being able to “feel himself into” the “bygone
Aristotle.”161 In a supplement to these passages, Husserl writes of the possibility of an author
interacting “into me” through their works in such a way that “we are communalized” (Wir sind
vergemeinschaftet).162 These passages bring together several threads. They refer to a
philosophical community (which Husserl has described as intimate). They refer to an empathic
pairing that brings two persons together as one (which Husserl has described as an intimate form
of coupling). They refer to an empathic pairing with a determinate individual with whom I am
denied a concrete encounter. To be sure, this only demonstrates that empathy with non-concrete
others is a possibility in extraordinary circumstances. Empathy in this example is something that
is practiced after the fact without the other person present. Empathy is practiced on the condition
that Husserl understands the history of ideas, and is able to place Plato as an individual person in

Hua XIV, p. 198: “Alle Einheit des historischen Geistes als historischen ist eine einseitige Beziehung. Mein
Leben und das Platons ist eins. Ich setze seine Lebensarbeit fort, che Einheit seiner Leistungen ist Glied in der
Einheit meiner Leistungen; sein Streben, sein Wollen, sein Gestalten setzt sich in dem meinen fort. Die
Wissenschaft als historische Einheit ist Korrelat der Einheit des Leistens, das durch eine Vielheit von Personen
hindurchgeht, die späteren üben Einfühlung in das Leben der früheren, soweit sie ihre Leistungen nachverstehen als
Leistungen, sofern sie ideengeschichtlich verstehen, worauf jene bei ihren Theorien letztlich hinauswollten, was in
ihnen offen gebheben ist und was nun verbessert werden muss, was wir Nachfahren eben fortführen, bessern, zum
Ende bringen wollen.”
160
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Hua XIV, p. 200: “Fühle ich mich in Aristoteles ein, so ist es der vergangene Aristoteles.”

Hua XIV, p. 222: “Der Autor oder die mit mir unmittelbar-wechselseitig kommunizierende andere Person wirkt
„in mich hinein”, in mein Ich, das seinen lebendigen Bewusstseinshorizont hat, seine originale Seinssphäre und
seine Seinshabitualität, seine Weise, als passives und aktives Ich zu sein. Aber der Andere hat die seinen. Sein
Gedanke ist „in" ihm sein Gedanke und ist jetzt zugleich in mich eingegangen und mein Gedanke, seine Akte sind
sein Leben, meine gleichgerichteten Akte die meinen; der Gedanke in ihm <ist> seine habituelle „Richtung” als in
ihm bleibende Geltung, als bleibend Gültiges dasselbe, aber auch dasselbe in mir in meiner nunmehr habituellen
Richtung auf dasselbe. Das geistige Gebilde „subjektiv” verschieden geworden und an sich geistig dasselbe. Wir
sind vergemeinschaftet.”
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the context of a historical lineage that he then picks up in the present.163 The centripetal moment
here refers to the ways that I represent other persons as inwardly unified with myself in an
intimate way. This is an intimate representation of the other person as a determinate other even
when they are absent (or deceased) insofar as shared interests or goals form a temporally
extended whole in the form of a tradition with which members continue to found in the present
while being dependent upon that tradition. The appropriation of a tradition, while demonstrated
in the setting of anonymous communities as involving mereological distance, here exhibits an
intimate closeness. Individuals cooperatively found such a community (even when this is onesided in terms of a historical succession), and are also dependent upon that community as a
whole. By this, Husserl indicates the possibility of taking over the projects of those with whom I
share interests or projects, and of establishing a unity in the form of a community. In this sense,
the philosophical community’s achievements closely depend on philosophers as its parts. There
is mutual foundational dependence here in Husserl’s mereological sense since the community
depends on philosophers insofar as it is founded upon them and their activities, while individual
philosophers reciprocally depend on the philosophical community as a whole for their own
individual pursuits.

Further supplementation for this claim comes in Husserl’s Ideas I in a section (§141) devoted to the topic of
mediate and unmediated evidence. There Husserl contrasts the immediacy of the evidence that comes from
perception with the mediate evidence of memory. The latter is mediated insofar as it refers back to an original
perception. As Husserl claims, though, rigorous explication of the source of one’s memories can be such that we
actually manage to connect the evidence of our memories back up to the present moment. In those cases, perception
in the present elucidates the memory. “But if the explication is conducted up to the current now, then some of the
light of perception and its evidence beams back on the entire series.” Ideas I, p. 281. I suggest that something
similar is going on in Husserl’s discussion of the kind of connection he’s able to have with Plato as a historical
figure.
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Unlike membership in anonymous communities, the reflexivity of intimate community
experience refers to determinateness both toward the other persons with whom one is intimately
paired and toward the shared surrounding world. In terms of the intimate community of
philosophers, Husserl hints at a specific kind of philosophical surrounding world. On its own,
this is not a surprising claim, given that he elsewhere refers to the specific surrounding worlds of
scientists broadly, or of mathematicians and botanists more narrowly. The uniqueness of the
surrounding world of philosophers, though, is based on its radicality. The philosophical
surrounding world (or perhaps more precisely, the surrounding world of the Husserlian
phenomenologist) exists insofar as members have similarly “suspended” the sense of the
surrounding world as it is lived through in the natural attitude.164 It is no longer a surrounding
world that is lived through straightforwardly, and the existence of all transcendent realities is
bracketed through the epoche. The philosophical surrounding world is experienced when
members approach their surrounding world in the philosophical attitude and with “a universal
critical attitude.”165 This amounts to a philosophical community whose surrounding world is
experienced by a group of individuals who are in the habit of critically calling the tenets of a
socio-cultural world itself into question. There is here a reflective questioning of the
commitments of their tradition to evaluate whether or not to continue abiding by them.166 In this

VL, p. 281: “Waking life is always a directedness to this or that, being directed toward it as an end or as means, as
relevant or irrelevant, toward the interesting or the indifferent, toward the private or public, toward what is daily
required or intrusively new. All this lies within the world-horizon; but special motives are required when one who is
gripped in this world-life reorients himself and somehow comes to make the world itself thematic, to take up a
lasting interest in it.”
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VL, p. 288. Further discussion of this notion of “critical” is provided in Chapter V.
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VL, p. 281.
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case, Husserl opposes the critical attitude of philosophers to the approach from those who are
“conservatively satisfied” (konservativ Befriedigten) and who promote the uncritical acceptance
of tradition above all.167 To a certain extent, this critical attitude, when entered into habitually,
even influences the apprehension of the philosophers’ non-philosophical surrounding world:

As a phenomenologist, I can, of course, at any time go back into the natural attitude, back
to the straightforward pursuit of my theoretical or other life-interests; I can, as before, be
active as a father, a citizen, an official, as a ‘good European,’ etc., that is, as a human
being in my human community, in my world. As before—and yet not quite as before. For
I can never again achieve the old naiveté; I can only understand it. My transcendental
insights and purposes have become merely inactive, but they continue to be my own.168

The surrounding world of the philosopher according to Husserl is characterized as experientially
intimate in the mereological sense if individual members reflect on that world understood as a
whole and insofar as it is a world that exists for a determinate group of persons (on the
assumption, to reiterate, that one has a strong grasp on the history of philosophers and their
ideas). This is experientially intimate to the extent that individual members as parts are “close”
or “proximate” in relation to the community in terms of reflecting on it as a whole as opposed to
being engaged with particular objects and states of affairs within it. Unlike the intersubjectively
accessible surrounding world of nature which is open to all perceivers, the world as the explicit
correlate of consciousness is put forth as only open to those who have habitually engaged in the
labor of philosophical practice.

“Those who are conservatively satisfied with the tradition will fight with the circle of philosophers, and the
struggle will occur in the sphere of political power. The persecution begins at the very beginnings of philosophy.
The people who live these ideas are ostracized. And yet, ideas are stronger than any empirical powers.” VL, p. 288.
[Translation modified]
167

168

Crisis, p. 210.
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The dependence between individuals as parts and the community as a whole is reciprocal
in the case of intimate communities in comparison with the one-sided dependence seen in the
case of anonymous communities. The relation of the individual to the anonymous community as
I showed was either implicit or accidental. While there may be a reciprocal determination of the
individual here from the direction of the community, it is only in a weak sense since the
community as a whole is not thematically experienced in the everydayness of members as its
parts. In an intimate community, though, the individuals have a less mediated relation to the
whole, such that they can more directly “steer” the community and be guided by communitywide goals. Some communities can exist despite the coming and going of members. For
anonymous communities, the community as a whole is ontologically founded on individuals as
its parts. But if the community can continue to exist even when some of its parts have left, then
this dependence is not reciprocal such as is found in intimately dependent moments such as color
and extension. One experiences oneself and fellow members within an anonymous community as
more akin to independent parts (pieces) rather than as reciprocally dependent parts (moments).
Intimate communities are similarly founded on individuals as their parts, but these community
wholes have the additional experiential features of reciprocally determining aspects of the lives
of members such as by providing explicit constraints to their wills. While anonymous
communities can continue to exist despite the coming and going of members, intimate
communities are not durable to the same extent.
§5. Conclusions
I have here argued that Husserl provides an account of the first-person experience of
belonging to a community that explicitly makes use of his notion of mereological proximity. The
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upshot of my argument is that Husserl provides a phenomenological account of the experience of
community membership by showing how personal associations are correlated with their shared
surrounding worlds. This is directly tied to the ways that individuals as parts are related in
mediate or immediate fashion to the community whole. Descriptions of mediacy and immediacy
in the context of community were shown to be representative of Husserl’s notion of mereological
proximity.
The argument I have given here supplements and re-frames, though does not supplant,
the interpretations in the secondary literature introduced above. Views claiming that shared
interests, goals, or appropriations of a tradition shape experiences of belonging to a community
are correct to the extent that they highlight different ways in which experiences of interpersonal
interactions and a shared surrounding world are shaped. At the same time, though, these views
do not completely uncover the fine-grained fashion in which Husserl discusses different
experiences of community membership. I conclude this chapter by showing the extent to which
interpretations in the secondary literature can be supplemented by my reading.
Accounts that emphasize shared interests or goals in the experience of community
membership are correct in showing that experiences of others and of our shared surrounding
world are filtered by similar attitudes or projects. Husserl is definitely clear that shared interests
and goals make an impact on the experience of belonging to a particular community. This on its
own, however, is not entirely representative of the experiential structure of community
membership put forward by Husserl. Insofar as commentators focus exclusively on shared
interests or shared goals in regard to experiencing membership within “true” communities, they
impose an imprecise limitation on the breadth of Husserl’s concept of membership. If
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membership in a community in Husserl’s true sense is experienced only in those groupings that
are explicitly “interest-oriented” or “goal-oriented,” and if anonymous groupings such as
Gesellschaften or humanity at large are not oriented in these ways, then attempts to account for
the structure of experiences within such groupings from a Husserlian standpoint will face a
difficult descriptive hurdle. Appealing to the mereological reading I have given, both anonymous
societies and the human community at large are encapsulated within the general framework
Husserl provides regarding experiences of the members of personal associations in correlation
with their shared surrounding worlds. While it is clear that the content of these experiences can
vary between different communities, they nevertheless for Husserl are made sense of as types of
the same general framework.
Furthermore, it is not the case that shared interests and goals do the entirety of the work
in regard to distinguishing between different types of communities. It is true that we can
distinguish the community of philosophers from the community of bird-watchers or wine
enthusiasts by way of their different interests and activities.169 For Husserl, though, descriptions
of communities with shared interests and practical goals are often embedded within a further
layer of sophistication, such that interests and goals are themselves contextualized in terms of
being anonymous or intimate in the mereological senses. My experience of membership within a
particular community can either involve a one-sided founding dependence of the community
upon its members (anonymous communities) or there can be a mutual founding dependence
between community members as parts and the community as a whole (intimate communities).
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The existence of a philosophically-minded community of wine-drinking bird-watchers might put pressure on this
point, but I think Husserl’s mereology still adequately accounts for such a case.
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This strategy for differentiating between different types of communities envelopes distinctions
that appeal to shared interests and goals.
Accounts that emphasize the socio-historical appropriation of traditions in experiences of
community membership are faithful to Husserl’s writings in showing how our membership
experiences are shaped by indeterminate or ever absent others. The influences of traditions
permeate experiences of community membership even without the pairing of ourselves with
concrete others. As I have argued, Husserl’s account of the experience of community
membership in general includes a pairing of myself with at least one other person in the form of
a personal association. The pairing Husserl refers to is empathic insofar as it is an act that
represents the other’s awareness of a shared surrounding world. This applies even to sociohistorical communities that we belong to through the appropriation of traditions. This claim
would be indefensible if the notion of empathy referred only to actual encounters with
individual, embodied others. Nevertheless, Husserl invokes his notion of empathy even in cases
when our representation of other persons occurs without encountering them concretely. This
possibility is brought up by Husserl insofar as empathy is merely potential or mediated, and
mediation refers us explicitly back to his notion of mereological proximity.
The presence of disagreements in the context of community membership was brought up
at the end of §3 where I highlighted that Husserl allows for dissent amidst fellow members and
in regard to their shared surrounding world. Other commentators have addressed these topics, so
I do not further pursue them here.170 Based on the argument I have provided in this chapter,
though, I suggest in closing this chapter that mereological proximity provides the tools for
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Cf. Zahavi (2001); Miettinen (2013); Szanto (2016).
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understanding disagreements within communities. For example, disagreement in the context of a
community can facilitate the movement from a pre-reflective understanding of one’s community
to a reflective approach to one’s community.171 When things go wrong, community harmony as a
whole is disrupted, and this can motivate members either to approach each other differently or to
modify the organization of institutions within their surrounding world. These kinds of
disagreements refer to ways in which community members can intend the community as a
whole, and thereby become experientially “close” to the community in the mereological sense.
As Husserl writes, we are always involved in the shaping of our shared surrounding world:
“Whether we want to or not, whether it is right or wrong, we act in this way. Could we not also
act rationally?”172 I propose that one way in which community members can act rationally in so
shaping the surrounding world is by reflexively thinking and acting with an eye to the
community understood as a whole.173
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Cf. Searle (2003).

Hua XXVII, p. 4 (Kaizo 1, p. 326): “Ob wir wollen oder nicht, ob schlecht oder recht, wir tun so. Können wir es
nicht auch vernünftig tun, steht Vernünftigkeit und Tüchtigkeit nicht in unserer Macht?”
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This suggestion is pursued further in Chapter V in regard to socio-cultural cries and betrayals of trust.

CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
§1. Introduction
This chapter argues that Husserl’s concept of community supplements a difficulty found
in Margaret Gilbert’s theory of political obligations within large political communities such as
countries.1 More specifically, I argue that Husserl is better able to account for the structures of
the experiences that members have within communities possessing large degrees of
impersonality and anonymity.2 I do not claim that Husserl has a comprehensively worked out
theory of obligations in general or political obligations in particular. I do claim, though, that
Husserl’s treatment of the features of impersonality and anonymity in the context of community
are preferable to the treatment given to them by Gilbert. This preferability matters insofar as
those specific features are fundamental to Gilbert’s theory of political obligations.
Near the end of her 1989 book On Social Facts, Gilbert claims that, “In order
meaningfully to engage in political philosophy one needs an accurate social ontology.”3 Gilbert

One note on terminology is in order. Gilbert refers primarily to “societies” and “social groups.” She does not use
the term “communities” to the same extent that Husserl does. Given the arguments I have made up to this point,
however, it is clear that Husserl’s concept of community accounts for all forms of personal associations. Husserl’s
concept does not carry with it the terminological baggage associated with “community” as Tönnies and his
terminological heirs occasionally contrast it with “society,” for instance. All references to “communities” in what
follows, even in reference to Gilbert’s positions, are to be taken as referring to any form of social grouping.
1

2

Precise definitions of both of these terms are given in what follows.

3

Gilbert (1989), p. 436. This position is echoed in the social and political ontology of John Searle (2003) and in the
political analyses of Colin Hay (2006). I here take this point on in the form of an assumption since other authors
have defended it. Gilbert, Searle, and Hay provide their own arguments for why ontology should precede political
philosophy.
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puts forward a short “sketch” in her early work on the applicability of her own social ontology to
the political domain4, but then directly engages with political philosophy by the time of her 2006
A Theory of Political Obligations. Part of what this chapter provides is an assessment of how
Gilbert’s position changes over time (primarily between the 1989 and 2006 books), and why
those changes matter. By showcasing these changes, I demonstrate how her more recent account
is closer to Husserl’s writings on community than has been recognized, while also showing how
her position has become more protected against the kinds of criticisms recently brought against
her by phenomenologists.
Political philosophers have debated whether members of political communities have
obligations to uphold the institutions of their political communities, and if so, what the source is
of that normative force. Gilbert refers to this nexus of questions as the “membership problem.”
One question representative of this problem is: “Must one obey the commands of one’s country
simply because it is one’s country?”5 This is an important problem in the context of political
philosophy insofar as it draws attention to the nature of the constraints to the wills of members of
a political community, both in relation to one another and in relation to the political community
as a whole. Husserl provides his own ontological account of the social world6, and there is
considerable overlap with the content put forth in the theories of contemporary social
ontologists.7 Not only is it the case that Husserl provides an ontological account of the social

4

Gilbert (1989), pp. 436-439.

5

Gilbert (2006), p. 12.

6

Cf., Chapter I.

It is clear that Husserl’s phenomenology was ahead of its time in proceeding in this vein. Commentators have even
claimed that the first usage of the term “social ontology” is found in Husserl’s writings, specifically in a manuscript
from 1910 found presented in Husserliana XIII, pp. 98-104. Cf. Szanto (2016); Miettinen (2014).
7
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world, but there are components of his account that can retrospectively provide assistance to
Gilbert’s account of the features of impersonality and anonymity.8 Husserlian philosophy thereby
contributes to work in political philosophy by way of addressing fundamental components of the
political “membership problem.”
I begin by showing important similarities and differences between the positions of
Husserl and Gilbert (§2). Both writers endorse tenets associated with the position in the
contemporary collective intentionality literature regarding sharedness arising from the subject of
collective intentions (2.1).9 Influenced by Husserl’s writings on community, contemporary
phenomenologists have criticized Gilbert’s theory for having overly stringent criteria for the
establishment of a plural subject, suggesting that her theory requires participants to explicitly
engage in something like an agreement in order to be social (2.2). According to such criticisms,
Gilbert does not account for forms of communalization brought about in the absence of explicit
agreements, and fails to explain how joint commitments themselves come about. By presenting
Gilbert’s recent work on political obligations (beyond what she wrote earlier on the social
domain in general), I show that the force of such criticisms has been diminished when her work
is considered as a whole. In providing her answer to the “membership problem” (§3), Gilbert
demonstrates how her plural subject theory takes into account instances in which members of a
group are collectively influenced without the necessity of an explicit agreement (3.1). Building

8

Cf. Thomasson (1997); Szanto (2016).

Cf., Schweikard & Schmid (2013); Szanto (2016); Koo (2016). As Szanto has recently claimed, Husserl’s account
of collective intentionality “cannot be easily harmonized” with any of the three main approaches taken entirely on
their own, and that “Husserl’s own account resonates with a number of insights among each of them” Szanto (2016),
pp. 156-160. As I show, though, there are fundamental points of overlap between Husserl’s writings on community
and accounts such as Gilbert’s of collective intentionality emphasizing a shared subject.
9
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on the relatively simple case of two people going for a walk together, Gilbert extrapolates into
analyses of larger groups such as countries (3.2). This extrapolation is accomplished with the
help of amplifying her account of the features of impersonality and anonymity within large
groupings. I show how this implicitly responds to some of the main phenomenological criticisms
that have been levied against her (3.3). While Gilbert’s answer to the “membership problem” is
applied to all forms of political groupings, I identify a difficulty inherent to her account
regarding the kind of consciousness that members have of political obligations in the context of
impersonal and anonymous groups. Put briefly, Gilbert faces a difficulty insofar as her plural
subject account requires that members are conscious of the group’s unity while the features of
impersonality and anonymity seem to preclude such awareness (3.4). Gilbert draws attention to
the kinds of experiences had by members of a community, and the difficulty I raise is motivated
by Husserl’s phenomenological conception of the same kinds of experiences. Given the affinities
between the two philosophers, I turn to Husserl’s conception of community membership not just
as a point of comparison, but as a resource to address the difficulty identified in Gilbert’s work
(§4). I present Husserl’s account of the experience of membership within large communities
(4.1), and argue that he is better equipped to address the difficulty identified in Gilbert regarding
political obligations in large communities (4.2). Husserl’s concept of community in general and
his account of the experiences of community membership are thereby shown to be of crucial
importance to a specific problem of political philosophy (§5).
§2. Comparing Husserl and Gilbert
The project of bringing Husserl and Gilbert together is here motivated by showcasing
their similarities and differences. In this way, I engage in a project similar to Amie Thomasson
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(1997), who compares the social ontologies of Husserl and Searle. The possibility of my project
is foreshadowed in Thomasson’s work insofar as she highlights Husserl’s notion of social
subjectivities as involving a “we” understood as an entity in its own right.10 As becomes clear
below, this commitment to the “we” is shared by Gilbert. The main point of overlap between
Husserl and Gilbert is in their conception of communities as distinct entities that are brought
about through the activities of their individual members.11 Communities are theorized by both
writers as being similar to the unities of individual subjects or subjectivities. This is what Gilbert
means in referring to groups as “plural subjects.” Just as individuals engage in their own
individual projects (e.g., “I, the first-person singular subject, am going for a walk”), so too are
communities said to engage in community projects on these accounts (e.g., “We, the first-person
plural subject, are going for a walk”). These community endeavors are not summative of the
projects of all members understood as individuals, but refer to a unified community “we” that is
more than a mere collection.
2.1 Overlap regarding Plural Subjects
Gilbert’s plural subject theory is put forth as an answer to the philosophical problem of
how individual persons share in cognitive, evaluative, or practical activities.12 On Gilbert’s

“Thus for Husserl the existence of the social or ‘spiritual’ world depends not merely on collective intentionality in
Searle’s sense (of individuals with thoughts in the form ‘we intend’) but on higher-level social associations for
whom this piece of paper is money, this piece of rock a work of art, this building a place of spiritual significance.
This is a more robust understanding of collective intentionality than Searle’s, since Searle insists that we do not need
to posit any higher social subjectivity for the existence of collective intentionality; ‘we’ intentions still take place ‘in
the heads’ of separate individuals.” Thomasson (1997), p. 117.
10

See Chapter I for a further discussion of Husserl’s ontology of communities in comparison with traditional
conceptions such as ontological individualism and ontological holism.
11

This is referred to as the problem of “collective intentionality.” As Schweikard and Schmid concisely put the
point, “Collective intentionality is the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of facts, states of
affairs, goals, or values.” Schweikard & Schmid (2013).
12
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account, individual persons are said to be collectively engaged in such activities insofar as they
belong to a “plural subject” brought about through a joint commitment. By a “plural subject,”
Gilbert means any group that is jointly committed with one another as a group toward some
goal.13 A joint commitment arises when a group of persons undertake a certain task or goal
together “as a body.” Gilbert designates joint commitments as arising when “the parties jointly
commit to X as a body. Different joint commitments involve different substitutions for ‘X.’”14
Joint commitments are practical commitments of the wills of at least two individuals15, and by
engaging in such a commitment, members are said to “pool” their wills together.16 Two
individuals may jointly commit to going for a walk together17 or to be married18; larger groups
may be jointly committed to defend a plot of land from intruders or to storm a building
together.19 What is crucial for all of these examples provided by Gilbert is they are actions
undertaken by a “we”; the subject of these types of actions are not individuals or mere
aggregations of individuals. Rather, the subject of these actions is said to be the group taken
together, the first-person plural “we” taken as a whole.

13

Gilbert (2006), p. 144.

14

Gilbert (2006), pp. 136-137.

“A joint commitment is a kind of commitment of the will. In this case, the wills of two or more people crate it,
and two or more people are committed by it.” Gilbert (2006), p. 134.
15

16

Gilbert (1989), pp. 197-198.

17

Gilbert (1990); Gilbert (2006).

18

Gilbert (2006), p. 112.

19

Gilbert (2006), pp. 178-179.
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In order to bring about a plural subject, Gilbert claims that the individual members must
express to one another their “readiness” to be jointly committed to a specific task.20 By openly
expressing readiness to the other members, one shows they are prepared and willing to undertake
a shared endeavor. In some cases, expressions of readiness may come in the form of explicit
agreements. An explicit agreement may be lacking, though, such as when a background
understanding prescribes how joint commitments are to come about.21
Foreshadowing the direction of her later work, Gilbert includes within her 1989 account a
general notion of the ways in which a plural subject can exist when not all fellow members are
known personally (what she later defines as the characteristic of “impersonality”) or where some
fellow members are not even recognized as existing (“anonymity”).22 This is accounted for by
appeal to “common knowledge” possessed by the relevant members of a group. A group can be
jointly committed while not knowing of all other fellow members insofar as there is some kind of
common knowledge regarding the group in question and their requisite readiness. This common
knowledge could be a reference, for example, to “we the members of a large crowd demanding
X.” There is thereby a reference to a generally individuated group without picking out specific
known individuals within it. A plural subject for Gilbert requires both common knowledge and
joint readiness.23 No detailed account is given in the 1989 work regarding how common

Gilbert (1989), pp. 184-185; (2006), p. 120: “One can say at least that each party to the joint action does
something expressive of readiness to participate in that action. Further, each party makes this readiness manifest to
the others. Something each party does or says makes their personal readiness clear, as it is intended to.”
20

21

I will return to this distinction in what follows, as I argue that the latter notion is further developed in her account
of membership within large political communities.
22

Gilbert (1989), p. 212. Cf. Gilbert (2003).

23

Gilbert (1989), p. 202.
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knowledge factors into large groupings such as countries. By 2006, though, she provides a
detailed account of the features of impersonality and anonymity. Along with a more robust
notion of impersonality and anonymity, she also has far more to say on the topic of “population
common knowledge.” Since my goal in this section is just to establish the main sites of overlap
between her general plural subject theory and Husserl’s writings on community, Gilbert’s more
detailed conceptions of impersonality, anonymity, and population common knowledge are
presented in the following section. They are thereby shown to protect against recent criticisms
that have been directed toward her by phenomenologists.
Gilbert claims that membership within jointly-committed plural subjects exhibits the
three features of (1) intentionality of membership, (2) unity, and (3) consciousness of that unity
by members.24 I here focus exclusively on the third feature, as I argue below that it is here that
Gilbert lacks a sufficient account of the consciousness of unity in cases of impersonal,
anonymous communities (that is, in the cases she appeals to regarding political obligations).25
According to Gilbert, members of a group must themselves have conscious awareness or
perception of the group’s unity. Gilbert recognizes the importance of properly characterizing this
consciousness of unity while also indicating that it can arise in different ways for different
groupings.26 Conscious awareness of a group’s unity is relatively straightforward in the case of

24

Gilbert (2006), pp. 62-63, 96, 168.

25

When Gilbert talks about intentionality, she is not using it in the phenomenological sense of that feature of
consciousness such that all consciousness is conscious of or about something. Rather, Gilbert is using the more
restricted sense of intentionality as meaning or purposefully intending to do something. The unity of a plural subject
refers to it being more than a mere aggregation, that is, as being inwardly bound and more than the sum of its parts
where those parts are individual persons. As Chelstrom point out, intentionality for Gilbert is more in reference to
the German Absicht rather than Intentionalität. Chelstrom (2012), p. 159. This point is returned to below.
“Precisely what degree of awareness is necessary, assuming that some is, is an important issue.” Gilbert (2006), p.
63.
26
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small groups such as a dyad. For example, I have a different kind of awareness when “we” are
going for a walk together than when I am going on a walk alone. Getting clear on what
consciousness of unity amounts to in referring to a large country as a unified “we” requires
further examination and is returned to below.
Husserl similarly thematizes the ways in which groups are bound together in the form of
a shared subject of actions, and his notion of communities as akin to “many-headed”
(vielköpfige) yet unified subjectivities harmonizes well with Gilbert. As Thomasson realized,
Husserl’s notion of personal associations is of social subjectivities understood as entities existing
beyond the summation of individual members.27 Similar to Gilbert’s discussion of joint
commitments as commitments of the will, Husserl provides an account of “communities of will,”
such that individual persons share in the pursuit of an end. For instance, he writes that “If the
relationship [between members of a community of will] is well-founded, then every action in
which it appears will be characterized as proceeding from the establishment of the intertwining
wills of both persons.”28 It here bears repeating something that was introduced in an earlier
chapter, namely, Husserl’s schema regarding the structure of such practical joint activities in his
manuscripts:

[In the] community of will, agreement can also be reciprocal, resulting in a reciprocal
arrangement. I fulfill your wish if you fulfill mine, I’m doing this to benefit you and you
do this for my benefit. Furthermore, we both wish that something should be done, so we
“share” our decision; I do one part and you do the other part. Etc. S1 and S2 want the
same G, not each for himself, but S1 wants G just as S2 equally wants it, the will of S2
belongs to that willed by S1 and vice versa. That the part D1 is realized by S1 and D2 by
27

Thomasson (1997), p. 117.

Hua XIV, pp. 169-170: “Ist das Verhältnis gestiftet, so ist jede Handlung, in der es in Erscheinung tritt,
charakterisiert als aus der stiftenden Willensverflechtung der beiden Personen hervorgehend.”
28
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S2 in turn lies in the will decided on by both, and is for both resolved as “means” (in the
broad sense), or as what belongs to its realization and to the intent.29
In this way, there is a sharing or, to use Gilbert’s phrase, a “pooling” of the wills of members.30
This passage indicates a feature similar to Gilbert’s notion of expressions of readiness. Individual
members express a conditionality regarding their membership by making clear to fellow
members that they are prepared to do their part if the others will do theirs. Husserl’s account of
communities of will can thereby be seen as similar to Gilbert’s account of joint commitments
insofar as two or more individuals are committed to bringing about some goal together.
For Husserl, a community understood as a whole is to be considered as a unified entity
despite being made up of a plurality of members. In some places he refers to the community as a
distinct “subject” and in other places as akin to a large-scale experiencing “subjectivity.” Writing
of the sense in which a community is a subject, Husserl indicates that this is because it acts as a
“substrate” that has no other place than as the “substrate of a communicative plurality of
persons” (die kommunikative Personvielheit Substrat).31 In the passage from Husserl’s “Kaizo
article” appealed to in earlier chapters, he states that the “community is a personal and, as it
were, many-headed yet interconnected subjectivity” (ein personale, sozusagen vielköpfige und

Hua XIV, p. 170: “Willensgemeinschaft, Einverständnis kann dann auch ein wechselseitiges sein, endend in einer
wechselseitigen Vereinbarung. Ich erfülle deinen Wunsch, wenn du den meinen erfüllst, ich tue das dir zugute, wenn
du dafür mir jenes zugute tust. Ferner: Wir wünschen beide, dass etwas geschehe, wir ent- schliessen uns
„gemeinsam”, ich tue davon den Teil, du den anderen Teil. Usw. S1 und S2 wollen dasselbe G, aber nicht jedes für
sich, sondern S1 will G als von S2 gleichfalls Gewolltes, der Wille des S2 gehört mit zum Gewollten des Si und
umgekehrt. Dass S1 den Teil D1 realisiert und S2 D2, das liegt wiederum im Willen beider beschlossen, und ist für
beide beschlossen als „Mittel” (im weiteren Sinn) oder als zur Realisierung gehörig, vorher aber zur Absicht.”
29

30

Cf., Szanto (2016).

31

Hua XIV, pp. 200-201.
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doch verbundene Subjektivität).32 This notion of the community as a many-headed subjectivity is
further echoed in his manuscripts.33
As shown here, there is considerable overlap in the ontological considerations that are
given to communities by Gilbert and Husserl. This is seen insofar as they are both committed to
the position that members of a social group belong to a shared subject or subjectivity in the form
of a first-person plural “we.” There are additional similarities in their conceptions of the ways in
which the wills of members are intertwined and the kind of group readiness that is required for
undertaking a shared activity. In turning below to developments in Gilbert’s later work, I suggest
one further point of overlap between Husserl’s notion of the “shared surrounding world” and
Gilbert’s notion of common knowledge.34 Husserl provides an account of the experiential
structures of consciousness that members of a group have. In this sense, he comes close to the
descriptions given by Gilbert regarding consciousness of a group’s unity. As I go on to show, it
is here where Husserl’s theoretical account diverges. Husserl’s account of the experiences of
membership within a community as a part have been described in detail in Chapter III, so I do

32

Hua XXVII, p. 22.

“Community subjectivity is a many-headed [vielköpfige] subjectivity in the form of the ego-alteri. Each
communalized ego has not only his consciousness, but has a view into the other and with the other into a universal
connection of consciousness with a many-headed subjectivity, but, of course, not as a losing of oneself into
indefiniteness.” Hua XIV, p. 218: “Die Gemeinschaftssubjektivität ist eine vielköpfige Subjektivität, Form des egoalteri. Jedes vergemeinschaftete ego hat nicht nur sein Bewmsstsein, sondern seines als in die Anderen
hineinschauendes und sich mit den Anderen zu einem universalen Bewusstseinszusammenhang mit vielköpfiger
Subjektivität verbindend, aber freilich sich ins Unbestimmte verlierend.”
33

34

This is presented below and not here insofar as it presupposes the way in which Gilbert goes on to distinguish
between individual and population common knowledge, which requires a discussion of impersonality and
anonymity.

184
not completely recapitulate them here. I return below, however, to his specific ways of
describing membership within loosely-bound, anonymous communities.35
2.2 Criticism from Phenomenologists in the Secondary Literature
It is not enough to showcase the similarities between Gilbert and Husserl especially since
Gilbert’s theory has received a fair amount of criticism from Husserlian-influenced
phenomenologists.36 While acknowledging similarities, contemporary commentators such as
Emanuele Caminada, Thomas Szanto, and Eric Chelstrom have been critical of different facets
of Gilbert’s account from the perspective of Husserl’s writings on the social world.37 After
laying out what I take to be the most forceful components of these objections, I suggest in the
next section that Gilbert’s later works are no longer vulnerable to all of these
phenomenologically-motivated criticisms.
Caminada suggests there is simultaneously an affinity between the works of Husserl and
Gilbert at the same time that there are irreconcilable differences. While Husserl’s notion of

35

One additional point of overlap between Gilbert and Husserl that is worth pointing out is their ways of navigating
between the extremes of ontological individualism and ontological holism. As I argued in Chapter I, Husserl’s
concept of community, considered from an ontological perspective, represents a third way between the positions of
ontological individualism and ontological holism. To reiterate, individualism is the position that communities are
nothing more than the aggregation of a relevant group of individual persons and their activities. Holism, on the other
hand, is the position that communities are more than the aggregation of a relevant group of individuals and their
individual interactions. Holists, rather, are committed to the notion that communities are more than the sum of their
parts when those parts are taken to be individual persons. Both Husserl and Gilbert provide a middle position
regarding the ontological status of plural subjects being between individualism and holism. On Gilbert’s account,
individualism errs in considering individuals as acting only as singular agents. Holism in it staunchest forms errs on
her account by not allowing individual persons to play a role in the constitution of a community. Her plural subject
theory provides a middle path, though, by showing that persons can engage not just in singular actions but also
plural actions. Given my conclusion in Chapter I, it is clear that this is yet another site of overlap between Gilbert
and Husserl. Cf. Gilbert (1989), pp. 427-436.
36

I suspect that the reason why so much ink has been spilled in criticizing Gilbert precisely because her plural
subject theory is so close to Husserl’s concept of community, and not that she is entirely out of line with Husserlian
tenets. For this reason, Husserlian phenomenologists seem drawn to her plural subject theory like bees to honey.
37

Cf. Schmid (2009).
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“personalities of a higher order” or “personal unities of a higher level” are similar to Gilbertian
plural subjects as brought about by joint commitments, Caminada suggests that Husserl’s theory
is more inclusive in accounting for more types of groupings.38 Rather than just accounting for
joint commitments that arise based on active, explicit commitments, Caminada highlights that
Husserl’s conception applies to more subtle forms of groupings where an explicit commitment
has not been made between partners.39 According to Caminada, Husserl’s account is thereby
preferable insofar as it can deal both with groups that arise on the basis of an explicit joint
commitment as well as with those groups that exist based on “the enduring effect of grouping.”40
Furthermore, Caminada criticizes Gilbert for focusing on the jointness of joint commitments
without thematizing the content of those commitments. According to this objection, Gilbert
overemphasizes the sense in which individual persons constitute a plural subject, while she
purportedly neglects an account of the content of what those agents are pursuing.41
Szanto is similarly clear that there is a large amount of overlap between Husserl and
Gilbert.42 On Szanto’s account, though, Husserl sees joint commitments as already being social
achievements or results, rather than being the starting point for sociality.43 Put otherwise, Szanto

38

Caminada (2016), p. 284.

“Husserl’s plural subject theory is thus different from Gilbert’s in a crucial respect: it does not presuppose nonsocial individuals that can commit themselves to become social. Husserl envisages intentional associations and
socialization already at the level of passivity. At this level, a pre-reflexive, relational communality emerges and
necessarily sediments itself in individual minds. But personal life arises only through the intentional medium of
these communities and can be actively constituted through commitments and endorsements.” Caminada (2016), p.
286.
39

40

Caminada (2016), p. 287.

41

Cf., Caminada (2016), p. 285.

42

Szanto (2016), p. 157.

43

Szanto (2016), p. 158.
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suggests that Gilbert errs in supposing that we first need to engage in joint commitments in order
to start being social, whereas it seems that there are more basic forms of social life that do not
require an explicit joint commitment.
According to Chelstrom, Gilbert overemphasizes practical intending to the detriment of
an appropriate focus on non-practical forms of consciousness within groups. For example,
Chelstrom writes: “By starting with intentionality [Absicht] and not offering an account of how
that is dependent upon or integrated with intentionality [Intentionalität] Gilbert inherits
unnecessary theoretical problems. Gilbert’s theoretical edifice is insufficiently
phenomenologically grounded.”44 According to this objection, Gilbert’s primary focus on plural
subjects as practical intertwinings or poolings of the wills of members does not adequately
account for all of the sophisticated workings of social consciousness. Given what I have
highlighted from Gilbert’s account above regarding the inclusion of “consciousness of unity” for
members within a plural subject, it is clear that her framework requires a clear discussion of the
structures of consciousness. Chelstrom’s worry, then, is that Gilbert starts with a specific type of
consciousness (practical intentionality), and then attempts to account for all consciousness in
general in practical terms.
The criticisms put forth by Caminada and Chelstrom appeal to Gilbert’s earlier works,
primarily her 1989 On Social Facts and her 2003 book chapter “The Structure of the Social
Atom.” Szanto makes reference to her later 2006 work (A Theory of Political Obligations), but
does not seem to share my reading that Gilbert is thereby more protected against these kinds of
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Chelstrom (2012), p. 159.
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criticisms.45 As I claim, parts of Gilbert’s plural subject theory are amplified in this later work.
The parts of her theory that are thereby bolstered are parts that can guard in part against the
specific criticisms rehearsed here. After laying out precisely how Gilbert’s account is modified in
pursuit of an account of political obligations, I return to these criticisms to reassess their potency.
§3. Gilbert and the Membership Problem
Gilbert’s 2006 work on plural subject theory as applied to the political sphere is not
simply “old wine in a new bottle.” There are theoretical features that are modified in this later
work that alter the ability of her theory to account for large social groupings. More specifically,
the features she adds involve not requiring members to engage in explicit agreements,
distinguishing between basic and non-basic joint commitments, accounting for group
impersonality and anonymity, and distinguishing between individual and population common
knowledge. In doing this, furthermore, Gilbert’s account is implicitly better equipped to deal
with the criticisms levied against her by phenomenologists as discussed in the previous section.46
The problem that Gilbert works through in A Theory of Political Obligation is what she refers to
as “the membership problem.” The “membership problem” asks: “Does membership in a
political society in and of itself involve obligations to uphold the relevant political
institutions?”47 By upholding the political institutions of a political society, Gilbert refers to

I suspect that this is because Szanto is in his chapter appealing only to the first chapter of Gilbert’s 2006 work,
whereas the novel material comes in later.
45

I here say “implicitly” since 1) Gilbert herself is not directly addressing the concerns of phenomenologists, and 2)
her work on political obligations came out prior to those criticisms.
46

Gilbert (2006), p. 18. By “political society,” Gilbert focuses on countries, which she distinguishes from other
forms of political groupings such as marriages or clubs by way of possessing certain features. Four features that
belong to countries as a specific instantiation of political societies are: (1) typically having a relatively definite and
permanent geographical location; (2) tending to have a territory that is large in terms of both land mass and
47
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members engaging in activities that are related to governance, such as conforming to that
society’s laws.48
3.1 Gilbert’s Plural Subject Answer to the Membership Problem
What Gilbert provides in response to the political membership problem is an affirmative
answer to the question (that members do indeed have such obligations to uphold their group’s
political institutions), and an explanation of the source of the normative force behind those
obligations (that they arise on the basis of joint commitments). She refers to this solution as the
“plural subject theory of political obligations.”
One of the first ways Gilbert demonstrates the novelty of her new approach is by
contrasting it with the solution to the “membership problem” given in “actual contract theory.”
On that account, political obligations are said to arise insofar as the members of a political
community are party to explicit agreement that thereby acts as a constraint to their wills.49 While
explicit agreements such as contracts or promises are sufficient to bring about political
obligations, Gilbert argues that they are not the only possible source of obligations.50 As she
points out, actual contract theory has been criticized precisely insofar as many if not most
members of large political groups have not at any point explicitly agreed to uphold any political

population; (3) being likely to have smaller societies within themselves; and (4) providing bounds within which
individuals can live their whole lives. Gilbert (2006), pp. 16-17.
“I take a country’s political institutions to be those of its institutions that pertain to its governance. […]
Supporting or upholding political institutions will be understood to include but not be limited to conformity to those
political institutions, such as laws and commands, in relation to which the notion of conformity makes the best
sense.” Gilbert (2006), p. 14.
48

49

Gilbert (2006), pp. 55-56. “Actual” here is opposed to “hypothetical,” such as is put forth by Rawls.

50

Gilbert (2006), p. 61.
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institutions. This is what Gilbert refers to as the “no-agreement claim.”51 What she goes on to
develop is a theory of political obligations that provides an account of the requisite intentionality,
unity, and consciousness of unity in the absence of an explicit agreement or contract. 52 As
highlighted above, a joint activity can come about in the absence of an actual agreement, such as
when there are established background understandings between fellow members.53 For instance,
when two people begin to quarrel, there is here a joint activity that erupts without the parties
having to first come to the agreement, “Alright, shall we now start to quarrel?”54 Rather, the
background understandings of the parties allows them to begin a joint activity right away without
any kind of explicit agreement.55
As further evidence of the way that her account has become further sophisticated, Gilbert
goes on to distinguish between basic and non-basic kinds of joint commitments.56 The basic type
of joint commitment is one in which there is an expression of readiness to be part of a joint
commitment as a body with others in order to pursue some particular goal. Two people
committing to go for a walk together is an example of a basic form of joint commitment. In such
a case, both members express their readiness in some fashion, and form a plural subject insofar
as that readiness then leads to the activity of going for a walk. The non-basic type of joint
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commitment is such that individuals are jointly committed to espousing an indeterminate goal as
a body without having experienced any reciprocal expressiveness of readiness regarding a
particular goal. The example Gilbert provides is of two individuals, where they have jointly
committed to the idea that one of them will decide what they both will do on a specific weekend.
Even though only one of the two individuals will choose the activity, the other is involved in a
non-basic joint commitment to the extent that she will go along in upholding the end determined
by the chooser.57 The introduction of the class of non-basic joint commitments is an
amplification of her position in On Social Facts. As pointed out above, Gilbert there claims that
a plural subject cannot arise on the basis of common knowledge alone, and that it requires joint
readiness on the part of members.58 Beyond this, though, no detailed discussion is given there of
different cases of joint commitments such as could be had from variations in types of readiness.
In the case of non-basic joint commitments, however, it is precisely a lack of expressed readiness
regarding a particular goal to be jointly pursued that factors into the plural subject. Given that her
ultimate goal is to provide an account of the ways in which large social groups such as countries
function, it is clear that Gilbert needs a strong account of the non-basic case, since such groups
will almost certainly contain a large degree of both impersonality and anonymity.
Built on the basis of the simple dyadic example of two people going on a walk together,
Gilbert claims that all of the elements needed in order to understand political obligations for
members of large political communities are already in place.59 In the activity of going for a walk
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with someone, there is a basic form of a joint activity that takes place through a joint
commitment. This kind of joint commitment has the three features of social groups highlighted
by Gilbert, namely intentionality, unity, and consciousness of unity: “This is how each
understands what is going on, and each knows that each understands this.”60 When two people
are going for a walk together, furthermore, each of the members is said to have a certain
“standing” in relation to the other member by virtue of their membership in the joint activity.61
This “standing” means that each of the members is in a position to make demands of their fellow
member if the other person deviates from the joint activity of the walk.62 It is in this sense that a
basic form of obligations arises on the basis of joint commitments. Parties to a joint commitment
are said to have a special standing in regard to one another, and four significant aspects of this
standing are betrayal, trust, answerability, owing.63 Gilbert summarizes the role that these aspects
play for members of a joint commitment relative to one another:

By virtue of being party to a joint commitment I owe my conformity to the other parties
in their capacity as parties. In this capacity, therefore, they all have a special standing in
relation to my conformity: they have a right against me to it, and they will rightly take
themselves to have the standing to demand it from me and to rebuke me if it is not
forthcoming. In addition, they will be in a position to trust me to conform.
Correspondingly, they will appropriately feel betrayed if I fail to conform. Further, they
will rightly take me to be answerable to them for nonconformity.64
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By engaging in the joint commitment of going for a walk with one another, each of the walkers
takes on certain obligations toward the other, and reciprocally, each has certain rights against the
other.65
Joint commitments such as the commitment of two people to go on a walk together are
such that the plural subject of the action, the “we,” comprises two or more people. If one member
starts to walk too fast or if they suddenly turn around and abandon their walking partner, they
can be rightly rebuked for violating the joint activity. One member has the standing to rebuke the
other for walking too fast, and this standing is a function of the specific activity that the members
have entered into.66 This is the role that “standing” plays in her theory. If the two were not
involved in the joint activity of going for a walk together, or if the walk had already ended, then
each would no longer have such a standing to rebuke the other, for instance, to demand that they
walk slower while walking alone. Put otherwise, the obligations that each has to the other depend
on the content of the specific joint commitment. This dyadic example serves to characterize the
way in which a simple case of two people going for a walk together already brings rights and
obligations with it that members of the joint activity have by virtue of their membership within
the group. Membership within this kind of small group, according to Gilbert, includes
obligations for its members to one another, and these obligations are to uphold their basic joint
commitment. On the basis of this simple example, Gilbert suggests that there is already enough
to understand the ways in which significantly larger and more complex groupings are arranged.
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3.2 Extrapolating from Small to Large Groups
In further developing the notion of societies as plural subjects, Gilbert clarifies how a
plural subject applies to large populations. This amounts to clarifying the nature of non-basic
joint commitments. It initially seems, as Gilbert points out, that it is controversial to apply the
notion of a plural subject (especially as it was developed in the context of two people going for a
walk) to societies with large populations. This is controversial insofar as there seem to be
features of larger societies that are not always present in smaller groupings. The four features of
large populations that Gilbert draws attention to are inclusiveness, hierarchy, impersonality, and
anonymity. For the purposes of facilitating a discussion with Husserl, my main focus is on the
last two, impersonality and anonymity.67
By impersonality, Gilbert means the feature of membership within large social groups
such that not every other member is known closely or personally. It will rather be the case in
these kinds of groups that many of my fellow group members are strangers. Even in cases of
impersonality, I can experience having obligations to others; it is just that in such case these
obligations are general and apply to anyone in general. For example, in belonging to the political
community of the United States, I encounter many fellow members in public in such a way that I
experience having obligations towards them and rights against them without knowing them in
close, personal fashion. When I encounter such members face-to-face, they are experienced with
the sense of being strangers or as bearers of certain community roles (e.g., as a mail carrier,
police officer, butcher, baker, etc.).
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The feature of anonymity, as a feature of large social groups, means that members of a
social group may not even know of the existence of other members of the group. While
impersonality means that I encounter other persons face-to-face while not knowing anything
about them in particular, anonymity is such that I do not even encounter all other members of the
group to which we both nevertheless belong. For example, membership in a large political
community like the United States is such that there is no way I could know every other member.
The feature of anonymity is such that my experiences of membership include an indication that it
is a membership with entirely unknown others.
Gilbert provides two main examples to contextualize these features of joint commitments
in large groups. The first example is of a large starving crowd who are all together jointly
committed to storming the house of a corn-dealer to assuage their hunger.68 In this example, the
members of the crowd express their readiness to engage in the joint commitment by all (or at
least most) yelling in the affirmative when one of the group’s leaders urges them to all storm the
house. This expression of readiness on the part of the large crowd, then, serves to preempt the
possibility of there being a joint commitment. Furthermore, this expression of readiness and the
subsequent joint commitment accounts for a situation involving a large amount of impersonality
and anonymity. There is impersonality here since one need not have any close personal details
about fellow members encountered beyond their being similarly overwhelmingly hungry. There
is anonymity insofar as the crowd extends beyond those individuals one is currently
encountering. This nevertheless constitutes a plural subject according to Gilbert insofar as
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members have expressed their readiness and have jointly committed to the activity of the
storming.
Gilbert provides a second example that highlights a plural subject existing across a large
territory. In this second example, we are to imagine a large valley consisting of a society of
farmers who are all jointly committed to defending their land and their freedom in case of attack
by a neighboring invader.69 The expression of readiness in this case is such that all of the farmers
have in some way made it clear to the others that they will join in the fight if needed. If it
happens, then, that the neighboring group invades the valley, then this expression of readiness
has acted as a kind of primer to all of the farmers actually coming together in a collaborative,
unified fight.
The fulcrum of Gilbert’s argument regarding the inclusion of large groups within her
plural subject account is her appeal to “common knowledge,” and specifically to “population
common knowledge.” It is by way of population common knowledge, according to Gilbert, that
a large social group having the features of impersonality and anonymity is still able to count as a
plural subject.70 Common knowledge in general for Gilbert is some fact held by members of a
certain group where this fact “is entirely accessible and out in the open between them.”71 In the
case of “individual common knowledge,” there is something that is openly accessible to a group
of particular, known individuals. For example, it may be common knowledge between two
roommates that if one person cooks a meal, the other person does the dishes. “Population
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common knowledge,” though, refers to facts that are known by an indeterminate group which is
nevertheless delimited by means of some general features.72 For instance, there can be
population common knowledge in the form of things known by “we members of this large
staving crowd,” “we humans on this island,” “we the passengers of this airplane,” and so forth.
The generality of this individuating description indicates its applicability in cases of
impersonality and anonymity.73
In the examples of the large starving crowd and in the valley of farmers, members have
an awareness of other fellow members despite the groups in question having the characteristics
of impersonality and anonymity. There is a “we” that all members identify with in their pursuit
of a shared goal. This identification serves as an expression of readiness regarding the
undertaking of a certain activity. This fulfills her criterion that membership in a plural subject
should include a consciousness of unity. For example, I may not know everyone in the crowd,
but I have a general conception of “we the members of the crowd who are jointly committed to
X.” What, though, of situations in which the population is not conceptualized in this kind of
goal-oriented way? If Gilbert is as she says putting forth a structure that applies to all forms of
political communities, and if some political communities lack such a shared goal, then her
account should provide a way to conceptualize membership in those groupings that are not goaloriented.

“In contrast, population common knowledge is common knowledge between people considered by those involved
as members of a population individuated by means of a certain general description.” Gilbert (2006), p. 176.
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“In a large population, P, with a high degree of anonymity, whose members reside in a territory of great extent,
there is population common knowledge—involving all members of P—that all of the members of P have expressed
to one another, as members of P, their readiness to participate in a certain joint commitment among the members of
P. When these conditions are fulfilled, the members of P are jointly committed in the way in question.” Gilbert
(2006), p. 179.
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For Gilbert, large social groups are capable of being a plural subject in the non-basic
cases when that group possesses and abides by a “social rule.” Gilbert defines social rules as
follows:
There is a social rule in a population P if and only if the members of P are jointly
committed to accepting as a body a requirement (or fiat) of the following form: members
of P are to perform action A in circumstances C (that there is a particulate reason for
doing A in C may be specified as a part of what is required, or it may not.).74

In the case of the kinds of social rules that provide the framework within which members
peacefully live their lives, we reach the upshot of Gilbert’s account regarding political
obligations. 75 Just as two individuals who jointly go for a walk together incur obligations to one
another on the basis of their joint commitment, so too does she claim that all of the individuals
who are jointly committed to upholding social rules in a large political community have
obligations to one another in the form of political obligations. Since joint commitments have the
form that “the parties jointly commit to X as a body,” the X placeholder here is the upholding of
certain political institutions such as a community’s laws.76 For large political communities
having the features of impersonality and anonymity, the sense in which these political
obligations belong to a certain “body” (e.g., the “body politic”) refers to members having
obligations to all fellow members in the form of the generality of laws applying to a population.
When I encounter a stranger in public, then, I have law-based obligations to them by virtue of
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being a member of a specific political community. The normative force of political obligations is
here embedded within the context of population common knowledge, such that a reference need
not be made to any particular, known individuals with whom my membership is shared.
3.3 Reassessing Criticisms
The criticisms of Gilbert put forth by Caminada and Szanto are similar insofar as they
oppose the notion that a joint commitment in the form of an explicit agreement should be the
fundamental driver of sociality. Gilbert’s opposition to actual contract theory demonstrates one
of the ways in which her newer account is protected from such criticisms.77 Caminada, for
instance, suggested that Gilbert could only account for instances in which members came to
some explicit agreement regarding coming together as a plural subject. As highlighted above,
Szanto objects that joint commitments are results, not starting points. A robust account of
membership involving impersonality and anonymity accounts for sociality without any active
joint commitments. Gilbert in her 2006 work indicates that she is not proceeding in the fashion
of requiring such explicitness, and that her plural subject theory accounts for groupings in the
absence of an explicit agreement. One of Caminada’s additional criticisms was that Gilbert
focused on the jointness of a plural subject to the neglect of the content being pursued by the
group. What her later work clarifies is that the kinds of obligations that members have are
dependent on the specific kind of “standing” belonging to a particular plural subject, and that this
standing is a function of the specific joint activity. Here again, Gilbert’s newer account makes
clear how such criticisms falls short.

It seems to me that an argument could already made to this effect by appealing only to Gilbert’s 1989 work. What
is clear, though, is that appealing to her 2006 work more directly emphasizes the sense in which this kind of
criticism does not apply to her theory.
77
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The way that Gilbert accounts for plural subjects in the case of large political societies
jointly committed to uphold social rules acts as an implicit reply to the criticisms brought against
her by phenomenologists. One is here constrained by obligations in a way that does not require
the active agreement of parties. One can here be passively influenced by social conventions or
norms without having to explicitly endorse them from the beginning. Gilbert’s newly developed
theory of the ways in which impersonality and anonymity fit into the structure of large social
groupings, in addition to the ways in which these features fit into her account of the “non-basic”
account of joint commitments, show how her theory is further protected from the objection that
she is overly-focused on active joint commitments. What about Chelstrom’s criticism regarding
Gilbert beginning with practical intentionality instead of with a broader notion of the
intentionality of consciousness as phenomenologists have understood it? Even though Chelstrom
does not address Gilbert’s political work, there are good reasons for thinking that this criticism
still sticks in regard to Gilbert’s later approach, as I now demonstrate.
3.4 Phenomenological Discontents Based on Gilbert’s Answer
At the same time that Gilbert’s account of large groupings with the features of
impersonality and anonymity acts to defend her against some of the criticisms introduced earlier,
these new features open her theory up to a new round of phenomenologically-motivated
objections.78 Gilbert’s position continues to face problems insofar as she does not integrate her
account of plural subjects brought about by joint commitments into a more comprehensive
theory of the intentionality of consciousness (as Husserlian phenomenologists have understood

The criticisms I raise here are motivated by the explication of Husserl’s concept of community as developed in the
first three chapters.
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the notion). While her later work improves upon the former in the sense of explicitly focusing on
large groupings that do not include explicit agreements and providing a more sophisticated
account of joint commitments, the later account still misses out on important features of
impersonality and anonymity in relation to the structure of experiences of community
membership. This is not a superficial difficulty; it impacts the persuasiveness of the answer that
Gilbert gives to the political membership problem insofar as at least some political communities
involve impersonality and anonymity in the absence of a shared goal. Large goal-oriented groups
are neatly accounted for by Gilbert’s plural subject theory of political obligations. What I argue,
however, is that this theory is not well-equipped to deal with examples of large political
communities which are not goal oriented. Some political communities involve members that do
not work in an ostensibly cooperative fashion. To be sure, Gilbert attempts to account for this
objection by way of non-basic joint commitments in the form of individuals upholding social
rules. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how this is then cashed out in terms of the “consciousness
of unity” possessed by members. The new difficulty, I claim, is that she emphasizes that
membership involves consciousness of unity, being jointly committed as a body, and belonging
to a group without clear awareness of other fellow members. But can her theory can be
consistent in simultaneously holding all of these? If not, then this is a substantial problem for
Gilbert’s project, especially since many large political communities will not involve all members
to be coordinated in pursuit of a shared goal.
Gilbert’s account of the way in which large groups subscribe to social rules is such that
members are said to be jointly committed “as a body.” What I argue is that this sense of “as a
body” is not an accurate phenomenological depiction of the ways in which members of such a
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unity necessarily experience belonging to a group such as a large political community. If we take
the features of impersonality and anonymity seriously, then that which large social groups such
as political communities lack is precisely the kind of consciousness of unity that Gilbert insists
upon. Since large political communities such as countries possess these features, and since her
account of political obligations is to apply to all political configurations, this lacunae impacts the
persuasiveness of her plural subject theory as a generalized conception of political obligations.
What exactly does it mean to be “conscious” or “aware” of a social unity in the case of a
large group like that of a political community? While I agree with Gilbert that there is some
degree of awareness or representation of the “we” when it comes to membership within a
political community (where this is accounted for in terms of the kinds of obligations we have as
members to uphold that community’s political institutions), I am not convinced that she provides
us with an adequate account of what that awareness amounts to. This on its own would not be
problematic except for the fact that “consciousness of unity” is one of the three necessary
features of membership that Gilbert provides. Without an account of the structure of this
consciousness of unity in the case of large groupings having the properties of impersonality and
anonymity, her account is incomplete.
The examples that Gilbert provides regarding consciousness of unity in cases of
impersonality and anonymity are the cases of the large starving crown and the valley of farmers.
What these plural subjects have that others lack is an orientation or at least a readiness in regard
to a particular goal. In this way, the members of such groups consciously thematize themselves
as a group insofar as they make reference to what they are all jointly doing as a whole. In some
political communities, though, there is not the same kind of shared goal. Gilbert accounts for the
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movement to large political communities by highlighting the sense in which members abide by
social rules. In these cases, though, Gilbert no longer provides descriptions of the kinds of
consciousness of unity possessed by members. It is precisely here that the phenomenological
descriptions of community membership provided by Husserl can made inroads in the domain of
political philosophy.
§4. Husserl on Community Membership
Without recapitulating Husserl’s conception of community membership in its entirety,
there are a few fundamental aspects of his conception that I here bring to bear on Gilbert’s
theory.79 While Husserl himself does not provide a robust account of political obligations like
Gilbert, I argue that his conceptualization of experiences of membership within anonymous
communities is a more convincing account of the conscious awareness belonging to such a social
unity. What is of interest to my argument from Husserl’s concept of community is his ability to
address both the ontological and phenomenological structures of loosely-bound, anonymous
communities. Having the ability to provide an account of anonymous communities is important
in the context of putting forth an account of political communities insofar as they tend to be large
groupings where not everyone knows all other members. Husserl accounts for this by way of his
notion of “mereological proximity”, such that both the ontological structure of anonymous
communities and experiences therein for members was such that there was a large amount of
mereological “distance” or “remoteness” between members as parts and the community as a
whole.80
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As I have indicated in my discussion of Husserl regarding intimate communities such as
“personalities of a higher order” and tightly knit communities of will, he provides a conception
similar to Gilbert regarding consciousness of a group’s unity understood as a whole. This state of
affairs, however, is the exception rather than the rule. It is only in exceptional circumstances that
members have an explicit awareness of the community whole to which they belong. It is not
necessary for there to be an explicit reflexivity within the experiences of belonging within a
community as a part.
4.1 Anonymous Community Membership
Husserl distinguishes between different types of communities by way of their ranging
along a spectrum from intimate to anonymous internal organization. Husserl’s concept of
community accounts for the ways in which a large, anonymous community can be ontologically
structured in addition to showing the ways in which individual members of such a community
experience constraints (such as obligations) when there is no thematization of the group as a
whole. Husserl’s account of large social groups including the features of impersonality and
anonymity is preferable, I argue, to Gilbert’s account insofar as Husserl does not require us to
have experiences of membership within a community that explicitly make reference to the
community as a whole. If there is a reference to the community as a whole within an anonymous
community, it is accounted for by Husserl by way of such experiences being “mediated,” in the
sense of the experiences of individual members as parts being mereological “further” from the
community as a whole. Gilbert’s account, on the other hand, does require an explicit
thematization of the community as a whole within the structure of the joint commitments
constituting a plural subject. This is the case for Gilbert insofar as she insists that membership
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requires consciousness of the plural subject’s unity. Husserl’s account is preferable, then,
because experiences of membership within large communities such as those approached by
Gilbert only rarely include a reference to the community as a whole as a body. What Gilbert
deems to be a necessary component of experiences within countries is something that Husserl’s
phenomenological account reveals as a contingent instantiation; experiences within communities
can be otherwise.
I have argued that anonymous communities, for Husserl, are those which have the
mereological structure of a “concatenation” (Verkettung). As a mereological concept, a
concatenation is said to be a kind of unified whole where parts have “some but not all members
in common.”81 In this way, the notion of concatenation refers to a specific relation between the
different parts of a whole as well as relations to that parts have to that whole itself. Husserl
accounts for anonymous, concatenated communities not just on the ontological side, but also on
the phenomenological side such that he provides descriptions of the experiences that members
have when they belong to such communities. For Husserl there are two correlated moments
belonging to experiences of community membership.82 On the one hand, there is the experience
of belonging to a personal association, that is, empathic experiences of other individuals with
whom we are paired. At the same time, there is an experience of a shared surrounding world
(Umwelt), which is correlated with a specific personal association. Husserl’s account of the
shared surrounding world is very similar to Gilbert’s notion of population common knowledge.

81

LI, p. 33.

“We are in relation to a common surrounding world [gemeinsame Umwelt]—we are in personal association
[personalen Verband]: these belong together. We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world
did not stand there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage [intentionalen Verbundenheit] of our lives.
Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the other.” Ideas II, p. 201.
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While such common knowledge is characterized by Gilbert in terms of practical joint activities,
though, Husserl’s notion of the surrounding world is significantly broader, referring to all of the
socio-cultural objects and states of affairs that belong within the horizonal context of a certain
personal association.
Since Husserl’s account of the experience of belonging to a community as a part includes
the two moments of experiencing being alongside others in a personal association and having a
shared surrounding world, more needs to be said here on the topic of Husserl’s different
variations of empathy discussed in the previous chapter. Husserl gets close to the picture Gilbert
paints of joint commitment with a “consciousness of unity” when he talks about the earliest
philosophical tradition, and the sense in which he is picking up where other philosophers left off.
It is in this way that his descriptions of being united with one in the community tradition of
philosophy with Plato and Aristotle aligns well with Gilbert’s notion of individuals pooling their
wills to pursue a shared task.83 If we are to take impersonality and anonymity seriously, more
needs to be said on the topic of empathic pairing, especially where those pairings that
characterized by indeterminacy. In the previous chapter, I suggested four main ways in which
Husserl talks about empathic pairing in his writings, and that these four can be represented in the
form of a quadrant from the intersection of the axis of concretely versus non-concretely
experienced others and the axis of determinately versus indeterminately experienced others.
Given my focus here on anonymous communities, I am most interested in returning to the kind
of empathic pairing that arises when we belong to a group with concrete yet indeterminate others
on the one hand, and non-concrete and indeterminate others on the other hand. In the case of the
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pairing of myself with concretely-encountered indeterminate others, what we get is precisely
what Gilbert describes as the feature of “impersonality.” Empathic pairing with non-concrete and
indeterminate others is precisely what Gilbert describes as “anonymity.” Let this count, then, as
yet one further site of similarity between the two.
What though of consciousness of unity? For Gilbert, consciousness of unity in the case of
large social groups is accounted for by way of “population common knowledge.” Having such
common knowledge, then, amounts to being conscious of the group’s unity. For Husserl, it is
also the case that some kind of common or shared surrounding world factors into a group’s unity,
yet encountering objects and states of affairs in the surrounding world need not bring with it a
thematization of the community whole in the form of an explicit consciousness of unity.
Encountering the group to which one belongs is just one possibility in Husserl’s
conceptualization as seen in his discussion of the reflexivity of a social subjectivity.84
As these reflections show, there is a further point of overlap in relation to Gilbert,
namely, that Husserl is conceptualizing the features of impersonality and anonymity as defined
by Gilbert. On Husserl’s account, though, experiences of community membership can occur
without the community as a whole being thematized “as a body” by members. While Gilbert
includes “consciousness of unity” as an essential component in her account of experiences of
community membership, Husserl’s conception proceeds in a different fashion.

“Included in the surrounding world of such a circle [of friends], or, in general, of a social subjectivity (an
association of subjects, constituted through communication), is, once again, this very subjectivity itself insofar as it
too can become an Object for itself, when the association relates back to itself, just as each individual subject in it
can also become an Object.” Ideas II, p. 206.
84
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Husserl accounts for experiences as members of an anonymous linguistic community by
highlighting that such groupings do not give rise to the sense of a personal whole.85 In providing
an account of membership within anonymous communities such as in interactions with strangers
in public, Husserl writes:

The manner in which a personal association is established, of course, must emanate from
the actual empathy and the actual arrangement or arise in natural subordination, etc.,
emanating from the status of personal contact or communication. However, the basis of
personal associations must then be considered in mediate ways when the people remain
“unknown” [unbekannt]. But in any case there are communities of will of certain persons
who are in agreement as willing-subjects, albeit as mediated.86

In both cases, the language that Husserl uses in his descriptions is of mereological mediation and
the ways in which the shared surrounding world is characterized as existing for an
“indeterminate generality.” What these descriptions do not support, though, is the notion that
membership within anonymous communities necessarily includes a “consciousness of unity” or
an awareness of the “body” to which I am jointly committed with fellow members.
In a passage from one of his manuscripts (in Husserliana XIV, Nr. 10, Beilage XXVII),
Husserl writes on the distinction between different types of communities, such that some involve
members having consciousness of the unity of the group while others lack this focus.87 As
examples of the first case, he unsurprisingly appeals to groupings such as friendships and
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political obligations. What it does provide, though, is an indication that Husserl was aware of the kinds of
distinctions Gilbert goes on to make regarding large groupings, and that he wrote with an eye to capturing precisely
how this took share as correlated with consciousness.
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marriages. I have drawn attention to these specific groupings as accounted for by Husserl in
previous chapters, but what is interesting about this specific manuscript is that he also goes on to
include in his list of examples membership within a large “people” (Volk), such as all Germans.
As Husserl claims, there is a consciousness that lives in every German in the form of an
interpersonal unity despite the fact that most people do not know one another or have any
concrete encounters with one another. In this case, he acknowledges the possibility of members
being explicitly conscious of the group’s unity despite its size.88 This indicates that Husserl is at
least open to the idea that members of a large political community can possess a consciousness
of its internal unity, akin to Gilbert’s suggestion that this is a necessary component of plural
subjects. At the same time, though, Husserl also here highlights communities where there is not a
focus by members on the unity of the community. This is the case, for instance, in regard to the
human community at large, or to large supranational federations. In this way, Husserl suggests
that conscious reflexivity in the form of a consciousness of a group’s unity is not a necessary
component of all community experience.
4.2 A Husserlian Supplement to Gilbert’s Answer
I do not here suggest that Husserl himself has a comprehensive theory of political
obligations, or that he addressed what comes to be designated by Gilbert as the “membership
problem.” What he does provide us with, though, is a sophisticated account of communities that

Hua XIV, pp. 219-220: “Also Verkehrseinheit der Menschheit, Einheit der europäischen Völker, Einheit England
und seine Kolonien, Einheit eines Volkes usw., landsmannschaftliche Einheit, Einheit, die noch eine Geschichte hat
oder durch ihre Geschichte besonders verbunden bleibt: Einheit des Schwaben- oder Bayemvolkes etc. Einheit einer
Stadt und Stadtgeschichte, Einheit eines Vereins, einer Zweckgemeinschaft. In jedem Deutschen „lebt das
Bewusstsein”, ich bin Deutscher, es ist in jeder zugehörigen Person eine Intentionalität eingebildet, die ihrem
weitesten Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein und Gemeinschaftshorizont einen näheren und zugleich begrenzenden Sinn
gibt, also eine engere Gemeinschaft mit einem engeren Sinn hineinzeichnet: deutsches Volk.”
88
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involve a large degree of impersonality and anonymity on the basis of his notion of
“mereological proximity.” This account comes out both in his discussion of the kinds of
empathic pairing we have with indeterminate and unknown others and in the kinds of
experiences we have within the shared surrounding world of such a community. I now argue that
Husserl provides us with the resources for supplementing Gilbert’s answer to the membership
problem in such a way as to circumvent the difficulties highlighted above.
Similar to Gilbert, Husserl provides accounts of obligations that can be considered as
both basic and non-basic forms of joint commitments. One of the places that Husserl explicitly
discusses the intersection of community and obligation (Pflicht) is in his account of life within a
community such as a family. In this discussion, Husserl refers to functions that are imposed upon
members of the family in the form of constraints to their wills. One of the examples Husserl
provides of this is failing to take care of one’s responsibilities within the family. Acting with
neglect or selfishness in such instances is met with rebuke.89 The shared surrounding world of
family members includes family-based constraints, such that I am limited in my practical
possibilities by means of the expectations and structure of the group in question. This discussion,
however, comes in the context of the family understood as an intimate community.90 An
additional place where Husserl discusses constraints placed upon the wills of community
members is where he refers to the kinds of responsibilities that are imposed by broader
community norms. In these discussions, Husserl thematizes constraints to members in the
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Regarding Husserl’s mereological notion of “intimacy” as applied to communities, see Chapters II and III above.
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context of anonymous community. In this case, constraints are not issued by the community as a
whole, but arise rather in the content of the shared surrounding world of the community.
In a discussion of large, anonymous communities such as linguistic communities and the
unity of European culture, Husserl describes the kinds of experiences members have of
peacefully going about their days while also being constrained by norms. In line with his general
conception of the experience of community membership, Husserl accounts for these norms as
belonging to the experiences within a shared surrounding world:

Each instance of peaceful commerce [Verkehr] is already human communalization and
presupposes a common ground of norms, even just the norm of general kindness, the
norm not to deceive, etc.91

In these instances of anonymous communities, there is a mereological distance between their
members as parts and the wholes to which they belong to the extent that members need not
thematize the community as a whole while nevertheless belonging. Such shared norms within
anonymous communities are experienced as components of our surrounding world insofar as the
other persons around me are characterized as possessing a sense of responsibility in relation to
the way I expect they will treat me.92 When things go smoothly, I anticipate a general
benevolence from others insofar as they will refrain from inflicting unprovoked harm upon me.
In Ideas II, Husserl refers to different ways in which I can encounter other individuals
depending on whether I am in the naturalistic attitude or the personalistic attitude of everyday
life. In the naturalistic attitude, I do not treat others appropriately insofar as I strip them of their

91

Hua XV, p. 423.

92

Hua XV, p. 423.

211
various moral and juridical senses. Although he is not otherwise interested in these passages in
anything like the “membership problem” as worked on by Gilbert, he again endorses some of the
same tenets as her plural subject account of political obligations. As Husserl writes:

I am not treating a human being as a subject of rights if I do not take him as a member of
a community founded on law, to which we both belong, but instead view him as mere
matter, as without rights just like a mere thing.93

Insofar as I encounter a human being in the appropriate attitude, this passage suggests that
Husserl recognized the relation between having rights and obligations on the one hand, and
belonging to a specific type of community on the other. Belonging to a community founded on
law is here compatible with the notion laid out by Gilbert that membership brings with it
obligations to uphold that community’s institutions. In this case, the institutions Husserl appeals
to are laws regulating my interactions with other persons.
Similar to Gilbert, then, Husserl is able to provide something like an affirmative answer
to the “membership problem” and a justification of the normative force of obligations as arising
from a plural subject brought about through a joint commitment. While Gilbert’s answers to
these points are made explicitly, though, Husserl’s position is more implicit. Husserl implicitly
provides an affirmative answer to the membership problem insofar as the experience of
membership brings with it obligations to uphold the community’s institutions (either through
explicit rebuke in a family or latent in public community norms). There is in Husserl’s account a
consciousness of unity even within anonymous communities as exemplified in his discussion of
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membership in the German nation. This is further seen in his account of experiences of
belonging to linguistic communities or supranational federations.
Where Husserl’s framework is able to differ from Gilbert’s is in providing a more
persuasive account of the experiential structure of community membership when that involves
large degrees of impersonality and anonymity. Gilbert claims that all plural subjects mean that
members have a consciousness of the group’s unity. The nature of this unity is seen in her
discussion of plural subjects arising from joint commitments where all members commit to X as
a body. While she admits that such consciousness of unity will be different in cases of
impersonality and anonymity, she does not provide a persuasive account of the nature of this
consciousness. By appeal to Husserl’s concept of community, I have argued that it is not just that
Gilbert could have included more examples to make this clear. By insisting on there being a joint
commitment by members to X as a body and having this be a unity that members are all
conscious of, Gilbert does not leave adequate conceptual room to account for experiences within
large-scale, impersonal and anonymous communities. Husserl, on the other hand, provides a
similar account of community that does not require that all forms of community membership
contain a reference to the community as a whole.
§5. Conclusion
I have argued here that Husserl’s concept of community is relevant to problems of
contemporary political philosophy, and that one way of understanding this relevance is through
his capacity to supplement Gilbert’s answer to the political “membership problem.” I began by
showing how Gilbert’s plural subject theory has been received by phenomenologists, proposing
that her more recent work on the topic of political obligations protects against many of those
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phenomenologically-motivated criticisms. Appealing to impersonality and anonymity in the
context of large political communities, however, brings with it a new set of concerns. I have
pursued the potential connections that can be made between the two philosophers, arguing that
Husserl’s conception of community supplements Gilbert’s theory in regard to impersonality and
anonymity within large political communities. In closing, I provided a Husserlian-inspired
answer to Gilbert’s membership problem. This use of Husserl’s concept of community into the
domain of a contemporary debate in political philosophy makes it clear that Husserl’s conception
is of relevance not just to his own phenomenological endeavors, but breathes new life into
present debates.
At the beginning of the chapter, I drew attention to Gilbert’s insistence that an
appropriate approach to political philosophy requires an accurate social ontology. 94 Gilbert
argues that her plural subject theory is the appropriate kind of social ontology for the job, and
that problems of political philosophy are best accounted for by way of joint commitments. I am
in agreement with Gilbert in regard to much of her social ontological theory, and I have engaged
in a comparative venture to show just how much agreement there is between that theory and
Husserl’s conception of community. Despite their many points of similarity, their positions
diverge in a few places, so a complete trans-temporal harmonization is out of the question. There
are, to be sure, instances in which large political groups function as Gilbert describes them
regarding a consciousness of the group’s unity. Husserl is in agreement here in regard to this as a
possibility, especially when he refers to some communities as “intimate” and as “personalities of
a higher order.” As a Husserlian addition to Gilbert’s injunction regarding the relation between
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social ontology and political philosophy, I suggest than an appropriate approach to the latter also
requires an accurate phenomenology for the purposes of understanding a community’s internal
dynamics. In this way, I am in agreement with Chelstrom’s assessment that Gilbert brings
unnecessary difficulties upon her theory by starting with Absicht instead of Intentionalität. What
Chelstrom’s position stands to gain from the argument I have given here is the extent to which
Gilbert would benefit from a focus on the role that mereology plays in Husserl’s concept of
community.

CHAPTER V
TRUST AND CRISIS IN POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
“Trust is always an invitation not only to confidence tricksters but also to terrorists,
who discern its most easily destroyed and socially vital forms. Criminals, not moral
philosophers, have been the experts at discerning different forms of trust. Most of
us notice a given form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or severe injury.
We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice
air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted.”
Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust”1

§1. Introduction
According to Annette Baier, interpersonal trust is most salient when it has been weakened
or lost. Husserl similarly claims that reflections on experiences within our surrounding world can
be motivated through socio-cultural crises. Husserl’s notion of “crisis” is in that way similar to
the inverse of trust to the extent that it shines light on the sedimented and taken-for-granted
traditions of a community. Clarifying the types of trust that are operative in a political
community is an important philosophical task insofar as the well-being of such communities
requires members to trust one another to some extent. Given its susceptibility to injury in the
form of betrayal, this philosophical task extends also to understanding the ways in which trust
within political communities is threatened.
This chapter takes its start from Margaret Gilbert’s work on the topic of political
obligations.2 While Gilbert incorporates the concept of trust in her theory in passing, I suggest
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The previous chapter facilitated a conversation between Husserl’s conception of community and Gilbert’s writings
on political obligations. I there highlighted a difficulty internal to her theory in accounting for impersonal and
anonymous communities, a group to which most large political communities belong. The present chapter takes a
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that her treatment is not theoretically neutral, but implicitly privileges a certain conception of
trust understood in the form of a “three-place relation.”3 This is problematic insofar as the
conception of trust Gilbert draws on has been criticized in the trust literature as passing over the
background or underlying conditions that allow for trust to arise in the first place. To address the
difficulty in Gilbert’s theory, appeal is made to conceptions of trust and betrayal from
philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists. Furthermore, I argue that a turn to Husserl’s
phenomenology in addition to these theorists of trust is instructive insofar as it accounts for the
consciousness of unity that members have when trust is either present or betrayed. Returning to
Husserl provides the additional benefit of allowing for the development of a critical approach to
trust in light of the possibility of socio-cultural crisis. Since Gilbert’s theory of political
obligations makes use of the notion of trust in the context of members’ joint commitments to
peace-promoting governing rules, a further examination of what such trust presupposes is
needed.
I begin by returning to the conceptual difficulty identified in Gilbert’s plural subject
theory of political obligations in the previous chapter. I show the need for additional emphasis on
trust and betrayal for an account of political obligations in impersonal and anonymous
communities beyond the treatment given to them by Gilbert (§2). Phenomenology provides the
resources to elucidate experiences of trust and betrayal so far as those are parts of the
consciousness of a group’s unity for members.4 Since Husserl does not have an explicitly worked

more specific approach to that difficulty in Gilbert’s theory by highlighting how trust and betrayal factor into
experiences of members of a political community.
3
4

This notion and additional conceptions of trust are defined in what follows.

I argued in Chapter IV that Husserlian phenomenology clarifies the kinds of conscious experiences that members
of a community have regarding the group’s unity, especially when those groups have the features of impersonality
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out theory of trust, however, I first seek out and evaluate theories of trust from elsewhere. To that
end, I review prominent conceptions of trust as candidates to fill the specific gap left by Gilbert.
Ultimately, I argue that Karen Jones’s account of trust understood as “basal security” fits the bill
for what is needed in an account of impersonal and anonymous communities (§3). The chapter is
tied back to Husserl by showing the extent to which Jones’s account of trust and its susceptibility
to dissolution runs parallel with Husserl’s discussions of everyday experiences within the sociocultural surrounding world and crises therein. Most theorists characterize trust as an
unquestioningly positive attitude with betrayal characterized inversely as negative. Returning to
Husserl’s notion of crisis makes it apparent that the positivity of our initial trusting is itself
something deserving critical investigation. Put otherwise, the possibility of betrayal suggests that
initial attitudes of trust presuppose specific historically-influenced social and political structures.
Husserlian phenomenology thematizes components of the world that have been forgotten or
taken-for-granted, and straightforward trusting attitudes within political communities are one of
those taken-for-granted structures (§4). I provide a phenomenological analysis highlighting the
correlations of consciousness and its objects within political communities with specific emphasis
on trust and crisis. In the end, this sheds light on the possibility of extending Husserl’s writings
on community in general to political community by way of the topic of trust. Along the
trajectory of the previous chapter, it identifies a difficulty in Gilbert’s theory and proposes a
remedy (§5).

and anonymity. That clarification was necessary given Gilbert’s insistence that membership includes a
consciousness of such unity.
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§2. Trust and Betrayal in Large Communities
2.1 Resituating Gilbert
It must immediately be pointed out that Gilbert, in A Theory of Political Obligations, is
primarily interested in providing an account of political obligations and putting forth an answer
to the political “membership problem.”5 She is not putting forth a standalone account of how
members of a social group experience their surrounding worlds in general. Furthermore, it is not
her immediate project to provide a philosophical theory of trust. Given my argument in the
previous chapter, however, an account of how members experience belonging to communities
through experiences of components of their surrounding environment is necessary if we are to
account for membership experiences in groups having the characteristics of impersonality and
anonymity. As I argue below, providing an account of the socio-cultural surrounding world in
the context of membership in political communities motivates reflections on trust and betrayal
beyond the minor mentions of them made by Gilbert. To put the problem simply, there are
different types of trust, and these differences are made salient by comparing intimate
communities with impersonal and anonymous communities. At the same time, different types of
trust carry with them the inverse of different types of betrayal. Gilbert’s quick account of
members’ experiences within impersonal and anonymous communities masks the different types
of experiences of both trust and betrayal.

As a reminder, the “membership problem” asks: “Does membership in a political society in and of itself involve
obligations to uphold the relevant political institutions?” Gilbert (2006), p. 18. Gilbert’s book as a whole is an
attempt to flesh out an affirmative response to this question, and she refers to her answer as the plural subject theory
of political obligations.
5
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The general difficulty within Gilbert’s plural subject theory of political obligations can be
quickly summarized as followed. Gilbert claims that one of the fundamental features in the
experiences that community members have is a “consciousness of unity” referring to the social
bonds holding the group together.6 At the same time, she introduces reflections on large groups
as having the features of impersonality and anonymity in order to properly thematize political
groups. Impersonality refers to instances in which fellow members are encountered as strangers,
that is, as individuals who are not known to us in a close or personal way.7 Anonymity refers to
instances in which I do not know some of my fellow community members at all, that is, I have
no inkling of their existence. While Gilbert’s plural subject theory of social groups succeeds in
accounting for a “consciousness of unity” in small groups such as two people going for a walk
together, she has not provided a full account of the experiential structure of the “we” in cases of
impersonality and anonymity. This is especially the case insofar as no account has been given of
how impersonal and anonymous communities are experienced in regard to their unity by
members when the group in question is not engaged in a goal-oriented task.
For these reasons, I appealed above (in Chapter IV) to Husserl’s concept of community in
order to outline a strategy, otherwise amenable to Gilbert’s approach, which does address the
ways in which members of a community experience the unity of their community even when
those groups are impersonal and anonymous. Husserl accounts for this unity insofar as the
community exists within one part of our experience of the shared surrounding world, being
reflected in experiences of language, churches, books, states, and so forth. For Husserl,
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consciousness of community membership in large communities is “mediated” through our
experience of a shared surrounding world and through experiences of unknown others.8 On this
account, members do not need to have an explicit, thematic awareness of their membership. The
notion of the surrounding world as appealed to in the previous chapter was maximally broad. In
what follows, I am again focusing on the way that an awareness of the surrounding world is a
component of the experience of community membership, but in this case my focus is much
narrower. More specifically, I am looking at the ways in which trust and betrayal shape
experiences of the socio-cultural surrounding world for community members.
2.2 Special Standing
What then does Gilbert mean by trust and betrayal, and how is her treatment of them
problematic? Gilbert mentions trust and betrayal in passing in the context of her political
writings, but then quickly shifts focus to the relationship of interpersonal “owing” in the forms of
rights and obligations instead of trust.9 Trust and betrayal make their appearance in her account
of the special “standing” that members to a joint commitment have in relation to one another.
The general difficulty identified in the previous chapter, then, is here indirectly reflected in the
quick pass that Gilbert makes regarding trust and betrayal.10 In not providing an account of the
consciousness of a group’s unity beyond the direct thematization of the group understood as a
goal-oriented body, Gilbert also passes over some of the more nuanced ways in which trust and

The notion of mediation here is a reference to Husserl’s mereology and specifically his account of mereological
proximity as laid out in the previous chapters.
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The concepts of trust and betrayal continue to take a back seat even in her more recent works. Cf. Gilbert (2014).
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I suspect that if Gilbert had paid further attention to the necessity of enriching her notions of impersonality and
anonymity, that it would have been more apparent that further work was needed also on the notion of trust.
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betrayal factor into our social worlds. This is a problem for her theory of political obligations
insofar as the complexities of trust and betrayal can threaten the kind of peaceful cooperation
that her theory promotes. By focusing on how trust and betrayal factor into Gilbert’s account of
this special standing, I then indicate how she presupposes a specific yet problematic theory of
trust.11
Gilbert writes that there are four components in the relationship of the special “standing”
that holds between members of a joint commitment. Those four components are betrayal, trust,
answerability, and owing. I am most interested here in the first two of these components, and it is
on these two topics that she spills the least ink. Gilbert claims that it is with the fourth, owing,
that we approach an account of rights and obligations, and it is here that she focuses most of her
political writings.12 It is helpful to repeat Gilbert’s account of “standing” and contextualize how
it fits into the kinds of joint commitments that constitute a plural subject. Summarizing her
discussion of standing, Gilbert writes:

By virtue of being party to a joint commitment I owe my conformity to the other parties
in their capacity as parties. In this capacity, therefore, they all have a special standing in
relation to my conformity: they have a right against me to it, and they will rightly take
themselves to have the standing to demand it from me and to rebuke me if it is not
forthcoming. In addition, they will be in a position to trust me to conform.
Correspondingly, they will appropriately feel betrayed if I fail to conform. Further, they
will rightly take me to be answerable to them for nonconformity.13

The operative theory of trust we can infer from Gilbert’s political work is then shown as problematic in light of
other possible theories in the next section.
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Gilbert uses this account of the special standing that members of a joint commitment have
towards one another as a basis for her account of political obligations. Her primary focus,
though, is on owing and what is owed to others as opposed to more explicit reflections on trust
and betrayal.
For Gilbert, both trust and betrayal are best understood in the context of joint
commitments, where at least two persons have committed to pursue a certain goal together “as a
body.”14 Furthermore, trust and betrayal are understood as two sides of the same coin. On the
basis of being jointly committed toward some X with fellow members, I thereby trust them to
uphold their part of the commitment, and I possess a special standing in relation to them to feel
betrayed if they do not do their part.15 In some cases, I trust fellow members to a joint
commitment and then rebuke them if they betray that trust. As Gilbert writes:

If I am not in a position to trust you to do something, you cannot betray me when you fail
to do it. You can surprise me, disappoint me, wound me, but you cannot betray me.
Whatever lays me open to betrayal legitimates my trust (as opposed to justifying it). […]
Betrayal, one might say, is the dark side of trust.16

On this account, trust is put forth as a positive attitude within the framework of the special
standing holding between members of a joint commitment that enables members to work
together. Betrayal on the other hand is understood as a “dark side of trust,” and exists as a
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“In the context of a joint commitment one betrays whomever one betrays in their capacity as participants with
oneself in the joint commitment in question. […] Given that a sense of betrayal is appropriate in the context of a
joint commitment, such a commitment clearly gives the parties a special standing in relation to one another’s
actions. There are certain actions that one party can only perform at the cost of betraying the other party.” Gilbert
(2006), pp. 151-152.
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negative attitude that discourages or dissolves joint commitments. When things go smoothly,
trust is the default position and betrayal disrupts the joint commitment either in the form of
motivating a rebuke or in dissolving the plural subject.17
Gilbert accounts for the joint commitments that apply to large groups such as political
communities under the heading of “non-basic” joint commitments. This type of joint
commitment is characterized as having members who have not had reciprocal experiences of the
readiness of fellow members and who have not committed to a specific goal.18 Gilbert accounts
for “non-basic” joint commitments such as those exhibited in impersonal and anonymous
communities by appeal to the notion of “social rules.” Gilbert claims that the form of these social
rules is as follows:

There is a social rule in a population P if and only if the members of P are jointly
committed to accepting as a body a requirement (or fiat) of the following form: members
of P are to perform action A in circumstances C (that there is a particulate reason for
doing A in C may be specified as a part of what is required, or it may not.).19

The specific kinds of social rules that are of relevance to Gilbert in the context of pursuing a
theory of political obligations are the class of what she calls “governing rules.” By a “governing
rule,” Gilbert refers to the kind of social rules “that settles a matter that demands settling for the
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sake of the peaceful progress of life.”20 The laws of a particular society count as governing rules
according to this description, and an affirmative answer to the “membership problem” entails
that members of a political society have obligations to uphold them by virtue of belonging to the
group.
Members of population P would be following the social, governing rule in performing
certain peace-maintaining actions A in relation to one another in the specific circumstances C,
where there is a certain general level of trust that is presupposed in relation to other fellow
members to do the same. Betraying that trust in this context amounts to the breaking of
governing rules, which amounts to an infraction that disrupts the peaceful progress of life in the
political community. Consider, for instance, the kind of rule following involved in driving a
vehicle on a public road. When things go smoothly, other drivers trust me to behave in a certain
way, and that trust is reciprocated in the attitudes I hold towards them. When another driver
blatantly disobeys a traffic law, this trust has been betrayed. If the betrayal of trust on the road is
severe enough, it threatens to disrupt the peaceful progression of the lives of other community
members. Similar to the case of trust in her discussion of special standing, then, joint
commitments within a political community in cases of peaceful interactions are put forth as the
ideal, default arrangement, with disruptions to governing rules put forth as a negative disruption
to the joint commitment.
This account of trust is uncontroversial when social interactions go smoothly or when the
stakes of the betrayal are relatively minimal, such as in going for a walk with a friend.21 In such
20
21

Gilbert (2006), p. 186.

The extent to which even this notion of trust can be considered uncontroversial is returned to in §4 below through
Husserl’s examination of the dangers of taken-for-grantedness.
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cases, there is an “individual common knowledge” that holds between the specific members of
the group framing the expectations that members have regarding other members. Individual
common knowledge, according to Gilbert, means that there is some knowledge that is held
“between particular people considered as such by those involved.”22 However, there is at least
one form of trust that is of relevance to the political sphere that Gilbert has not accounted for,
and that refers to the kinds of trust we can have of unknown others, that is, of strangers. This is
problematic insofar as it comes to bear on experiences within large political communities having
the features of impersonality and anonymity. It is precisely in these sorts of communities that we
trust and are susceptible to betrayal in a unique way. In the case of experiences of membership in
impersonal and anonymous communities, the notions of trust and betrayal as components of
“standing” are contextualized within the wider-ranging experiences of one’s surroundings and of
unknown others around me. While Gilbert attempts to account for this wider background by
appeal to “population common knowledge,” the previous chapter demonstrated that this notion is
not worked out in regard to members having a “consciousness of unity” of the group’s bond. As
a reminder, Gilbert defines population common knowledge as “common knowledge between
people considered by those involved as members of a population individuated by means of a
certain general description.” 23 In tightly-knit intimate communities, my trust of others is built on
a foundation of knowing others personally over time and of knowing how we together factor into
a joint commitment. In impersonal and anonymous communities, however, an immediate,
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interpersonal foundation is lacking even when we have at least some degree of trust or
confidence in strangers with whom I take to be sharing population common knowledge.
Gilbert’s account of trust demonstrates that she is operating with a specific understanding
of trust. Her formulation of social, governing rules as they relate to trust in the special standing
between members of a joint commitment is akin to what I introduce below as the “three-place
relation” conception of trust.24 What the three-place relation means is that individual members of
a joint commitment trust each other in relation to a specific valued thing or action. For instance,
when going for a walk with someone, I trust my walking partner to keep a pace that is similar to
mine, to not inexplicably turn around and run away from me, and so forth. My trust of the other
member to the joint commitment is in relation to the background circumstances of our joint
commitment, and these background circumstances are accounted for in Gilbert’s notion of
“individual common knowledge.”
In the case of impersonal and anonymous political communities bound by governing
rules, I trust strangers to abide by the imperatives of those rules in the relevant circumstances. In
these situations, I trust other individual persons to behave in a certain way, where this behavior is
contextualized within the joint commitment in question. Returning to the example of a small
group of two individuals walking together, the constraints to walking apply only to the two
members of the joint commitment; they do not apply to other individuals walking in the same
vicinity. The content of the constraints refers to a specific standing members have towards other
members of the specific joint commitment, but this does not mean that I thereby have the
standing to trust that other strangers nearby walk alongside me in the same direction and with a
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set pace. I have the standing to feel betrayed by my friend if they do something to inexplicably
disrupt our joint activity of walking together, but I do not have the standing to feel betrayed if a
stranger walks away from me. There are, nevertheless, other types of constraints that hold
between others and myself in public, such that I trust others to not harm me or maliciously
interfere with my activities. In the case of these wider constraints, there is still a coordination of
wills on the basis of the non-basic joint commitments of an impersonal and anonymous
community insofar as we are all abiding by the same governing rules. Gilbert does not provide
an account of what a “consciousness of unity” amounts to in such cases. Such an account should,
by Gilbert’s own descriptions of special standing, include some awareness of the trust and
openness to betrayal towards strangers. I have an explicit awareness of the unity that arises when
“we” go for a walk together, but it is less plausible to suppose that I am consciously aware of a
political community’s unity when simply going about my business. I can here be said to trust
other strangers to respect my autonomy by obeying the relevant governing rules insofar as I take
us to be jointly committed to uphold the same political obligations, but the extent to which this
amounts to a consciousness of unity is called into question given the generality or the absence of
those others in the group with me. If I do indeed experience trust and the possibility of betrayal
in impersonal and anonymous communities, this must somehow be grounded in the group’s
“population common knowledge,” but such generalized trusting or possibilities of betrayal are
not accounted for by Gilbert’s descriptions.
To indicate the direction of my argument going forward, it is worth considering what is
presupposed by the kind of trust described in Gilbert’s notion of special standing, especially trust
and betrayal in impersonal and anonymous communities. One way to highlight this is by drawing
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attention to severe betrayals of trust such as incidents of sexual violence or terrorist attacks.25 In
such cases, informal rebuke or official punishment to those who betray trust and dissolve a joint
commitment are not necessarily the end of the story regarding the experiences of group
members.26 Put otherwise, traumatic experiences of betrayal can impact the ability of individuals
to be engaged with others in a joint commitment. There are potentially more far-reaching and
enduring effects of such severe incidents. Theorists like Susan Brison and Karen Jones have
pointed out the ways in which the very possibility of trusting others within one’s community is
diminished on the basis of surviving traumatic experiences of betrayal.27 While I go on to
highlight ways that Husserl can go further than Jones regarding experiences of trust and betrayal
in political communities, what these examples suggest is that additional reflection is necessary
on the background conditions of trust beyond what is provided by Gilbert’s notion of population
common knowledge. Since Gilbert accounts for the normative force of political obligations by
appeal to being jointly committed to governing rules, and since there are betrayals of trust that
severely disrupt this peace within communities, it is important to look into these background
conditions. If betrayal and trust were just a matter of our interactions with other known
individuals in well-defined joint commitments such as going for a walk, then Gilbert’s account
would be sufficient. However, some forms of the betrayal of trust are not of this sort. By drawing
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attention to impersonality and anonymity, it becomes clear that trust and betrayal are not simply
a matter of our experiences of other persons, but that they fit into broader background
experiences of the socio-cultural surrounding world.
Gilbert’s theory of political obligations faces difficulties by not accounting for
experiences of trust and betrayal in impersonal and anonymous communities. For this reason, it
is helpful to frame the discussion by way of surveying candidate theories of trust as given in the
political science, sociology, and philosophy literature. Doing so strengthens Gilbert’s account of
obligations within political communities by showing the conscious experiences we have both
when things go smoothly and when they do not.
§3. Surveying Conceptions of Trust
I here look to theories of trust as they have been given by philosophers, political
scientists, and sociologists. This is not to be taken as an exhaustive presentation of theoretical
conceptions of trust.28 Rather, the accounts presented here are ones that highlight specific ways
in which trust and betrayal come into play in what has been defined as impersonal and
anonymous communities. On the one hand, any account of trust can here be productively
introduced given Gilbert’s quick gloss. On the other hand, some notions of trust are more fitting
than others when it comes to accounting for impersonality and anonymity in large political
communities. Given Gilbert’s commitment that group membership should include a
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consciousness of the group’s unity, a strong candidate for a conceptualization of trust will be one
that includes descriptive components of the ways trust is experienced. The conceptions of trust I
appeal to here are (1) trust as a three-place relation, (2) as social capital, (3) as noncognitive
security, and finally (4) as basal security. I argue in the end that Karen Jones’s account of trust
understood as “basal security” best fills the gap identified in Gilbert’s theory of political
obligations. The account that Jones provides has the additional attraction of acting as a bridge
with Husserl’s phenomenology.
3.1 Three-Place Relations
Annette Baier’s article on trust provides an account of trust in the form of a three-place
relationship. In this case, trust is conceptualized in the following form: person A trusts person B
with some valued thing C.29 In this way, to trust is to depend on the good will of the other
person.30 For Baier, trust is assumed to be a positive attitude and betrayal acts as a negative
modification. A trusting relationship is morally decent to the extent that it would survive if both
parties had full knowledge of how they were being relied upon by the other.31 Trust is then
morally bad if the relationship would dissolve when such knowledge came to light. This threeplace relation is put forth as wide enough to account both for our interactions with known others
as well as unknown strangers. In the latter case, Baier writes that the stranger is trusted to “care”
for our autonomy, where such care is general enough to refer to at the very least not harming
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Baier (1986), p. 235.
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Baier (1986), p. 235.
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Baier (1986), pp. 255-256.

231
us.32 In this latter case of having a trust of strangers, Baier writes that this exists in the form of an
“unconscious trust,” where the notion of unconscious seems to refer to instances in which our
trust functions habitually, without our having to choose to take up a certain relation to the
other.33
Baier points out that there is an additional component that is necessary to understand trust
beyond what is found in her theoretical framework, a kind of surplus framing the parts of the
three-place relation and acting as conditions for their possibility. While Baier primarily focuses
on trust in the form of a three-place relation, she acknowledges that a full account of trust also
has to understand the wider background in which individuals interact.34 Baier indicates what she
means here by discussing a background “climate of trust” or a “network of trust.” 35 What this
indicates is that three-place relations of trust require that there are certain trusting regularities
amidst members of a community. For communities in which it is rare to trust others, attempts to
enter into a three-place relation of trust with someone else will be unlikely, especially when
entering into relations with strangers.
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It is plausible to infer from Gilbert’s writings that she is operating with a three-place
relation of trust. The trust I have of others according to Gilbert is tied to the content of our joint
commitment, and betrayal amounts to the other person or persons not living up to their part of
the commitment. This is the case both for small joint commitments such as two people going for
a walk and for larger groupings bound by social, governing rules. While Baier indicates the
necessity of looking beyond three-place relations in order to account for wider climates or
networks within which trust functions, Gilbert does not. Instead, Gilbert turns directly to
relations of owing within joint commitments. To be sure, there are components within Gilbert’s
overall theory that can be used towards the end of account for these surplus notions of trust, such
as her notion of population common knowledge.36 Nevertheless, Gilbert does not address trust in
wider networks of common knowledge or the experiences of members therein, especially within
impersonal and anonymous communities.
3.2 Social Capital
Political scientists and sociologists have approached trust under the heading of “social
capital.”37 In these discussions, it is emphasized that trust acts as a kind of social lubrication
promoting the efficient functioning and flourishing of communities. We thereby encounter
phenomena akin to what Baier highlighted regarding background networks or climates within
which trust takes shape. The ease with which social interactions proceed in cases of high levels
of social capital makes it understandable that Niklas Luhmann would conceptualize trust as a

Recall the sense in which Gilbert’s notion of common knowledge runs parallel with Husserl’s account of the
surrounding world as given in Chapter IV.
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Cf. Rothstein (2007).
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way in which we attempt to reduce social complexity.38 Inversely, social capital theorists mark
the absence of trust as a kind of social “friction.” Francis Fukuyama defines trust and social
capital in the following way:

Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of
that community. […] Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust
in a society or in certain parts of it.39

Put similarly by Robert Putnam:

Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties
of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness arising from them. […] A society
characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for
the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. If we don’t have to balance
every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished. Trustworthiness lubricates
social life.40

Communities can of course exist in the absence of trust, where members are dishonest and
uncooperative, but such a situation is usually associated with notions of inefficiency.41 Trusting
societies move without friction insofar as members do not have to hedge their actions through
extensive contracts or various forms of insurance.42 Communities marked by distrust, however,
lack such efficiency since additional time is required in order to guarantee mechanisms of
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assurances for members. For example, it may be the case in less trusting groups that additional
time and energy are spent writing out complex contracts, closing exploitable contractual
loopholes, and policing breaches to agreements.
Given the specific problem that Gilbert’s account introduces in the political sphere, it is
not enough to focus on accounts of interpersonal trust where we interact with other known
individuals. For Putnam, the kind of trust we have in cases of our interactions with well-known
others, or at least those others we encounter on a frequent basis, is referred to as a “thick trust.”
This corresponds to the kinds of trust found in small groups such as two people going for a walk
together or a married couple. The features of impersonality and anonymity demand a more
specific type of trust, though, and we come across the requisite type of trust in what Putnam
refers to as “thin trust.”43 Thin trust for Putnam refers to the kinds of attitudes that we have
towards strangers, such as those we encounter in passing in coffee shops.44 In these cases, there
are certain background norms that lay out our expectations regarding the behavior of others. I
tend to have a thin trust of strangers of public at the very least to the extent that I expect them to
not harm me.
What social capital conceptions of trust provide in the current context is a sense of the
ways in which a “thin trust” prevents what would otherwise be a kind of social friction. Trust as
understood by social capital theorists is clearly a positive event, and is correlated here with

“Trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and nested in wider networks is sometimes called
“thick trust.” On the other hand, a thinner trust in “the generalized other,” like your new acquaintance from the
coffee shop, also rests implicitly on some background of shared social networks and expectations of reciprocity.
Thin trust is even more useful than thick trust, because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people
whom we can know personally.” Putnam (2000), p. 136.
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positive economic growth, stronger indications of confidence in leaders or institutions, and so
forth. Social capital theorists account for these metrics in political and economic terms, such that
economies function more efficiently when high levels of trust are present. High levels of trust in
other persons or in political leaders allows for the possibility of more economic growth than we
would have if the procedural flow were interrupted by eruptions of social and political distrust
(e.g., protests, revolutions, low consumer confidence, etc.). Levels of trust or distrust are
measured through public opinion polls, where social scientists seek to understand fluctuating
levels of support or opposition to politicians and institutions of the political community. While
this acts to initially indicate the kind of trust that is of relevance in the context of impersonal and
anonymous communities as discussed by Gilbert and as gestured to by Baier, we do not yet have
anything like an account of the experiences that members within such groups have.
3.3 Non-Cognitive Security
Lawrence Becker conceptualizes the trust that members of a political community have as
a sense of security or ease in the face of what they take to be others’ motives for acting.45
Becker’s interest is primarily in “noncognitive” versions of trust insofar as they have relevance
in the context of political philosophy.46 In a similar vein with Putnam’s account of “thin trust,”
Becker discusses a “noncognitive” account of trust. By “noncognitive,” Becker means an
account of trust that does not directly thematize the beliefs or expectations individuals have
about specific other persons.47 Rather, according to Becker, “it is fundamentally a matter of our
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having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not focused on
specific people, institutions, or groups.”48 In this way, our membership within political
communities involves not only our explicit beliefs and cognitive abilities, but also includes our
“noncognitive stability.”49
For Becker, it is not enough to gauge political forms of trust by looking to opinion polls
or what members of the community directly say. It is seemingly inevitable that members of a
political community will be able to find problems with certain parts of their governments and
this may show itself in terms of a decline of trust or credibility in surveys. What is also important
to theorize according to Becker is a deeper level of noncognitive “attitudes, affects, and
emotions” that members possess. For Becker, this is even more important than explicit beliefs
insofar as individuals continue to go along in one way or another with the governments to which
they belong even while distrusting particular leaders or institutions. The notion of trust
understood as a “noncognitive security about motives,” then, refers to the sense of implicit
agreement with how a political community is functioning overall, despite any reservations
regarding those who holds power at a certain time or various policy enactments. As Becker
writes:

It strikes me as a plausible hypothesis, however, that democratic government is not
seriously disabled by a consequent decline in people’s credulity and reliance, as long as
they continue to believe that officials generally mean well, play by the rules, and play
fair. When we feel secure about that much, we tend to write off incompetence,
mendacity, greed, and cowardice as simply human foibles.50
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A truly effective government does not on this account need the explicit, trusting endorsement of
its members so long as there is a general feeling that the government more or less means well.
Trust is in this way a kind of non-cognitive yet positive relation to the political community and
to its institutions as a whole.
3.4 Basal Security
In her three-place relation version of trust, Baier provides a compelling account of the
ways in which trust is experienced when one individual trusts another individual with some
valued possession. Notions of thin trust as discussed by social capital theorists refer us to the
kinds of efficient interactions that can occur when we do not feel the need to be overly on-guard
against dishonest and uncooperative individuals. Becker’s account highlights a type of trust that
is important to the political sphere where focus is not on specific individuals or institutions, but
on a general sense of security amidst unknown others in a community. The trajectory we see here
is towards the “atmospheres” in which trust is operative beyond the trust we have of individual
persons. With Becker’s theory, we get closer to an account of the experiences of community
members insofar as he touches on attitudes and affections in relation to a background sense of
security regarding governments. Turning now to Karen Jones, we find an account of trust that
directly thematizes the kinds of experiences we have in and of our socio-cultural world in
general, and not just those we have of individual persons. This thematization has the advantage
of being able to conceptualize experiences that group members have both of being in a trusting
environment as well as inhabiting an environment deemed to be threatening in the aftermath of
betrayals of trust.
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Jones begins her reflections on trust by appealing to the quote given by Baier which is
included as the epigraph to this chapter, highlighting what it is that some terrorists take aim at in
their attacks.51 Successful terror campaigns are able to target a specific kind of trust that
members of a community have in relation both to other members and in relation to their
environments at large.52 For Jones, three-place models touch on one aspect of trust, but this does
not come close to exhausting the concept. There is an additional sense of trust that is better
captured in terms of our overall sense of security, which Jones calls our “basal security.”

That trust is a three-place relation is now common ground even among otherwise
competing accounts of trust. However, while the aftershock of terror does significantly
change the landscape of three-place trust relations, the power of terror lies in its ability to
shake what I call our basal security. […] Basal security is not adequately theorized in
three-place terms and thus has not been adequately theorized in contemporary
philosophical works on trust.53
Jones thereby postulates “an underlying, affectively-laden state that is explanatory of our
willingness or otherwise to enter into particular three-place trusting relations. Call this
underlying state basal security.”54
Jones compares situations in which straightforward trusting relations to the world at large
are shocked and even dissolved, referring to the experiences of survivors of terrorist attacks or
sexual violence. These instances elucidate a kind of background trust as well as the possibility of
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its elimination. While some forms of betrayal can allow us to revise our beliefs and habits of
trusting, other betrayals impact our “metatrust.” As Jones writes: “These are the betrayals that, if
serious, shatter basal security.”55 Similar to Becker, Jones is focused on a noncognitive account
of trust insofar as her focus is on the kinds of experiences that persons have apart from their
explicitly held and acknowledged beliefs.

We need to postulate basal security in order to explain dissonance in our judgments of
risk and in our willingness actually to trust on the basis of such judged risk, and we need
to postulate it to explain why the world should be experienced as radically different after
an attack than it was before an attack, even in those cases where the agent does not revise
her beliefs about how objectively risky the world is.56

What Jones is most interested in is the sense in which victims of such attacks can truly be said to
live in “different worlds” before and after attacks.57 Jones supports her account by appealing to
the work of Susan Brison, who provides a first-person account of what it is like to experience
being a victim of sexual violence.58 As Brison writes:

When the inconceivable happens, one starts to doubt even the most mundane, realistic
perceptions. […] For the first several months after my attack, I led a spectral existence,
not quite sure whether I had died and the world went on without me, or whether I was
alive but in a totally alien world.59
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If trust was exhausted through three-place models, then it would not make sense to acknowledge
experiences of living within different worlds before and after an attack, one mundane and one
alien. Rather, it would only speak to the dissolution of specific three-place relations of trust.
Insofar as Jones and Brison draw attention to how one’s world as a whole can come to be
experienced as alienating, this supports the notion of there being more to relations of trust than
what is accounted for in the three-place form.
On the one hand, incidents of terrorism or sexual violence can be partially conceptualized
in terms of three-place relations of trust. For instance, I can say there is a certain betrayal of trust
that a terrorist has violated in carrying out their attack; I may have trusted them (thinly) as
strangers in a public space, where that trust was then betrayed. The victim of sexual violence has
similarly had trust violated in relation to their attacker at least partially in three-place terms;
individual A trusted individual B to behave in a non-violent manner, and that trust was then
betrayed through an act of sexual violence. On the other hand, these severe attacks indicate that
there is more to trust and betrayal than just our relation to other individual persons. In the
aftermath of terrorist attacks or incidents of sexual violence, both Brison and Jones describe the
ways in which victims may also come to have a different experiential relation to their
environment at large. Survivors of terrorist attacks and survivors of sexual violence may have
radically different approaches to being amidst strangers in their communities. As Jones writes,
this new relation to the world occurs despite the kinds of explicitly held beliefs of survivors, such
as their calculations of risk. Three-place relations of trust do not on their own account for this
shift in experientially different worlds.
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Jones puts forth her account of trust as basal security to account for trust and betrayal as
related to the very core of our experience of being in the social world. Basal security is presented
in the form of a spectrum. Depending on different levels of basal security, Jones claims there are
experiences of certain components of an environment and objects therein as having different
levels of salience.

Our habits of trusting, whether habits of overlooking or of focusing on our
vulnerabilities, determine whether risk will be salient to us and thus contribute to the
pattern of our three-place trust. […] To attribute an unarticulated, affectively laden,
implicit, interpretive framework to an agent is to attribute to this agent a set of
dispositions of salience, interpretation, motivation, and affect. Differences in these
frameworks and the dispositions that constitute them give rise to differences in the way
the world is experienced.60

On this account, possessing a relatively high level of basal security allows for feelings of security
or comfort amidst strangers in public, which means not calling other individuals or the general
safety of an area into question. The possession of low levels of basal security, on the other hand,
is associated with an overriding feeling of unease or alienation, a lack of security regarding other
persons and my surrounding world. The world itself is thereby characterized as a threatening or
risky place in the case of low levels of basal security.
Any of the conceptions of trust presented in this section supplement Gilbert’s plural
subject theory of political obligations in its current form since she does not specify exactly how
she is using the term. However, given the specific difficulty identified above in her work
regarding the kinds of experiences had by members of large political communities, there are
good reasons to believe that Jones’s conception of trust as “basal security” provides the best fit
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for filling the gap. Gilbert faces difficulties in accounting for experiences in impersonal and
anonymous communities, and I argue above that this is reflected in the amount of time she
spends incorporating trust and betrayal into her theory. Jones’s conception of trust as basal
security directly addresses the background presuppositions of trust in such communities which
were absent from Gilbert’s account. Jones highlights the sense in which our straightforward
experience of the world is marked by a kind of “metatrust,” whereas successfully carried-out
terrorist attacks or instances of sexual violence eliminate those experiences of a general trust
within a social group. This dissolution of basal security, importantly, amounts to more than just
the withdrawal of trust directed at individual persons in particular circumstances. Rather, trust as
basal security highlights the sense in which trusting relations shape how we experience a world
in general. Survivors of such attacks are said to be unwilling to enter into three-place relations of
trust. The account of trust that Gilbert provides implicitly endorses a three-place relation, but that
does not account for the background conditions that contextualize our trusting relations. This is a
crucial gap insofar as those background conditions are especially prevalent in holding together
impersonal and anonymous communities.
One of the upshots of Jones’s account is that it focuses explicitly on experiences of
betrayal in addition to trust, whereas the primary focuses of the other accounts presented here
were focused more on positive attitudes of trust. This is instructive in bringing some of the
background presuppositions of three-place relations of trust to the fore. At the same time, this
can be taken further in order to thematize the ways that trust and betrayal factor into experiences
of membership within political communities. Jones’s starting point is with individuals who
already have a high level of basal security prior to experiences of severe attacks, of blindly or
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unquestioningly trusting others on the background of a healthy basal security.61 What this covers
over, however, are the wide-ranging historical background conditions that such an initial sense of
security presupposes and the fact that not everyone shares this starting position. That basal trust
can be “shattered” is itself indicative of a wider background, network, or climate of trust and it is
through this realization that Jones provides supplementation to the conception of trust put forth
by Gilbert. Jones claims that it is relatively uncontroversial how this basal security comes
about.62 For instance, she points to such security as being instilled to individuals in part by their
genes and in part by their parents.63 What this passes over, however, is that this initial build-up of
basal security can occur in a socio-cultural atmosphere with maliciously prejudicial social and
political institutions that allow for patterns of such severe betrayals of trust to emerge in the first
place.
Moving to Husserl, it is shown that his account is similar to Jones’s on these topics,
opening up the possibility of a detailed phenomenological analysis of such experiences of trust
and betrayal. In addition, Husserl approaches the very possibility of socio-cultural crises as
indicative of components of our world that had been forgotten or taken-for-granted. Trust as it
exists in the form of basal security is something that is taken-for-granted in instances of
peacefully going about our lives. Husserl’s historically-focused phenomenology calls this kind of
taken-for-grantedness into question by placing such prejudices into historical context.
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§4. Husserl on Trust and Crisis
There are two reasons it is instructive to turn to Husserl on the heels of what has been
discussed so far. First, a Husserlian standpoint allows for a detailed intentional analysis of the
correlations between consciousness and world in experiences of trust and betrayal. This is
important given Gilbert’s insistence that experiences of community membership should include
some consciousness of the group’s unity, and since trust and betrayal are components of her
theory of political obligations. Jones demonstrates the possibility of our trusting experiences
being understood in terms of our relation to the world understood in an underlying affective
fashion and this in itself alleviates the difficulty Gilbert faces in terms of incorporating trust into
an account of community membership amidst strangers. Husserl can provide a detailed account
of how features of life in political communities such as trust and betrayal are experienced. Since
the kind of consciousness of unity involved in impersonal and anonymous communities has a
more complex structure than that of smaller groups and since trust and betrayal are not
persuasively accounted for in Gilbert’s descriptions, Husserl’s framework is here a desirable
addition. This strengthens Gilbert’s theory of political obligations even further than the
incorporation of Jones’s notion of trust.
The second reason it is instructive to turn to Husserl is due to his account of sociocultural crises as symptomatic of underlying yet forgotten presuppositions of our everyday
experiences. While the accounts of trust given so far conceptualize trust as a positive attitude that
then becomes negative through instances of betrayal, Husserl’s analyses of socio-cultural crises
take aim at taken-for-granted components of our straightforward, everyday experiences. Even if
these experiences are characterized positively in the sense of being experiences of our social and
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political world functioning smoothly, this does not guarantee that we truly understand the
meanings of our actions or the reasons that things have traditionally been done a certain way.
Husserl demonstrates that crises occur when there is a forgetting of the tradition-based
components of what shapes our experiences. Instead of simply taking our everyday experiences
as positive by default, Husserl provides an avenue seeking to bring about self-responsibility and
responsibility for one’s community that does not take seemingly uncontroversial parts of the
social and political world for granted. This is especially pressing in the context of this chapter
due to Gilbert’s aspirations in putting forth a theory of political obligations. Belonging to a
political community according to Gilbert amounts to abiding by those social rules that are
understood as “governing rules,” which “settle a matter that demands settling for the sake of the
peaceful progress of life,” rules such as a society’s laws.64 The specific kinds of betrayals to trust
that Jones highlights indicates the possibility of there being structural or institutional problems
intertwined with the governing rules of a political community. Put otherwise, there may be
threats to the peaceful progression of the lives of community members that are tacitly built into
the joint commitments constituting the community. The manner in which members experience
trust and betrayal can be symptomatic of more wide-ranging socio-cultural crises.
I first highlight the overlap between Jones’s notion of basal security and Husserl’s notion
of “original belief” in the natural attitude (4.1). The loss of “metatrust” characterized as low
basal security is shown to be akin to Husserl’s notion of socio-cultural “crisis.” I argue that
Husserl’s approach to socio-cultural crises is instructive in this context insofar as it leads to
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reflections on the originally taken-for-granted positivity of trust. In the face of even tacit crises,
the possibility of a liberating approach to community life in the form of a transformation or a
renewal becomes possible (4.2).
4.1 Basal Security from a Husserlian Standpoint
Husserl conceptualizes communities in general as existing along a spectrum from
anonymous to intimate, where this spectrum is clarified by appealing to the way he uses his
mereology to write about community.65 Even though Husserl does not explicitly pursue the
following line of thought, the notion of trust is similarly amenable to being conceptualized along
a spectrum. In the everyday spheres of family life, friendships, and romantic relationships, I trust
that there will be features such as mutuality, recognition, and mindful fidelity amidst particular
others. On the other hand, my trust in public settings involves the expectation that strangers will
act with a degree of civility. This corresponds to the distinction Putnam draws between “thick
trust” and “thin trust.”66 In all of these instances, it is essential that a guarantee is impossible in
the face of the freedom of other persons.67 Broken promises, betrayals, or violence draw our
attention to interpersonal fragility, and may even lead to the dissolution of the community in
question. An anonymous community of strangers bound by a loose set of background norms can
be transformed into an intimate community, a community whose members are explicitly aware
of themselves and fellow members as belonging to the community, in cases where things do not
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go as expected (e.g., Carr’s example of the We-constituting effects of terrorist attacks68). In such
cases, our trust regarding the general ways that other people will behave is betrayed. A group
may become more intimately bound through instances of increased familiarity with distinct
others and their trustworthiness. Moving in the other direction, an intimate grouping of
individuals such as close friends who trust one another may dissolve if trust is betrayed such that
members no longer feel that they know the others closely.69 While Husserl is clear that
anonymous communities can function automatically in “headless” fashion, he in no way
subscribes to any notion of inevitability regarding the directionality of communities along this
spectrum.70
Like Jones, Husserl recognized that different persons can experience the same world in
different ways. Members of different historical generations can have different experiences of
their surrounding worlds. Husserl’s narrative in the Crisis details the ways in which the
accomplishments of the natural sciences since Galileo have shaped the way we encounter
ordinary objects around us, throwing over them a “garb of ideas” such that we experience objects
as though they were bundles of mathematically exact physical measurements instead of
recognizing the perspectival and inexact manner of our actually experiencing them.71 This,
however, is not the only way the world can be experienced. Husserl suggests it would be
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anachronistic to think that the Ancient Greeks had experienced objects and states of affairs in
that way.72 This for Husserl indicates one of the ways in which apprehensions of the world can
differ across generations. While we all live in the objectively same world, the sedimentations of
different traditions impact what is experienced as salient or irrelevant in the shared socio-cultural
surrounding worlds of specific communities.73 Just as Jones highlights ways that levels of trust
impact the salience through which objects and states of affairs in our world are experienced (e.g.,
in regard to their riskiness), so too does Husserl acknowledge the ways that the traditional
sedimentations of a community impact the way the world is experienced.
As argued in Chapter III, Husserl accounts for the experience of being a part of a
community by appeal to a twofold structure. On the one hand, there are what I described as the
“centripetal experiences” of the other members of a personal association. On the other hand,
there are the “centrifugal experiences” that members have of their shared surrounding world. 74
Both of these experiential moments are filled out in Husserl’s writings with phenomenological
descriptions of the different types of intentionalities at play in them (e.g., axiological and
practical intentionality). Trust understood as a three-place relation only accounts for one part of
this whole, focusing on community experience understood as our being a part of a personal
association. What it misses, as argued above, is the sense in which our personal associations have
their own shared surrounding worlds. The approaches of both Jones and Husserl draw attention

72

VL, p. 272.

73

Cf. VL, p. 281.

74

Ideas II, p. 201.

249
to this kind of experience of the surrounding world. One entry point to this in Husserl’s work is
by appealing to his notions of horizons within the lifeworld.
In the Crisis, Husserl responds to what he takes to be the dangers of naturalism by
providing a phenomenological analysis of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt).75 A comprehensive
account of Husserl’s technical notion of the lifeworld cannot be given here, but I introduce it
because it includes an extensive phenomenological analysis of experiential “horizons,” and
because this notion of horizons makes it possible to thematize the different experiential features
of trust. Husserl discusses horizonal intentionality both in terms of internal and external
horizons.76 By “internal horizons,” Husserl refers to the sum of all additional perspectives that
one can take of an object or state of affairs besides the profile that is given to one in the present
moment. My perception of an object such as a tree also includes the apperception of its currently
unseen sides, which are synthesized into my perceptual experience. By “external horizons,”
Husserl refers to the ways in which our experiences of objects places them within a wider
network of states of affairs. In perceiving the tree, I apprehend it in the context of its
environmental region, such as in a garden amidst other trees. Investigations of horizons apply
also to our perceptions of valuable and practical objects, such as those sedimented in sociocultural artifacts and traditions. Objects, other subjects, and states of affairs are embedded in
wide-ranging horizonal relations beyond those that are accounted for in the context of Gilbert’s
plural subject theory of large groups. As suggested in the previous chapter, Gilbert’s notion of
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population common knowledge comes close to Husserl in this sense insofar as it refers to the
background understandings that influences our experiences of membership. Husserl, however,
provides a detailed account of experiences of community membership within impersonal and
anonymous communities given his appeal to the “mediations” of “mereological proximity.” This
advantage has repercussions in accounting for trust. With an analysis of horizon intentionality,
Husserl is able to theorize the same kinds of surplus instantiations of trust as gestured to by
Baier, such as “climates” or “networks” of trust. Three-place models never exhaust our trust of
other individuals, then, insofar as these intersubjective relations of trust are to be contextualized
within wider socio-cultural, historical horizons. It is for this reason that Husserl’s
phenomenological analyses provide detailed descriptions of the kinds of experiences described
by Jones, where it is similarly not simply a matter of specific interactions on the basis of threeplace relations of trust. Having a detailed description of such experiences matters in the current
context insofar as Gilbert’s theory of political obligations requires some consciousness of the
group’s unity. The notion of horizons allows for a far more comprehensive account of the rich
experiences we have, and this is further seen by appeal to Husserl’s notion of the “natural
attitude.”
For Husserl, the “natural attitude” is that way through which we ordinarily experience our
world, as being turned to things as they are unquestionably (fraglos) given to us.77 The natural
attitude is that attitude of everydayness in which we find ourselves amidst things considered as

IP, p. 15; Crisis, p. 13. Cf. Husserl’s discussion of mere communities of influence in Hua XIV, pp. 183, 204. On
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“pre-given” (vorgegeben) or “obvious” (selbstverständlich).78 Put otherwise, we ordinarily
encounter objects and states of affairs in the form of a taken-for-granted familiarity
(Heimatlichkeit or Vertrautheit).79 On Husserl’s account, this is not simply a matter of
encountering a world of physical objects. As he writes:

This surrounding world is comprised not of mere things but of use-Objects (clothes,
utensils, guns, tools), works of art, literary products, instruments for religious and judicial
activities (seals, official ornament, coronation insignia, ecclesiastical symbols, etc.). And
it is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members of
communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which, as wholes, have their
own lives, preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of
individuals, have their qualities as communities, their moral and juridical regulations,
their modes of functioning in collaboration with other communities and with their
individual persons, their dependencies on circumstances, their regulated changes and
their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time, according to
the determining circumstances.”80
There is a way in which we are thereby “certain” (gewiss), that we have a “perceptual certainty”
(Wahrnehmungsgewissheit)81 in the experiences of our surrounding world in the natural
attitude.82 While in the natural attitude, I take the objects and states of affairs encountered in
experience as simply existing around me in an uncontroversial fashion and as simply spread out
endlessly in space.83 Husserl characterizes this as the “general thesis of the natural attitude.”84
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Over the course of our experience, Husserl highlights the different ways in which what
we initially and unquestioningly take to be the case can become “modalized.” For example, a
perception of an object of which I am initially certain of regarding its existence can take on the
characteristics of being doubtful, being probable, being possible, and so forth.85 Perceptions are
given more “weight” (Gewicht) when they meet our expectations over the course of experience.86
Furthermore, an initially certain belief in regard to some perceived thing can become negated if it
turns out to have not been what I first apprehended.87 For instance, Husserl writes:
Just as negation, figuratively speaking, “strikes through” [durchstreicht], so affirmation
“underlines” [unterstreicht]; it “confirms” a position, assenting to it instead of, like
negation, “canceling” it.88
The “doxic modalities” are not given on their own, but depend on an “unmodalized” form of
belief; there is something that is at least initially taken to be “certain” that can then be called into
question in various ways.89 Husserl refers to the initial certainty that we have in the natural
attitude as an “original belief” (Urglaube) or “original doxa” (Urdoxa).90 There is here a simple,
underlying confidence that what I encounter in experience is actually there and not, for instance,
an illusion. As Husserl writes in this context: “Certainty of belief is belief simply, in the precise
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sense of the term.”91 Understood in this way, there is an initial positivity upon which something
like a denial or a becoming-suspect can be experientially founded. This certainty is not a belief in
terms of an affirmation or an explicit judgment, but is instead a passively constituted and initially
unquestioned faith that the world is the same way that I take it to be over the course of my
natural experiencing.92 I here implicitly take things to exist in the ways that they are initially
experienced. On the basis of an “original belief,” it is then possible for my experience to take on
different belief characters.
It is through the notion of “original belief” or “original doxa” that a connection can be
made between Husserl and Karen Jones on the notion of trust understood as basal security.
Objects and states of affairs that we take to exist in a determinate fashion can be corrected over
time through additional experiences, or our initial take can be further confirmed. The same is the
case in regard to how we experience other persons. I may take someone to have a certain type of
personal character, but can then be surprised by something they say or do. To appeal to one of
Husserl’s examples, I can take something to be a person onto to have my expectations
disappointed when I learn that it was only a life-like mannequin.93 We experience relations of
trust as well as instances of betrayals of trust in the natural attitude. In a description of personal
life, Husserl writes:

The persons who belong to the social association are given to each other as
“companions,” not as opposed objects but as counter-subjects who live “with” one
another, who converse and are related to one another, actually or potentially, in acts of
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love and counter-love, of hate and counter-hate, of trust and counter-trust [des Vertrauens
und Gegenvertrauens], etc.94

We here remain wrapped up within the world in the natural attitude without have to necessarily
take up a thematic awareness of our world as such.
In Jones’s language, there is no necessity of fundamental alterations to our basal security,
even in minor instances of non-reciprocated trust or disappointments of expectations regarding
objects and states of affairs. As such, it is uncontroversial to think of trust here on the model of a
three-place relation when things are going smoothly, so long as we acknowledge that such a
relation is itself founded on an unmodalized or unshaken “original belief.”95 We here have
experiences of community membership that do not require us to take up any reflective or critical
stance towards the groups to which we belong or the wider background upon which our social
interactions occur. Our world as a whole is not itself made thematic while we live with the
“original belief” of the natural attitude. As Husserl writes:

How is the essentially original attitude, the fundamental historical mode of human
existence, to be characterized? We answer: men obviously always live, for generative
reasons, in communities, in family, tribe, nation, which are themselves in turn divided, in
varying degrees of complexity, into particular social groups. Now natural life can be
characterized as a life naïvely, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being
always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal horizon, without, however,
being thematic as such. What is thematic is whatever one is directed toward.96
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So long as there are not internally or externally motivated events that call my fundamental belief
regarding the status of the world into question, I can live in a kind of naïve realism.
The definition that Jones provides of trust understood as basal security is of an
“underlying, affectively-laden state” that influences our willingness to interact with other persons
and with our environments at large.97 On the basis of a generalized sense of security in the face
of others and my environment, I can then enter into different instantiations of trust understood in
three-place terms. There are good reasons, then, for connecting an initially strong basal security
with Husserl’s notion of “original belief,” since our straightforward living in the natural attitude
is itself marked by evaluative, affective, and practical components. In the absence of a severe
interruption, Jones’s notion of basal security understood as a kind of “metatrust” is akin to
Husserl’s notion of the taken-for-granted status of our “original belief” in the world of the
natural attitude. The advantage that a Husserlian approach has in this context is in providing
detailed phenomenological descriptions of life in the natural attitude.98 This is an advantage
insofar as Gilbert’s theory of political obligations requires a detailed account of the
consciousness of unity had by members of impersonal and anonymous communities.
4.2 Crisis and Critical Renewal
Within Husserl’s writings, there are different ways in which the socio-cultural world can
be made thematic to consciousness. One way is through the explicit labor of phenomenology, but
another way is through experiences of socio-cultural crisis. Both of these involve a change of
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attitude away from the natural attitude towards a more reflective attitude.99 In the latter case, the
world can be made thematic when events within one’s community do not go as anticipated. We
come across different ways in which Husserl discusses “crises.”100 According to Buckley, a
helpful definition of Husserl’s notion of crisis is as a “forgetfulness.”101 One form of crisis that
Husserl discusses is a crisis of the loss of meaning that the sciences have for us as persons in the
socio-cultural world.102 It is this kind of crisis that Buckley refers to as a crisis in the cultural
sphere.103 Crisis understood as a socio-cultural forgetfulness, then, indicative of the conditions at
play in our everyday, natural attitude as marked by a taken-for-grantedness.
Reflecting in the aftermath of the First World War, Husserl writes that the war
demonstrated the “internal untruthfulness and senselessness of this [European] culture.”104 The
cultural shock that the war represented was not just limited to the devastations of military force,
but also made itself felt through the aftershocks “of psychological torture, of moral depravity,
and economic need.”105 There is a crisis here to the extent that it had been taken for granted that
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the sciences would improve the lives of human beings, yet the sciences were instead used in the
service of war. This crisis arises in part insofar as an unbridled naturalism has taken hold of
inappropriate aspects of human life.106 Husserl insists that these kinds of methodological
missteps have drastic practical implications.107 As he puts it in one of his lectures: “Philosophy
has to do with questions which can be a matter of indifference for no one because taking a
position in regard to them is decisive for the dignity of genuine humanity.”108 By approaching all
areas of human life by appeal to naturalism, there is a forgetting of our more immediate
lifeworld. This includes our being together with other persons in personal communities, where
these communities are not properly conceptualized in a naturalistic framework.109 The language
Husserl uses to discuss socio-cultural crises is of a splintering or fracturing of communities into
their parts understood as individual persons at the expense of a loss of the sense of the
community understood as a whole.110 There was here an initially taken-for-granted trust or faith
that the community was “on the right track,” but this trust was betrayed through the outbreak of
the war. Even where a community continues to be nominally acknowledged by its members in
the midst of such crises, there is nevertheless a loss of faith or belief in what the community as a
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whole is capable of accomplishing on the basis of such devastation. Husserl appeals to this loss
of faith in the face of community crisis.111
While some of the crises Husserl investigates are immediately apparent in their
devastating consequences (e.g., the First World War with its physical, psychological, and
economic violence), other crises are not as apparent to those living through them. This is seen in
one way that Husserl approaches the crisis of the sciences. In these cases, Husserl is at pains to
show the existence of potential crises where they are tacit or disguised. Motivating the beginning
of the Crisis, for instance, it is rhetorically asked: “Is there, in view of their constant successes,
really a crisis of the sciences?”112 The affirmative answer and subsequent explanation
demonstrates the way in which a crisis lurks when we take aspects of our world for granted.
There is a crisis when there are components of our world that exist as unquestioned prejudices.113
In line with the notion of crisis arising on the basis of an unquestioned, taken-for-grantedness,
Husserl writes of the ways that concepts arise in natural life such that they mask “dark and
unclear horizons […] with intricate and hidden implications.”114 We can, after all, be “blinded by
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the ‘prosperity’” that the sciences bring about.115 One of the tasks of philosophical self-reflection
according to Husserl is to liberate oneself and one’s community from such prejudices even
amidst the flourishing of practical results. This task is “critical” in the sense that it attempts to
understand the total unity of history and to understand how we have gotten to where we are. For
Husserl, the responsible philosopher “must have the insight that all the things he [or she] takes
for granted are prejudices, that all prejudices are obscurities arising out of a sedimentation of
tradition.”116 The nature of this tacit crisis is such that Husserl first has to make it apparent, to
make it felt by his readers, insofar as things might seem to be functioning efficiently and
successfully.
The ability to highlight crises where they remain tacit and otherwise straightforwardly
lived-through is part of what makes Husserl’s approach so radical. In the “Vienna Lecture,”
Husserl responds to being called a “reactionary” by claiming to be “far more radical and far more
revolutionary than those who in their words proclaim themselves so radical today.”117 As Natalie
Depraz points out, a Husserlian sense of revolution can here be read as a return to a previous
state insofar as that return “intensifies” the original experience. Depraz writes:

If [Husserl] is revolutionary, it is on account of his endeavoring to observe history and
the political phenomena he meets with as deeply and rigorously as possible. Such an
attitude requires a complete transformation of the way phenomena are looked at. It is
necessary to focus upon their original meaning.118
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In the current context, then, a Husserlian approach opens the possibility of transforming
phenomena of trust even when things go smoothly. Baier suggest in the conclusion of her article
on trust that it might be inadvisable to turn philosophical attention to trust insofar as it is a
“fragile plant” that might inadvertently be destroyed. As Baier writes:

Trust is a fragile plant, which may not endure inspection of its roots, even when they
were, before the inspection, quite healthy. So, although some forms of trust would
survive a suddenly achieved mutual awareness of them, they may not survive the gradual
and possibly painful process by which such awareness actually comes about. It may then
be the better part of wisdom, even when we have an acceptable test for trust, not to use it
except where some distrust already exists, better to take nonsuspect trust on trust.119

A Husserlian approach does not hold the same kinds of reservations. It may initially seem that
trust is a default, positive attitude for individuals and for the well-being of the communities to
which they belong. The way in which this default position is taken-for-granted, however,
indicates the possibility of a wider crisis of trust insofar as we remain at a distance from
understanding the origins and presuppositions of our patterns of trusting within the community.
Husserl is interested in the project of socio-cultural renewal (Erneuerung). The kind of
renewal that Husserl writes about in both the “Kaizo” articles and the “Vienna Lecture” is one
that attempts to bring a faith in community back to those groups who have forgotten or otherwise
lost it. Put otherwise, there is an attempt here to reinvigorate community life in the face of sociocultural crises. Bringing back this kind of faith is not a nostalgic attempt at returning to how
things were “in the old days.” Husserl’s attempt, rather, is a critical approach to renewal, such
that the taken-for-grantedness of our initial everydayness is called into question for the purpose
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of providing appropriate foundations for all of social and political life on the basis of an
explicitly carried out “responsible critique” that reflects on our prejudices.120 Such foundations,
then, are put forth as preferable to those given through naturalistic approaches insofar as the
naturalistic approach led to disaster. For Husserl, it is precisely when all seems to be going
smoothly that we run the risk of forgetting or taking things for granted. It is in such situations
that we face the prospect of crisis. In the context of his writings on linguistic communities, he
draws attention to the “seductions of language” that occur when we simply use language instead
of reflecting on and explicating what we actually mean when using language.121 Even when
events seem to be running efficiently, when there is a social lubrication instead of a social
friction, it is possible that the presuppositions underlying our social world are facing a crisis
insofar as they are not reflected upon and forgotten. Similarly, Husserl draws attention to mere
“communities of influence” where we unquestioningly inherit traditions from others, as opposed
to the pre-eminent “idea of an ‘ethical’ humanity” composed of “reasonable subjects.”122
Unlike “original belief,” the kind of faith that Husserl attempts to renew in the sociocultural sphere is not arrived at automatically. Restoring faith, then, is a matter not of retuning to
an original naivety, but of rigorously reflecting and determining the basis of what community life
should be like. As Husserl writes:
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We are men, free-willing subjects who are actively engaged in our surrounding world,
constantly involved in shaping it. Whether we want to or not, whether it is right or wrong,
we act in this way. Could we not also act rationally? Do not rationality and efficiency
stand within our power?123

It is clear that efficiency is well within our power, with Husserl pointing out the hidden nature of
crises as being cloaked by practical successes. It is another kind of power, however, to act in a
collectively rational fashion where rationality refers to thinking and willing with insight into why
things are done a certain way. The only way Husserl thinks this faith can be renewed is by
reforming human reason and willing, where such a reformation amounts to seeking out and
eliminating all forms of prejudice and taken-for-grantedness. On this account, we need to
transform our faith into “prudent, rationally insightful ideas” bringing “complete determination
and clarity to the essence and possibility of its goal and of the method by which it is to be
attained.”124 In the “Vienna Lecture,” he concludes by suggesting that the correct path to follow
in the face of the potential dissolution of European humanity (that is, in the face of socio-cultural
crisis) is a renewal in the form of a “heroism of reason” (Heroismus der Vernunft) that combats a
lack of community faith towards the overcoming of naturalism. What we stand to gain from such
heroism is a “new life-inwardness (Lebens-innerlichkeit) and spiritualization.”125 In both cases,
we encounter the possibility of a community dissolution, where the community’s bonds are in

Hua XXVII, p. 4 (Kaizo 1, p. 326): “Wir sind Menschen, frei wollende Subjekte, die in ihre Umwelt tätig
eingreifen, sie beständig mitgestalten. Ob wir wollen oder nicht, ob schlecht oder recht, wir tun so. Können wir es
nicht auch vernünftig tun, steht Vernünftigkeit und Tüchtigkeit nicht in unserer Macht?”
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Hua XXVII¸ p. 5 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “Der uns erfüllende Glaube — bei unserer Kultur dürfe es nicht sein
Bewenden haben, sie könne und müsse durch Menschenvemunft und Menschenwillen reformiert werden — kann
doch nur dann nicht in bloßer Phantasie, sondern in Wirklichkeit „Berge versetzen“, wenn er sich in nüchterne
rational einsichtige Gedanken umsetzt, wenn er sich in ihnen Wesen und Möglichkeit seines Ziels und der es
realisierenden Methode zu vollkommener Bestimmtheit und Klarheit bringt.”
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need of a boost in the form of a more rationally grounded faith in that community. The overlap
between this and a renewal through reason highlights the importance that Husserl places upon
reciprocal corrections and affirmations in the case of communalization.126
As Buckley points out, Husserl’s turn to the “lifeworld” is in part to be understood as an
attempt to do away with the overly simplistic or reductive characterizations of the world as put
forth, for instance, by the naturalistic physical sciences.127 On Husserl’s account, what began for
researchers such as early mathematicians and geometers as well-understood “formulaemeanings,” have over time become formulae characterized as mere “symbolic meanings” whose
full meanings are not understood by the individuals who use them.128 Luhmann referred to trust
as one of the ways in which the complexity of social relationships is productively reduced,
similar to Husserl’s account of the shift to the ease of merely symbolic meanings.129 When we
trust other people and our environments, we reduce the kinds of social friction that we would
otherwise be wrapped up in, as highlighted by social capital theorists. Just as it is a possibility for
scientific formulae and even language to act as a “garb of ideas”130 that make it possible to
signify and function without going back to “the things themselves,” so too can trust cover over
something that is quite complex and ordinarily taken for granted. Buckley highlights that for
Husserl, smooth functioning is not itself an indication of an individual or institution being

“In this communalization, too, there constantly occurs an alteration of validity through reciprocal correction.”
Crisis, p. 163.
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rationally grounded.131 There are certain cases where we have a certain level of trust towards
others in public. This was seen in Jones’s notion of high levels of basal security understood as
arising through a combination of both nature and nurture. This is no guarantee that we should
trust in those ways, however, and it is no guarantee that such trust is itself an innocent thing.
Trust is similar to faith as Husserl describes it in the context of community life. This is
not to equate the two but it highlights that both of them can involve approaches to the sociocultural world that are “blind.” In cases of both blind trust and blind faith, we proceed
unquestioningly. There is no calling into question of our prejudices.132 There is not an initial
reflection on what is undertaken or any kind of drawn out rationalization of our actions; we “just
do it” as things are done within our tradition. This kind of naturally arising trust, akin to Jones’s
notion of basal security, fits the bill for the kind of phenomena that has the potential to smuggle
in crises as understood by Husserl. We trust in these ways automatically, but should we trust in
those ways? Consider Brison and Jones again. In the situations they describe there was an initial
trust that was then severely betrayed through an attack. What this elucidates for Jones is the
existence of an underlying trust that three-place models presuppose. This in itself is an important
realization in the context of philosophically understanding trust in general as well as
strengthening Gilbert’s quick treatment of trust. The spirit of Husserl’s project of renewal as
described here goes even further by calling into question the taken-for-granted presuppositions of
our everyday attitudes, which for present purposes includes a kind of blind trust. An approach to
trust proceeding in Husserlian fashion questions the possibilities of trust facing a crisis within
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our particular socio-cultural horizons. This amounts to asking whether the social and political
structures in the surrounding world are themselves rationally founded such that community
members are all fully aware of their institutions, of whether we can all provide reasons to
endorse how things are done or whether our institutions harbor prejudices.133
What reason might members of a community have to not trust others in impersonal and
anonymous communities? Appealing to the contemporary world, there are culturally embedded
forms of racism, sexism, ableism, and so forth. Community members may through their
upbringing attain a sense of trust understood as basal security, but insofar as this trust can be
betrayed through malicious institutional biases and “-isms,” there are components of our takenfor-granted world that must be scrutinized through a “responsible critique” that aims to root out
all prejudices. Furthermore, it is possible that these kinds of prejudices exist as blindspots to
those who happen to successfully attain a certain level of basal security. Just as Husserl
highlights the ways in which the “mathematization of nature” acts as a “garb of ideas” allowing
for misguided attempts to conceptualize the surrounding world of the ancient Greeks in similar
terms, so too is it possible that starting with an understanding of trust as basal security as the
default, normal position covers over the experiences of those who belong to a community
marked by distrust.
Insofar as trust is an attitude directed at the freedom of other persons, it is impossible in
principle to reach a guarantee that trust will be fulfilled; betrayal is an essential possibility for all

Husserl’s reflections on these topics suggest that such rational, reflective insight will eliminate certain evils. Put
otherwise, this approach attempts to root out evils that arise on the basis of forgetfulness as opposed to injustices
brought about intentionally. More would have to be said to address the latter, regarding mindfully-held, malicious
injustices.
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forms of trust. Nevertheless, some betrayals of trust can be mitigated through the work of
seeking to eliminate implicit, malicious biases that come to exist in our cultural communities. A
critical approach to socio-cultural renewal as pursued from a Husserlian standpoint is not an
approach that optimistically seeks a silver lining amidst the rubble of socio-cultural crises.134
Husserl’s position is not embodied in the phrase: “When life gives you lemons, make lemonade.”
Nor is it embodied in the phrase: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.”
The radicality of Husserl’s approach to tacit crises, rather, is closer to asking questions like:
“What are the historical events and presuppositions that have led to this experience we have of
lemons here and now?” Or: “What are the historical conditions of possibility that allow for
anyone to be fooled in these ways in the first place?” Transposed to trust, this amounts to
reflecting on the communities we live in with an eye to how actually existing patterns of trust
and betrayal have become what they are in the present. On Husserl’s account, the dangerous
consequences of prejudices arise so long as they are unreflected upon in critical fashion, and this
is because of the kinds of unclear horizons that characterize the natural attitude:

However, such clarity is by no means easy to attain. The skeptical pessimism and the
shamelessness of the political sophistry which so ominously dominates our age, and
which only uses socioethical argumentation as a disguise for the egotistical goals of an
utterly degenerate nationalism, would not be possible at all if the community's concepts,
which have arisen naturally, were not, despite their naturalness, afflicted with dark and
unclear horizons and with intricate and hidden implications whose clarification lies
completely beyond the powers of untrained thinking.135
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Brison (1993) makes a similar point in response to those who suggested to her that there could be some positive
upshot to having undergone experiences of sexual violence.
Hua XXVII, p. 5 (Kaizo 1, p. 327): “Solche Klarheit ist aber keineswegs leicht zu gewinnen. Jener skeptische
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If betrayals of trust are prevalent such as in climates that allow for the emergence of patterns of
sexual, racist, or other forms of violence, the question becomes how we can move in the
direction of a more rational foundation for social interactions and institutions instead of the kinds
of unclarity and forgetfulness that pose such threats. The features of trust and betrayal can be
made salient either through dramatic interruptions or through more tacit means. In both cases,
however, approaching crises of trust in a Husserlian fashion provides one way in which
communities can be made aware of themselves as wholes that exist in the form of a tradition.
This is a positive achievement for Husserl in both instances insofar as such communities with
reflective members belongs to the kinds of communities that he takes to be most “preeminent”136 and the most genuinely ethical.137
§5. Conclusion: Returning to Gilbert
In §2, I identified a difficulty in Gilbert’s work regarding inadequate attention being paid
to the notions of trust and betrayal. This was shown to be a difficulty for her account of political
obligations in general insofar as the trust she describes remains unclarified in the context of
impersonal and anonymous communities. A promising candidate for the kind of trust missing in
Gilbert’s work was proposed from the work of Karen Jones in the notion of trust understood as
basal security. Jones’s conception was enriched by turning to Husserl’s phenomenology, looking
especially at Husserl’s concept of “crisis” as a notion running counter to trust. Appealing to

Natürlichkeit nicht mit dunklen Horizonten behaftet wären, mit verwickelten und verdeckten Mittelbarkeiten, deren
klärende Auseinanderlegung die Kräfte des ungeschulten Denkens völlig übersteigt.”
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Husserl’s notion of socio-cultural renewal, it was suggested that the apparent positivity of trust in
its original, pre-betrayal sense is itself something capable of being critically reflected upon. In
closing, I show what Gilbert stands to gain from this enriched conception of the experiences of
trust and betrayal.
By embracing conceptions of trust beyond the three-place model, Gilbert would
consistently put forth a plural subject account of impersonal and anonymous communities while
also accounting for a “mediated “consciousness of the group’s unity in the experiences of
members. Trust and betrayal, therefore, are to be found not just in our encounters with other
individual persons, but also in mediated form in our experiences within the socio-cultural
surrounding world. For that reason, Gilbert would do well to widen her criteria for being
conscious of the unity of a social group to include instances in which members are only
indirectly aware of others through experiences of their surrounding worlds. More specifically in
the context of trust and betrayal, this would amount to providing an account of the ways in which
different levels of trust (understood as levels of basal security) amount to different levels of
salience regarding experiences both of other persons and of our surrounding world at large.
The formulation of Jones’s theory was motivated by a reflection on the worldconstituting effects in the experiences of survivors of terrorist attacks or sexual violence. Gilbert
is of course aware of the possibility of betrayals of trust, and her notion of joint commitments is
such that fellow members of a jointly-committed plural subject are to be rebuked for violating
the kinds of standing that all members of the group have in relation to one another. Gilbert
examines, for example, what happens in the case of a marriage where one partner cheats on the
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other.138 In this case, there was originally a joint commitment that constituted the marriage as a
plural subject. This is implicitly put forth in the form of a three-place relation: partner A trusts
partner B with valued thing C. The cheating of a spouse, however, betrays the joint commitment,
leading to the possibility of its dissolution. As Jones makes clear, there is a qualitative shift that
comes along with certain forms of severe betrayals of trust. Beyond just the dissolution of a
particular joint commitment, some severe betrayals alter the experiential salience of objects and
states of affairs, as well as our socio-cultural worlds at large. This qualitative shift brought the
notion of basal security to the fore as an important facet of trust beyond three-place relations.
Gilbert’s discussion of betrayal focuses on cases of trust being betrayed by individuals in
the contexts of specific joint commitments. If we take the features of impersonality and
anonymity seriously, then it is possible for us to be betrayed by unknown others, or even of
others that we never know exist. If we are betrayed either by strangers or by individuals we never
even encounter, it remains possible for this betrayal to find its place in experiences of objects and
states of affairs in the wider horizons of the socio-cultural surrounding world. In the language of
Gilbert’s framework, this occurs in the context of background, population common knowledge.
It is already helpful to supplement Gilbert’s notion of “standing” by appeal to social capital
notions of “thin trust,” or the notions of “networks” and “climates” of trust as seen in Baier and
Becker. Given the specific difficulty I have identified in Gilbert’s work, though, it is Jones’s
conception of trust as “basal security” that best remedies the gap left open in an account of
impersonal and anonymous communities. The notion of trust as basal security is productively
enriched through contact with Husserlian phenomenology. We thereby arrive at the possibility
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for a critical renewal of components of a population’s common knowledge. Given the extent to
which such common knowledge or a shared surrounding world factors into the discussion of trust
and betrayal, it is clear that appealing to joint commitments alone will not entirely guarantee the
goal of the peaceful progress of community members’ lives. With these supplementations,
Gilbert’s plural subject theory of political obligations is strengthened, all while nevertheless
sticking to the fundamental tenets of her social-ontological approach.

CONCLUSION

In my introduction, I wrote that this dissertation would serve as an answer to two
questions. The first question was: What exactly does Husserl mean when he writes about
community? The second question was: What relevance does Husserl’s concept of community
have to problems in social and political philosophy? With the five chapters put forth here, I hope
to have provided sufficient answers to both questions. Each of the previous chapters has its own
argument, but they are unified in support of my main claim. Husserl’s concept of personal
community is grounded in his theory of parts and wholes.
When Husserl writes about communities, from the perspectives of both ontology and
phenomenology, he appeals to his theory of parts and wholes. Individual persons are thereby
considered as parts of the community wholes to which they belong. On Husserl’s account, there
are different ways in which parts factor into wholes, and this is reflected in the different kinds of
community groupings that Husserl describes. There are several advantages that accrue to
Husserl’s concept of community on the basis of his appeal to mereology. As argued in Chapter I,
his ontology of community provides an attractive alternative to traditional accounts of
community, namely, ontological individualism and ontological holism. Chapter II argued that
Husserl’s use of “mereological proximity” in the context of his descriptions of community allow
him to have not just a single ontological account of all social groups, but provides him with
criteria for distinguishing between “anonymous” and “intimate” types of communities. In
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Chapter III, an account was given of the way that Husserl describes the complex intentional
experiences that persons have in belonging to communities.
The turn to the social and political sphere was accomplished by appeal to the philosophy
of Margaret Gilbert, specifically her plural subject theory of political obligations. Chapter IV
demonstrated a difficulty with Gilbert’s account and offered a Husserlian supplement to that
difficulty. More specifically, it was shown that Husserl’s mereological concept of community
was able to account for the kinds of experiences had by members of communities with the
features of impersonality and anonymity. In Chapter V, this line of argumentation was pushed in
an even more specific direction by showing the extent to which Husserl’s concept of community
comes to bear on the topic of trust within political communities. In closing, an argument was
given for the contribution that Husserl’s approach to socio-cultural renewal in the face of takenfor-granted traditions makes to the topic of trust and betrayal. Chapters IV and V taken together
strengthen Gilbert’s theory of political obligations while also demonstrating the fruitfulness of
Husserlian phenomenology to the social and the political domain.
When all goes peacefully, it is easy to miss out on the complexity of community life. The
extent to which our experiences are intertwined with others is not always immediately apparent.
When things stop going smoothly or when violence prevents peacefulness from arising in the
first place, it becomes all too clear that communities and experiences therein are fragile. By
elucidating the ontological structure of community and the structures of our experiences of
community life, Husserl provides us with some opportunities. One opportunity we are given is to
appreciate this complexity, to marvel at the achievement of community in our interpersonal
relationships and in our relations to the socio-cultural surrounding world at large. A more
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pressing opportunity is given to us, however, insofar as this elucidation shows some of the ways
in which we can “get our hands dirty.” Husserl writes that all communities are “many-headed,”
but that need not entail those communities are inevitably “headless.” Bringing about
communities that represent a “higher form of life” requires community members to rigorously
and responsibly strive to bring about unity on the basis of multiplicity. This means responding to
the historical traditions that have been handed down to us in order to root out taken-for-granted
prejudices that threaten our communities from the inside.
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